

BRHADĀRANYAKOPANIṢAD-
BHĀṢYA-VĀRTIKA

2.1

Ajātaśatru Brāhmaṇa

तद्धेदमित्यविज्ञातप्रत्यक्तत्त्वादिदं जगत् ।
रज्ज्वां सर्पादिवज्जातं नामरूपक्रियात्मकम् ॥१॥

(In the words) *tad dhedam* ...¹ (is described) this world as having the nature of name, form and activity, since the truth (or, true nature) of the inner self has not been known—this (origin) is as (that of a) serpent etc.² (which seems to) become born from (lit. in, i.e. in the place of) a rope.³ [1]

This is a statement in an extremely brief form, of what was discussed in BU 1.4.

¹This has a reference to BU 1.4.7.

²The word etc. stands for other objects like a piece of silver, a double moon and such other objects which are seen (or perceived) in a misapprehension (or, superimposition, i.e. falsely conceived objects).

³It appears that, for the sake of metre, Sureśvara has used *rajjvām* in the place of *rajjvādaṁ* which was necessary (or required) in view of *sarpādi*.

अनिश्चिता यथा रज्जुरन्धकारे विकल्पिता ।
सर्पधारादिभिर्भावैस्तद्वदात्मा विकल्पितः ॥२॥

“As a rope, which is not determined (as such), is, in darkness, mistaken for (various) becomings, viz. a serpent or a stream (of water)—in the same way is the Ātman (variously) conceived.” [2]

This is *Gauḍapāḍakārikā* 2.17. It is adduced as an authoritative support for what is said in the preceding verse.

अनर्थहेतुरज्ञानं तदुत्थं चाखिलं जगत् ।
प्रतीचोऽनर्थ इत्यस्माद्वीतोऽत्यर्थं मुमुक्षति ॥३॥

The cause of the undesirable is ignorance¹ and the entire world is the product of that.² An individual³ intensely seeks to release himself (from it,⁴) since that is the undesirable for the inner self.⁵

[3]

¹Translation follows AnSS edition. NKL edition reads *anarthahetur ajñātaḥ* 'The cause of the undesirable is not known, (i.e. identified).' The use of the word 'undesirable' is to indicate the final opinion of the Vedānta on Avidyā.

²Literally, has arisen from that ignorance.

³Individual means a human being of the transmigratory world—in reality 'the product of Avidyā'.

⁴It can refer *either* to the undesirable effects of ignorance *or* to ignorance itself.

⁵The inner self refers to the sentience within an individual's body.

पुरुषार्थोऽखिलानर्थप्रध्वस्तिः प्रत्यगात्मनः ।
सम्यक्तत्त्वपरिज्ञानं पुरुषार्थस्य कारणम् ॥४॥

For the inner self,¹ the end of life² is the removal³ of all the undesirable; (indeed) the effective means⁴ to the end of one's life is the complete⁵ (*pari*) correct⁶ knowledge of the truth⁷ about it.

[4]

This states how every individual self is beset with the undesirable.

¹Here, it stands for an individual in the transmigratory world.

²Literally, the end of human life; the desired achievement of a human being.

³Literally, destruction. Yet, 'removal' means securing release from all evils of worldly life.

⁴*kāraṇam* could mean 'efficient cause'. Yet the words 'the effective means' are used for effectively removing every evil and thereby serving to effect the overall achievement of final release.

⁵The preposition *pari* is significant; it refers to the knowledge of the nature of the bondage for the inner self and its effects as well.

⁶*samyak* precludes the views of other non-Vedāntic thinkers.

⁷Truth stands for the true knowledge of everything which has appeared to have been associated with the inner self.

निरस्ताशेषानर्थाप्तकृत्स्नाह्लादसतत्त्वकः ।

स्वतो यतोऽयं संसारी तेनाज्ञो विपरीतदृक् ॥५॥

Since this transmigratory being is by its nature¹ of the nature of one that has obtained the entire delight after having dispelled away every undesirable (effect), therefore, the one who has not known (the true nature of it)² sees (all this)³ otherwise.⁴

[5]

This states why *tattvaparijñāna* in verse 4 secures the end of human life.

¹Or literally, by itself. That is to say: not made so by any other agency.

²This refers to the transmigratory being, though it finally signifies the inner self.

³'All this' means 'whatever is known as worldly thing or being'.

⁴This refers to the effect of Avidyā, i.e. the inner self which is taken to be an individual being, possessing various belongings and passing under different vicissitudes (i.e. phases) of life.

मोहमात्रान्तरायत्वात्पुरुषार्थस्य नापरम् ।

अविद्याध्वंसिनो बोधात्किञ्चित्साधनमिष्यते ॥६॥

Since, (securing) the end of human life has only ignorance¹

as its hindrance, therefore, there is not accepted (in Vedānta) any means other than knowledge² as the destroyer of ignorance. [6]

This verse sets aside the idea of any other means to *mokṣa*.

¹This verse uses both *moha* and *avidyā* as synonyms.

²This is *samyaktattvaparijñāna* of verse 4 above. The other means could be, according to SP, either *prasaṅkhyāna* (NKL: *dhīsamuccita karman*) or *karman* (NKL: *kevala karman*).

आत्मेत्येवेति विद्यायाः सूत्रमित्युदितं पुरा ।
उपोद्धातस्तथा तस्य प्रागुक्तः सप्रयोजनः ॥७॥

Earlier, there has been stated the principal thought¹ of the lore (of the Ātman)² in the words *ātmety eva ...*; so also (*tathā*) the introductory to it has been already (*prāk*) stated, together with its purpose.³ [7]

This brings out clearly the meaningfulness of BU 1.4.

¹*sūtram* is here the principal thought which is enunciated at BU 1.4.7.

²Here only 'lore' is referred to; it means Ātmavidyā or Brahavidyā—cf. verse 9 below.

³This appears to be understood from *tad etat padanīyam asya sarvasya yad ayam ātmā* in BU 1.4.7 up to *ātmā hy eṣāṃ sa bhavati* in BU 1.4.10. This long passage is described as the *prayojana* in SP thus: *ākṣepapūrvakaṃ prayojanaṃ tad āhur ityādāv uktam ity āha*. The reference seems to be to BUB 1.4.9.

प्रतीचि साक्षाद्विज्ञाते ज्ञेयं सर्वं समाप्यते ।
निःशेषतस्तमोऽवस्तेः पुमर्थश्च समाप्यते ॥८॥

When the inner self is directly¹ known, all that is to be known is obtained² (and thus), as the entire darkness³ is destroyed, the end of (a human being's) life is obtained. [8]

This stresses upon the purposefulness of *pratyaktattvavijñāna*.

¹This refers to one's experience or realisation (*anubhavāvagati*); cf. BSB *brahmāvagatir hi puruṣārthaḥ* (i.e. *mokṣaḥ*) (1.1.1, pp. 77-78).

²Here 'obtained' has the meaning of 'known'—(also elsewhere) the latter one means 'secured or got'.

³It stands metaphorically for ignorance which is referred to as *moha* and also as *Avidyā* in verse 6 above.

यत एवमतः पश्येदात्मन्यात्मानमद्वयम् ।
आत्मैको ब्रह्मविद्याया विषयः श्रुतितो मतः ॥९॥

Since this is so, therefore, one should see within one's self¹ the Ātman, which has no duality.² (Indeed), only the Ātman has been known from the Śruti as the object (i.e. the subject matter) of the lore of the Brahman.³ [9]

¹This refers to the inner self of one who is desirous of liberation. The Ātman here is, at least at the verbal level, different from the Ātman which is subsequently identified as the Brahman.

²To complete, add: (associated with it).

³This line accepts the worldly dealing (*vyavahāra*) of language, i.e. the knower-knowable relation understood from the use of words. This suggests the greatness of the Ātman (cf. SP: *svamahimapratiṣṭhatvārthaṁ viśinaṣṭi*).

अथ योऽन्यामिति तथाविद्यां चानूद्य नश्वरीम् ।
आध्यायावसितेः कार्यं तस्या व्याख्यातमञ्जसा ॥१०॥

Then, in the words *atha yo 'nyām ...*,¹ (the Upaniṣad or Śruti) first makes a statement² about the perishable³ ignorance and has, in the natural course,⁴ explained fully its⁵ effect up to the end of the Adhyāya.⁶ [10]

This explains *anarthahetu* understood in verse 3 above.

¹This refers to BU 1.4.10: *atha yo 'nyām devatām upāste ...*

na sa veda.

²*anūdyā* literally means 'having restated'. But here the reference is to the clear statement of/about Avidyā.

³It signifies the destructible nature of Avidyā.

⁴Literally, smoothly, or in a straight manner.

⁵This refers to Avidyā.

⁶That is, up to the end of BU 1.6 (i.e. first Adhyāya).

अध्यात्ममधिभूतं च तथा चैवाधिदैवतम् ।
 भूतं भवद्विष्यं च साध्यं साधनमेव च ।
 जनिमत्सर्वमेवेदमविद्यायाः समुत्थितम् ॥११॥
 संक्षिप्य चाप्युपन्यस्तमध्यायान्ते च तत्पुनः ॥१२॥
 त्रयं वा इदमित्येवं रूपं नाम च कर्म च ।
 त्रयस्यापि च संक्षेपो लिङ्गदेहात्मसंहतिः ॥१३॥
 त्रैलोक्यात्मशरीर्येष विश्वरूपः प्रजापतिः ।
 अन्तर्णीताखिलानन्तदेवतः प्राणविग्रहः ॥१४॥

What pertains to a body, what to the sphere of the elements, what again to the sphere of deities; what (belonged) to the past, what is of the present and what is going to be;¹ what is the means and also what the end(s); whatever has an origin²—all this, which has arisen from ignorance, [11] is indeed³ presented again at the end of that Adhyāya after giving it in brief. [12]

(And) thus in *trayam vā idam* ...⁴ the triad of form, name and action is stated in brief,⁵ a conglomeration of the subtle body and the Ātman. [13]

(That is to say: This is) Prajāpati, (later) assuming various (lit. all) forms, possessed of a body in the form of the triad of worlds⁶ and having a manifestation (lit. body) in Prāṇa⁷ with all the deities⁸ concealed within. [14]

This is a brief statement of the contents of the Saptāṇṇa Brāhmaṇa, i.e. BU 1.5 and 1.6. Verse 14 explains the contents of verse 12.

¹Or literally, what is becoming. *bhaviṣya* is for *bhaviṣyat*.

²Literally, what has a birth.

³*ca*, used twice in verse 12, stands for emphasis, conveyed only once by 'indeed'.

⁴Read BU 1.6.1: *trayaṃ vā idam ...*

⁵Read BU 1.6.3: *tad etat trayam ...* and this refers to the *kāryakāraṇasaṃghāta* (SP).

⁶This refers to the *kārya* as a whole, the embodied (subtle form, viz. the Sūtrātman).

⁷This refers to the sentience in a body.

⁸Reference is thus made to the organs and the deities superintending over them.

अविज्ञातात्मतत्त्वः संस्तदध्यस्ताभिमानवान् ।

पराक्प्रवृत्तेर्विरतो विद्याया विषयस्त्वयम् ॥१५॥

साक्षात्कृतात्मभावोऽयमेवंलक्षणवस्तुनि ।

श्रुत्योपस्थाप्यते गार्ग्यो ब्रह्मविद्याभिधित्सया ॥१६॥

This one (viz. Gārgya), being one who has not known the true nature of the Ātman, who has had the consciousness (or, ego) of being what is superimposed¹ on it (viz. the Ātman) and who has become averse to action (prescribed by religion), is the person eligible (*viṣaya*)² for the instruction (about the Ātman, i.e. the Brahman). [15]

He has directly understood the Ātman in the thing, which has such nature³ (and therefore) he, Gārgya, is presented by the Śruti (as the *viṣaya*) with the desire to state⁴ the instruction about the Brahman. [16]

This refers to the purpose of the narrative in BU 2.1.

¹This refers to the *lingadehātmasaṃhati* of verse 13 above (which is clarified further) and the consequent misapprehension about the nature of the Ātman.

²*viṣaya* is for *adhikārin*, one of the four Anubandhas of the discussion.

³This refers to verse 14 above.

⁴That is, to expound.

अकृत्स्नब्रह्मवेदित्वाद्दृप्तोऽसावल्पकस्ततः ।
न हि पूर्णपरिज्ञानः कश्चिद्दृष्यति निर्द्वयः ॥१७॥

Since he had not known about the Brahman in its fullness, he was therefore very proud and of less importance.¹ Indeed, one, who possesses complete knowledge (of the Brahman),² is never proud—the one who does not have (any consciousness or awareness of) duality.³ [17]

This explains how Gārgya Ajātaśatru is considered as eligible for receiving instruction regarding the Brahman.

¹This refers to the eligibility of Gārgya as a pupil, i.e. his inferior status as compared to that of Kāśya.

²Refer to verse 4 above.

³Literally, one who has got over (viz. discarded) the notion of duality.

समाप्ताशेषविज्ञेयपुरुषार्थस्तथा परः ।
अजातशत्रुरैकात्म्याद्गार्ग्याचार्यः प्रकल्पते ॥१८॥

So also, the other one, who has obtained¹ (the knowledge of) the entire knowable, which is the (ultimate) end of life, viz. Ajātaśatru can be the preceptor of Gārgya, owing to his (having realised) the singleness of the Ātman. [18]

This answers away the doubt about the non-eligibility of Gārgya for being the preceptor.

¹Namely, known or acquired (the full knowledge of the Ātman).

व्याख्यातायामविद्यायां तदुच्छ्रितावथाधुना ।
आत्मेत्येवेति सूत्रस्य व्याख्या प्रस्तूयते स्फुटा ॥१९॥
श्रुत्या गार्ग्याद्युपन्यासशिष्याचार्यस्वरूपया ।
सुखावबोधसिद्धयर्थमियमाख्यायिकोदिता ॥२०॥

(Thus) when ignorance has been (fully) explained (in the earlier Adhyāya), there is now introduced a clear exposition of the enunciation *ātmety evopāsīta* in order that it (i.e. ignorance) is removed (lit. destroyed). [19]

The Śruti has stated the narrative which has in the introductory (part) a pupil in the form of Gārgya and the preceptor (in the form of Ajātaśatru), for the purpose that an easy understanding (of the lore of the Brahman) is secured. [20]

According to SP, these two verses have the purpose of showing how the narrative in BU 2.1 is fruitful; read SP: *asaṁdigdhā-bādhita-phalavajjñānodayāya*.

Now follows in verses 21-28 the statement of *Bhartṛprapañca* regarding the connection between BU first Adhyāya and BU 2.1 and also the refutation thereof.

अन्ये त्वत्राभिसंबन्धमेवं व्याचक्षते बुधाः ।
 स एष इत्यपन्यस्तो विज्ञानात्मा हि यः पुरा ॥२१॥
 गार्ग्यकार्येतिहासेन वक्ष्यते तस्य निर्णयः ।
 कर्त्र्यो भोक्त्र्यश्च देहेऽस्मिन्देवता एव नापरः ।
 श्रुतिर्गार्ग्यात्मना सेयं पूर्वपक्षमभाषत ॥२२॥
 आत्मनोऽस्तित्वकर्तृत्वभोक्तृत्वप्रतिपत्तये ॥२३॥

The other learned (scholars),¹ however, expound the connection here (i.e. of BU 2.1 to the earlier portion of BU) thus: The knowing inner self (*viññānātman*) which was introduced (in the discussion) earlier, in the words *sa eṣa...*² [21]

has its decision³ stated in the narrative of Gārgya and Kāśya; that is: In this body, the agents (of actions etc.) and the enjoyers are the deities (and it is stated later:⁴) 'not any other'⁵ — thus has the Śruti stated the *prima facie* view in the form (of the words) of Gārgya. [22]

(This, the Śruti has done) for establishing the existence of the Ātman (and) its capacity to do activities and to enjoy

(the fruits thereof).

[23]

¹This use of the plural is possibly in mock respect for Bhartṛprapañca.

²Read *sa eṣa iha praviṣṭaḥ* in BU 1.4.7.

³This is literal translation; it stands for 'fuller and clear explanation'.

⁴Read SP: *aparaśabdād ūrdhvam iti padam adhyāhṛtya pūrvapakṣapadena yojanīyam*. SP adds further (possibly a statement in the commentary of Bhartṛprapañca): *yathāhuh bhoktryaś ca devatāḥ karaṇādhiṣṭhātryaś ca kim anyad vijñānātmanā kāryam asty etasmin darśane sthito gārgyaḥ pūrvapakṣaparigrahāyotthāpyata iti*.

⁵Namely, the Ātman. This is stated with the purpose of averting a doubt about the uselessness of the decision, for already the thought of the *vijñānātman* is clear (NKL).

श्रुत्या सिद्धान्तसिद्धयर्थं काश्यरूपं प्रकल्पितम् ।

निष्फलत्वात्स चायुक्तः प्रकृतानभिसंगतेः ॥२४॥

Then, for proving the Siddhānta, the Śruti has thought of (or, presented) the part of Kāśya. And¹ that (connection) is opposed to reason,² for it does not serve any purpose³ and is not (properly) connected with what has been undertaken (or, begun).⁴

[24]

¹In verse 24cd begins the refutation of Bhartṛprapañca's view.

²The particle *nañ* has the sense of opposition—not the sense of negation.

³That is to say: The Ātman does not have any need to perform any action for an enjoyment or towards an end.

⁴The main purpose of the Śruti is to establish only the singleness of the Ātman—cf. BU 1.4.10: *tad ātmānam evāvet*—and its not having any purpose to achieve. As such, the idea of *karṭṛtva* and *bhokṭṛtva* of the Ātman which Bhartṛprapañca posits, is purposeless (read SP: *na hi jīvasya vāstave karṭṛtvādau*

tatsiddhiḥ— where *tat* refers to *ātmakarṭṛtvādi*). This is clarified in the next verse.

देवतास्तित्वपक्षेऽपि किमस्तित्वादि नेष्यते ।
देहाद्विन्नस्य विज्ञातुरिष्टं चेन्निष्फलः श्रमः ॥२५॥

(One might ask:) “Why not accept the existence etc.¹ (of the Ātman, apart from the gross body) even after accepting the existence (etc.)¹ of the deities (as proposed)?²” (In answer, it is said:) If you thus desire to accept (the existence etc. of) the knower (i.e. *viññātr*) apart from the body, then that effort (to seek to prove that desired end) is purposeless (lit. fruitless).³

[25]

¹The word etc. stands for *karṭṛtva* and *bhokṭṛtva*.

²Cf. verse 22cd above.

³There is thus stated by Sureśvara his view (as opposed to that of Bhartṛprapañca) is free from any blemish. This is clarified in the following two and a half verses.

अज्ञातैकात्म्ययाथात्म्यो यदा त्विह विवक्ष्यते ।
अविद्याकार्यनिष्ठः सञ्श्रुत्या गार्ग्यशरीरया ॥२६॥
पूर्वपक्षितयाशेषदुःखहेतूपशान्तये ।
पूर्वपक्षनिदानच्छिन्नाशयः सिद्धान्तवाद्यपि ॥२७॥
श्रुत्येहोत्थाप्यतेऽशेषवेदान्तार्थावबुद्धये ।
सर्वोऽप्येष तदा यत्नः फलवान्स्यान्न चान्यथा ॥२८॥
श्रद्धाचारादिविध्यर्था यदि वाख्यायिका त्वियम् ।

When (i.e. as against Bhartṛprapañca's view) it is taken that the intention of the Śruti referring to Gārgya,¹ a person given to activities proceeding from ignorance, [26]
as the holder of the *prima facie* view; and, so also, Kāśya as the exponent of the Siddhānta, as the remover (lit. destroyer) of the decision² of the holder of the *prima facie* view, [27]
is mentioned the Śruti so that one knows the entire (or,

complete) meaning of the Vedānta (i.e. Upaniṣad), only then,³ all this effort (of the Śruti) would become meaningful (lit. fruitful), not otherwise. [28]

Or perhaps,⁴ this narrative is introduced for the purpose of laying down an injunction regarding faith and (proper) conduct (of a person) etc.⁵ [29ab]

¹*gārgyaśarīrā śruti* literally means: the Śruti text in the form of (the statement about) Gārgya.

²*nidāna* is taken here for resorting to ignorance which leads to Upāsanās as the *upāya* for *tattvajñāna*.

³That is, in the opinion of the Siddhāntin, viz. Sureśvara's explanation.

⁴Earlier, Sureśvara has clarified the purpose of the narrative in BU 2.1.1ff. and here he states yet another purpose of the same.

⁵'Faith' refers to the proper attitude towards the lore of the Brahman and 'conduct' refers to one's proper method of attaining the same; and *ādi* 'etc.' refers to not resorting to mere reasoning about the Brahman—this last stressing the need of realising the same, cf. *naiṣā tarkeṇa matir āpaneyā* (*Kāthopaniṣad* 1.2.9).

Now follows the exposition of BU 2.1.1 in verses 29-43.

यथोक्तदर्शनाप्तार्थो नान्यदस्तीति भावितः ।

अतोऽतिदृष्टोऽविज्ञातदर्पकारणघस्मरः ॥२९॥

(Gārgya), who (thought, he had) obtained the (true) knowledge (of the Brahman in the three foods) as stated before,¹ came to hold that there (the Brahman) was not other (than himself) and therefore he was very proud and was the destroyer of the cause of the pride which was not known to him. [29c-f]

¹This is in accordance with SP. The meaning is: Prāṇa is known by the names Virāj, Vaiśvānara, Prajāpati, Hiraṇyagarbha and Vijñānātman. This one deity obtains in the other deities

which superintend over the various other organs of the gross body. Therefore, it is the Brahman which is in reality the agent of all actions and the enjoyer of the fruits of the same.

श्रद्धालुं वित्तसंपन्नं श्रेयोऽर्थिनमुपेत्य तु ।
ब्रह्म तेऽहं ब्रवाणीति गार्ग्यः काश्यमभाषत ॥३०॥

Approaching Kāśya,¹ who already² had a faith (in the lore of the Brahman), had obtained the knowledge (of it),³ and was desirous of bliss, Gārgya, said to him, 'Let me tell you (about) the Brahman.' [30]

¹The adjectives of Kāśya are really of one who deserves to impart the instruction about the Brahman.

²This is for *tu*. But SP states: *yogyam adhikāriṇam prati praśnam antareṇāpi prativacanam ucitam iti vaksyamāṇārthasūcanārthas tuśabdah*.

³*vitta* is derived (in this context) from the verb root *vid* 'to know'.

न जातो न भविष्योऽस्ति शत्रुरैकात्म्यदर्शनात् ।
अजातशत्रुः काश्योऽतो गार्ग्यबुद्धिविरुद्धधीः ॥३१॥

Since there was not born, nor would there be (born)¹ and nor is there any enemy (for him), Kāśya, on account of his knowing (lit. seeing) the singleness of the Ātman, was (known as) Ajātaśatru;² therefore, he had an attitude (or faith) which was opposed to (that of) Gārgya. [31]

¹*bhaviṣyaḥ* is for *bhaviṣyan*.

²This is an illustration of the Brāhmaṇical etymology which serves a meaningful purpose.

ब्रह्म यस्मात्परं नास्ति न च वस्त्वन्तरं यतः ।
ब्रवाण्युपास्यं तत्तेऽहं सर्वापध्वस्तिकारणम् ॥३२॥

Since the Brahman is that beyond (or besides) which there is (nothing)¹ and there is no other thing (than that in existence), therefore, let me tell you that which is to be worshipped and that which is the cause of the destruction of all (notions about other things).² [32]

¹This has a basis in the Śruti statement: *yasmāt param nāparam asti kiñcit* (Śvetāśvataropaniṣad 3.9).

²This refers to the result of Brahmajñāna.

नापृष्ट इति नन्वेतद्विरुद्धमकरोदृषिः ।
यद्ब्रह्म ते ब्रवाणीति ह्यपृष्टः काश्यमब्रवीत् ॥३३॥

(One would object:) 'Indeed, the sage did what is opposed to (the instruction of the Smṛti) *nāpṛṣṭaḥ* ...,¹ since he said to Kāśya "Let me tell you about the Brahman," though indeed not asked by him.' [33]

This emphasises the sage's conduct in opposition to the acknowledged religious precept.

¹This has a reference to *Manusmṛti* 2.110:

*nāpṛṣṭaḥ kasyacid brūyān na cānyāyena pṛcchataḥ /
jānann api hi medhāvī jaḍaval loka ācaret //*

दर्पादिदर्शनान्नूनं वेत्त्यकृत्स्नात्मदर्शनम् ।
कृत्स्नत्वार्थमतोऽप्राक्षीत्काश्यं प्रज्ञासमन्वितम् ॥३४॥

(The objection is answered away thus:) 'Indeed, (the sage now) knew himself as having imperfect knowledge of the Ātman (within himself),¹ as has evidence in his pride etc.² Therefore, for securing fullness (of that knowledge), he asked³ Kāśya who was possessed of intellect.'⁴ [34]

¹'Of the Ātman' means 'about the nature of the Ātman'.

²Translation follows SP which states *akṛtsnātmadarśanam svātmānam* (gārgyo vettīti śeṣaḥ)— thus the word *akṛtsnātma-*

darśanam is taken as an adjective of Gārgya. NKL however states *akṛtsnātmadarśanam svam* and that means 'his own incomplete knowledge about the Ātman'—here, *svam* is a qualifier of the noun *akṛtsnātmadarśanam*, a substantive. (This is more likely despite our following SP.)

The word etc. refers to Gārgya's desire to secure full knowledge from Kāśya (i.e. he has *arthitva*) etc. (so SP—does it refer to his affliction on account of his ignorance?); or, better refer to the next verse.

³*aprākṣīt* is a paraphrase of *brāvāṇi* from the verb root *bru* in the sense of 'to ask'—this, in accordance with the well-known acceptance of *dhātūnām anekārthatva*. Read NKL yet: *brāvāṇi ity asya prcchāmi ity arthe prayogād (=lakṣaṇayā ?) avirodhaḥ*.

⁴This does not refer to *buddhīndriya*, it refers to his right knowledge.

श्रद्धालरधिकारी यो जिज्ञासविनयान्वितः ।

अपृष्टैनापि वक्तव्या तस्मै विद्या विपरिचिता ॥३५॥

'(A person), who has faith (in some preceptor) and is possessed of modesty, is eligible (to receive instruction).¹ To such a person instruction is to be imparted (lit. told) by a wise person,² even if he is not requested (lit. asked) by another.'³

[35]

This is to justify Gārgya's doing which can be considered as conforming to the teaching of the Smṛti.

¹These adjectives are significant for pointing out how Gārgya is a proper recipient of the lore of the Brahman. Also, they justify the word *ādi* (in *dārpādi* in the preceding verse). Also read in this context SP's quotations from *Manusmṛti* 2.111 and 114 which prove, by the method of *Vyatireka*, the propriety of these adjectives:

adharmena tu yaḥ prāha yaś cādharmena prcchati /

tayor anyataṛaḥ praiti vidveṣaṃ ca nigacchati //

(The text of *Manusmṛti* however reads ... *vidveṣaṃ vādhi-*

gacchati) and

*vidyā brāhmaṇam ety āha śevadhis te 'smi rakṣa mām /
asūyakāya mām mā dās tathā syāṃ vīryavattamā //*

धर्मार्थौ यत्र न स्यातां शुश्रूषा वापि तद्विधा ।
तत्र विद्या न वक्तव्या शुभं बीजमिवोषरे ॥३६॥
धर्मार्थौ यत्र च स्यातां शुश्रूषा वापि तद्विधा ।
वक्तव्या तत्र विद्येति निषेधादेव लिङ्ग्यते ॥३७॥

That kind¹ of instruction should not be imparted² to him in whom there is no (inclination to the pursuit of) Dharma and Artha, or even a desire to receive (lit. to hear) it; even as a good (lit. auspicious)³ seed (should not be sown) in a barren land. [36]

From the prohibition (by the use of the particle *na*) it is indicated that this kind of instruction should be imparted to him in whom there is (inclination to the pursuit of) Dharma and Artha or even a desire to receive (lit. to hear) it. [37]

These two verses justify the contents of verses 34-35 by the statements involving Anvaya and Vyatireka.

¹*tadvidhā* is paraphrased by SP as *deśakālasāmarthyānurodhinī*.

²This is in conformity with the AnSS and NKL editions. However, *Manusmṛti* uses *vaptavyā* in place of *vaktavyā*— and that is warranted by the simile.

³The word 'auspicious' has the power to convey 'bliss' which attends upon a knower of the lore of the Brahman.

नष्टाश्वदग्धरथवनन्यायं चाश्रित्य भूमिपम् ।
प्राह मानुषवित्ताढ्यं दैववित्तसमन्वितम् ॥३८॥

(Gārgya) replied to the king, in the way (of the maxim) of two persons one of whom has lost the horses and the other (having) burnt a chariot,¹ asking him who was possessed of the human wealth together with the divine wealth.² [38]

This is to justify why Gārgya approached the king, a Kṣatriya. This is one more reason for Gārgya's doing.

¹Read the quotation in SP (possibly from the commentary of Bharṭṛprapañca): *yathāhuḥ— yuktaḥ saṃyogo 'dhikārārthena hetunā naṣṭāśvadagdharathavad iti.*

²Refer to BU 1.4.17.

वित्तद्वयेन संपन्नो यतोऽधिक्रियते नरः ।

सर्वकर्मस्वतोऽवादीद्वालाकिः काश्यमन्तिकात् ॥३९॥

Since a person, possessed of the two kinds of wealth (mentioned above), is stated to be eligible (for the performance) of all (kinds of religious) activities, therefore did the scion of Balāka speak in the presence (lit. nearness) of Kāśya.¹ [39]

¹This is justified by a quotation in SP (again from Bharṭṛprapañca, in all probability): *yathāhuḥ— ubhayavittavato 'sya hy adhikāras tasmād adhikārārthena hetunā yuktam upetya vacanam iti.*

This is the meaning of sahasram etasyām ... in BU 2.1.1.

ब्रह्म तुभ्यं ब्रवाणीतिवाङ्मात्रव्यापृतावहम् ।

गोसहस्रं ददाम्यद्य विनाप्यैकात्म्यनिर्णयात् ॥४०॥

Only on (Gārgya's) uttering the words, 'Let me tell you about the Brahman', (Kāśya said,) 'I shall grant you a thousand cows',—this, even without (his, i.e. the former's) decision regarding the singleness of the Ātman. [40]

This is the purport of janako janakah:

गोसहस्रप्रदानस्य निमित्तं श्रुतिरभ्यधात् ।

जनको जनक इति नामाभ्यासोक्तितः स्फुटम् ॥४१॥

शुश्रूषुं जनकं सर्वे जना दित्सन्तमेव च ।
विवक्षवोऽभिधावन्ति तमुद्दिश्य जिघृक्षवः ॥४२॥

The Śruti has stated the reason for the grant of a thousand cows; (this is) clear from the repeated mention of the name (in the words) *janako janakaḥ*. [41]

All the people, who wish to tell (what they have known), rush unto Janaka, who is desirous of hearing them and also wishing to grant them (gifts of cows etc.), with a desire to accept (lit. receive) the same (from him). [42]

मौढीं प्रसिद्धिमुल्लङ्घ्य गार्ग्योऽयं मामुपागतः ।
नूनं दित्सुं च शुश्रूषुं संभावयति मामपि ॥४३॥

This Gārgya has overlooked the (custom) well-known (even) among the non-learned (or, foolish)¹ and approached me who am indeed, he thinks, desirous of giving (gifts) and of receiving (lit. hearing from him what he wishes to instruct).² [43]

¹This alternative follows the reading *maudhīm* in NKL edition. AnSS reads *maugdhīm* which leads to the translation: the (belief) known among the ignorant, of course, with little difference.

²SP brings out the purport of this thus: *tadīyaṃ vānimātram eva nimittīkr̥tya gosahasradānam ucitam iti bhāvaḥ*.

Now follows the exposition of BU 2.1.2.

आदित्यचक्षुर्बुद्धिस्थश्चेतनः सर्वगो ध्रुवः ।
एतमेव सदोपासे ब्रह्मेति रविमध्यगम् ॥४४॥

The sun, residing in the eye (and) intellect, the sentient one, the one invariably (*dhruvaḥ*)¹ existing in all—this one do I ever worship as the Brahman abiding in the sun.² [44]

This verse explains the meaning(s) of *ya evāsau ...* and (SP adds:) *tvam api yathoktam brahmopāsveti śeṣaḥ*.

Sureśvara's mention of *cakṣus* and *buddhi* is prompted by BUB *ya evāsāv āditye cakṣuṣi caiko 'bhimānī cakṣurdvāreṇha hr̥di praviṣṭo 'ham bhoktā kartā cety avasthitaḥ*. Reference to *cakṣus* and *buddhi* is to the sense-organ (*indriya*) which is the bodily (*adhyātma*) support for Āditya.

¹It should be translated literally as 'the ever abiding, or the unchanged (among all)'.
²*ravimadhyaga* is *prādhānyān nirdeśaḥ*, i.e. as the chief among the objects of worship.

तथा ब्रुवाणं तं गार्ग्यं काश्यो मा मेत्यथोचिवान् ।
 केवलो मतिसंवादो भवदुक्तेर्ममाभवत् ॥४५॥
 न त्वपर्वार्थविज्ञानं प्रतिज्ञातं यथा त्वया ।
 मा वोचोऽतो यतो वेद्मि विनापि वचनात्तव ॥४६॥

To Gārgya, who was thus telling,¹ Kāśya said, 'Do not, (indeed) do not (tell me this);² (for), from your speech, there has been for me only a confirmation of my thought [45] and (*tu*) not any not-before-known³ knowledge as you had promised (to bring to me). Therefore, do not tell (that which) I have (already) known even without your telling.'⁴ [46]

¹'Telling' is for 'speaking about'.

²Alternatively, 'Do not tell me', where one *mā* can be taken for *mām*. But it is better to understand the *vīpsā* 'repetition' of the prohibitive particle *mā*; cf. verse 47 below.

³What Gārgya should have told (i.e. declared or imparted as instruction) should have been *ajñātārthajñāpana*.

⁴But it is already known to Kāśya (*jñātapiūrva*). See the next verse.

निषेधाभ्यासो मा मेति ज्ञातब्रह्मप्रवादिनः ।
 आबाधितधि(?) भि)याभ्यस्तो गार्ग्यस्यानुवितकारणात् ॥४७॥

The repetition of the prohibition by the particle, viz. *mā mā* (lit. prohibition) by the instructor (of the lore) of the Brahman,

who had already known (it), is owing to his fear that it would become stultified¹ on account of the non-statement (about the Brahman) by Gārgya. [47]

¹Here *ābādhitabhī* is accepted for *ābādhitadhī*; yet *ā* in the sense of *īṣat* which is proposed by SP need not be taken seriously.

सुप्रसिद्धं यदस्माकं त्वच्छासनमृतेऽपि तत् ।
नापेक्षते भवद्वाक्यं सिद्धयर्थं प्राक्प्रसिद्धितः ॥४८॥

'That, which has been well known to me even in the absence of (i.e. without) any instruction by you, does not expect (i.e. depend upon) your statement (i.e. saying about it), for establishing (or, imparting) it, since it is already established (for me, i.e. known to me).' [48]

तदुपासां न वेद्मीति मा च शङ्कां कृथा यतः ।
उपासनं च वेद्म्यस्य गुणं तत्फलमेव च ॥४९॥

'Do not also entertain any doubt that I do not know about the worship of that (viz. the Brahman), since I have (already) known about its worship, its¹ excellence and also the result thereof.'² [49]

¹That is, of that worship.

²SP adds here *atiṣṭhāḥ sarveṣāṃ ityādir avatārayati* as introductory to this verse. Actually, that should properly be the introduction of the following two verses.

अतीत्य सर्वभूतानि प्राधान्येन स्थितो यतः ॥५०॥
अतिष्ठा इति नामास्य तेनादित्यात्मनोऽभवत् ।
चक्षुरुद्दीप्तिमत्वाच्च राजेत्येषोऽभिधीयते ॥५१॥

Since this (Brahman Ātman) has remained principally (i.e. as the principal) among them, having surpassed (or, been superior to) all the elements, [50]

therefore, the name of this one, viz. the Ātman of the nature of Āditya 'sun', has been Atiṣṭhā; and also this one is called Rājan 'the king' owing to the eye's possessing extraordinary (ud-) lustre.¹ [51]

These two verses explain the significance of the name Atiṣṭhā—i.e. (i) excelling the elements and (ii) possessing the highest lustre.

¹Translation follows the reading in AnSS edition. NKL edition reads in the text *cakṣurmuddīptimattvāt* (v.l. in AnSS edition) while NKL properly reads *cakṣurmudī[di]ti*, i.e. it is *cakṣurmut* 'dazzling the eye, (i.e. stealing the power of the eye), *dīptimattvāt* 'on account of its possessing lustre'. (Or, causing delight to the eye, if *-mud* is accepted.)

स य एतं यथोद्दिष्टमुपास्तेऽहर्निशं नरः ।
यथोपासनमेवास्य फलं भवति नान्यथा ॥५२॥

He, who day and night worships this one, as described here, has for himself only that fruit (as described) to be in consonance with (*yathā*) the worship (which he has offered), not otherwise. [52]

This explains the words in the BU sentence *sa ya etam*

Now follows the exposition of BU 2.1.3.

मतिसंवाददोषेण काश्येनोत्सारिते रवौ ।
गाय्यो ब्रह्मान्तरं राज्ञे प्रवक्तुमुपचक्रमे ॥५३॥

After (the notion of the Brahman) in respect of the sun¹ was rejected by Kāśya through (the fault of) its (merely) conforming to his (already known) thought, Gārgya proceeded to tell the king (about) another (form of the) Brahman. [53]

This is the purport of *sa hovāca ... candre puruṣaḥ*

चन्द्रे मनसि बुद्धौ च ब्रह्मोपासेऽहमद्वयम् ।
 भानुमण्डलतो यस्माद्विगुणं चन्द्रमण्डलम् ।
 बृहन्निति ततश्चन्द्रः प्रमाणेनाभिधीयते ॥५४॥

(He said,) 'I worship the Brahman, which does not have duality (in it), in the moon, the *manas*¹ and the intellect; (and) since the orb of the moon is (of a size) double (that) of the orb of the sun; therefore is the moon called Br̥hat,² in accordance with the magnitude³ (of its size). [54]

Sureśvara's mention of *manasi buddhau ca* is prompted by BUB: *ya evāsau candre manasi caikaḥ bhoktā kartā ceti pūrvavad viśeṣaṇam* (cf. under verse 44 above). Here, *manas* and *buddhi* are the insentient support for Candra.

¹The word *manas* is retained in the translation, though usually they translate it as 'mind'. The two words have different imports, the first does not show any trace of sentience associated with it whereas the latter is (certainly) associated with it.

²This is to point out the significance of the address Br̥hat (nominative form *br̥han*) an adjective of the moon-Brahman.

³The reference to this magnitude is known from *Brahmāṇḍa Purāṇa* 1.24.99cd-100 (SP states the text:)

navayojanasāhasro viṣkambhaḥ savituh smṛtaḥ //
dvigūṇas tasya vistāro maṇḍalasya pramāṇataḥ //
dvigūṇaḥ sūryavistārād vistāraḥ śaśinaḥ smṛtaḥ //

अम्भोऽतिपाण्डरं वासो यस्माच्चन्द्राभिमानिनः ।
 तस्मात्पाण्डरवासाः स्यात्सोमः सौम्यत्वकारणात् ॥५५॥
 ज्योत्स्नया राजतेऽत्यर्थं सोमो ब्राह्मणराजतः ।
 सोमो राजेत्यतो वक्ति तदुपासाविधित्सया ॥५६॥

Since the garment of the one who identifies¹ himself with the moon is extremely pellucid (lit. clear-white) water, therefore that one is² described as one clad in white; (also that one is) called Soma for the reason of being (very) mild (gentle).

[55]

Thanks to *jyotsnā* , Soma shines exceedingly and, therefore, on account of silver(-like brightness of a) Brāhmaṇa, (the Śruti) describes it thus: (viz.) Soma (is) the king³—this, with a desire to prescribe the worship of that.⁴

[56]

This explains the words in the BU: *pāṇḍaravāsāḥ somo rājā* which describe the moon-Brahman.

¹This word gives the meaning of the literal expression 'having the awareness of being (the moon)'.

²*syāt* is taken for *asti*, according to the Vedic usage.

³Refer to *somo rājā* ... thus twice in this Brāhmaṇa and cf. BU 6.2.14; CU 5.4.2, 5.10.4; *Kauṣītakyupaniṣad* 4.3; *Jaiminīyopaniṣad* 3.21.2.

⁴The last clause states the result (lit. fruit) of the worship of the moon having the four significant names (i.e. adjectives): *br̥hat*, *pāṇḍaravāsas*, *soma* and *rājan*.

तुल्याभिधानधर्मत्वाल्लता सोमोऽपि गृह्यते ।
उभयोर्देवतैकत्वादुपास्यं तेन तद्द्वयम् ॥५७॥

A creeper (called Soma, i.e. Soma plant) also is taken as Soma (i.e. moon),¹ on account of their having properties² (which are) of the same description and, therefore, since both have (but) one deity (to superintend over them), the two of them are to be worshipped,³ (only as one deity). [57]

This states another meaning of the word Soma, viz. a plant of that name; this is beside the 'moon'.

¹NKL reads thus: *latāsome 'pi hr̥savṛddhyākhyo dharmo 'pi vidyate dvitripatrādirūpeṇa vṛddhēr ity arthaḥ*.

²SP clarifies these as *vṛddhi* 'waxing in size or fattening' and *hr̥sa* 'waning in size or withering away'. NKL points out that, in the case of the creeper-(moon) the appearance of one leaf, a second leaf and a third and so on go to show the *vṛddhi*.

³SP adds: *prāṇātmanaikīkr̥tya* 'having identified (each) with

Prāṇa (i.e. the vital force) in the body'.

एषैका देवता विभ्वी प्रत्येकार्थावसायिनी ।
भोक्त्री कर्त्री च सर्वत्र तस्य भोज्यमतोऽपरम् ॥५८॥

This (viz. the moon) is the only one deity, which is (all-)pervading and accomplishes¹ the purpose of each (of the two); so also, it is the enjoyer and the agent everywhere² and everything else is therefore the object of (its) enjoyment. [58]

This verse explains the nature of the deity of Soma in each of its senses.

¹That is, the deity, i.e. the moon, secures the purpose of each (of the orb of the moon and the plant).

²That is, in all the cases relevant upon each sense of Soma.

ब्रह्मैषा सर्वसंव्याप्तेरात्मेत्येतामुपास्महे ।

This (deity)¹ is the Brahman, since it encompasses (or, pervades) all—we worship this one as the Ātman. [59ab]

This points out that Prāṇa (i.e. the vital force) has to be taken as the Ātman—the Brahman which cannot be *bhojya*, viz. that which consists in food.

¹*devatā* is implied by *eṣā*.

Verses 59cd and 60 point to the general meaning of the various alternative notions of Gārgya about the Brahman (in *paryāya* 3 onwards).

व्याख्या तुल्यैव विज्ञेया सर्ववाक्येषु पूर्ववत् ॥५९॥
गुणो यत्र हि यः पुंसो नाम्ना संभाव्यतेऽत्र तु ।
फलं तदेव तस्य स्यात्सर्ववाक्येषु निर्णयः ॥६०॥

In all the (remaining) sentences (i.e. *paryāyas* of Gārgya about

the Brahman), one should know that the explanation (of each) is similar to what is given before (i.e. in respect of the first two *paryāyas*). [59cd]

And (*tu*) here (i.e. in respect of each) what(ever) property be understood (or, considered as possible) in whichever (of the *paryāyas*) is itself the result (lit. fruit) of that¹—this is² the decision in respect of all the sentences. [60]

¹This refers to the worship meant in respect of the so-called Brahman, possessed of that property.

²*syāt* is to be taken as *asti*.

BU 2.1.4 is now under reference.

This verse explains the significance of the third paryāya, viz. vidyut.

भानुचन्द्रमसोस्तेजो जलदैरभिभयते ।
विद्युत्तत्राप्यतितरां तेजस्वी तेन विद्युति ॥६१॥

The lustre of (each of) the sun and the moon is overpowered (i.e. covered or concealed) by the clouds;¹ but there (i.e. in the clouds) lightning (shines) exceedingly;² therefore, the lustrous (*puruṣa*) in lightning (is to be worshipped).³ [61]

¹This brings out the lustre in the sun and/or the moon (and, for that matter, in fire, viz. Agni, as the editor of NKL points out in his note; also read SP: *agner api kadācid udbhūtam abhibhūtam ca tejo lakṣyate tatrāpi jaladeṣu satsv apīti yāvat*) is less bright than that of lightning.

²Supply *tejasvinī* (about *vidyut*) after *atitarām*.

³*tejasvī* entails the words *dhyeyaḥ puruṣaḥ*.

BU 2.1.5 is under reference.

This verse refers to the fourth paryāya, viz. ākāśa.

खण्डशो न यथा मूर्तं खं पूर्णं चाप्रवर्तनात् ।

अप्रवर्त्यक्रियावत्स्युर्व्योम्नि सर्वाः प्रवृत्तयः ॥६२॥

The sky is, in its parts,¹ *mūrta* 'having a form', whereas it (is) complete (or whole),² for it is non-moving;³ for it cannot be moved (by any one) and therefore there cannot be any activity produced in or by it. Yet all activities are (said to be) of the sky.⁴ [62]

This verse explains how the sky is called *pūrṇa* and *apravarti*.

¹*khaṇḍaśaḥ* implies the various parts imagined of the sky as in *ghaṭākāśa*, *karakākāśa* etc.

²This refers to the real partlessness of the sky.

³Translation takes *apravarti* as *acala*. Yet, it can be taken alternatively as *apravartaka* 'not setting anyone/anything to any activity'.

⁴This is Sureśvara's alternative explanation of the word *apravarti*. No activity can be produced in the sky, nor can it be the support (viz. *adhikaraṇa*) of any activity. Any activity, which is said to be 'in the sky' is only imaginary. (Cf. SP: *vyomni hi sarvāḥ pravṛttayaḥ santi na svayaṁ kriyā tadvad vā tasmād apravartīty arthaḥ*. Yet NKL: *svayaṁ na kriyā[vat] kriyāvatām adhikaraṇam ity apravartīty arthaḥ*.)

Verses 63-65 speak of the fifth paryāya, viz. *Vāyu*.
BU 2.1.6 is under reference.

जिष्णुः स्याज्जयशीलत्वाज्जीयते न परैर्यतः ।
अपराजिष्णुरित्येवं तस्मादेवाभिधीयते ॥६३॥
अन्यतो मातृतो जाता अन्यतस्त्या उदाहृताः ।
अप्यन्यतस्त्यजायी स्यात्सापत्नभ्रातृमर्दनः ॥६४॥

(*Vāyu*) is¹ (described) as the conquerer, since it has the character (or, capacity) of (ever) conquering and since it is not conquered by others (or any enemies/opponents); therefore, it is invincible (lit. not-to-be-conquered)—so is it thus said.

anyatastyas are said to be those who are born of another, i.e. of another mother. And (*api*) one who is born of another would be the killer (or, tormentor) of them who are his brothers, viz. those born of the same (mother). [64]

These verses explain the significance of the three adjectives of Vāyu, viz. *jiṣṇu*, *aparājiṣṇu* and *anyatastyajāyin*. There is then a threefold result for its worshipper which is implied. The editor of NKL subjoins a note: *kramena ekaikaguṇopāśanasya ekaikaṃ phalam bodhyam*.

¹*syāt* is for *asti*.

जिष्णुरिन्द्रगुणोपास्तेवैकुण्ठगुणतः परः ।
सेनापराजितैत्यस्मात्सपत्नानां पराजयः ॥६५॥

(The worshipper becomes) a conquerer by concentrating on (or, worshipping) the qualities of Indra¹ (which he comes to possess); (he becomes) beyond (i.e. invincible to) the enemies owing to the qualities of Vaikuṇṭha (Viṣṇu ?) (which he comes to possess) and the army (of the Maruts)³ since it is (ever) unconquered; therefore, (the worshipper secures) the conquest of enemies.⁴ [65]

¹The name of Indra signifies Parameśvara, i.e. the lord of all.

²*vaikuṇṭha* literally means one who cannot be withstood (*aprasahya*)— whether it refers to Viṣṇu is (though implied, and, therefore, a little) doubtful!

³*senā* stands for the Vedic *marudgaṇa*. In Veda, the Maruts are a development of Vāyu, who is a close associate of Indra or Agni. Yet usually *senā* is associated with Indra (as here in this verse).

⁴This verse justifies the threefold result of the worship of Vāyu.

Verse 66 refers to the sixth paryāya, viz. Agni/Vāc.

BU 2.1.7 is under reference.

अभ्याहितमपि जगत्सहतेऽग्निर्यतस्ततः ।
भस्मसात्करणादुक्तो विषासहिरितीश्वरैः ॥६६॥

Since Agni overpowers the (outside)¹ world which it oversteps,² therefore, (i.e. thereby) rendering (the same, i.e. the world) into ashes, it is called by the learned (lit. the lords)³ *viṣāsahi* 'one that can stand the oncoming (world).'⁴ [66]

¹This refers to all *apparent* creation beside the Ātman.

²*sahate* literally means withstands.

³These are the lords of words, the learners and (as such) the knowers of (the meaning of) the Vedas.

⁴This is based on the etymology offered by SP: (*yad dhaviḥ svasmin*) *viṣyate kṣipyate tat sodhum śīlam astīti vyutapattiḥ*.

Verses 67 and 68 explain the meaning of the seventh paryāya:
ya evāpsu

BU 2.1.8 is under reference.

अप्सु रेतसि बुद्धौ च पुरुषं ब्रह्म चेतनम् ।
उपास एतमित्युक्तः काश्यः प्रत्याह पूर्ववत् ॥६७॥

"In waters, in semen and in intellect (do I see) *puruṣa*, the sentient Brahman—I worship this one," (thus) told (by Gārgya), Kāśya said in return as before. [67]

Sureśvara adds *retasi*, following BUB. Also, he adds *buddhau* as he has done under 2.1.2-3 (but this is not in BUB).

प्रतिबिम्बोदयः कार्यं प्रतिरूपं यतस्ततः ।
प्रतिरूप उपास्योऽप्सु फलमप्यस्य तादृशम् ॥६८॥

Since *pratirūpa* 'image' is an effect, viz. the rise (or, appearance) of a reflection; therefore, the reflection (of a

puruṣa 'a man' in the waters etc.) is to be worshipped. The result for this one (viz. the worshipper) in (relation to) waters is also of that kind.¹ [68]

¹Namely, *bahurūpa* 'multifold in form' as in the case of the preceding *paryāya*— but the stress is on the plentiness of waters conveyed by the plural form *apsu*.

Verse 69 explains the meaning of the eighth paryāya.

अन्वर्थे प्रतिशब्दोऽयं फलस्य पुरुषार्थतः ।
प्रातिलोम्येन तु ज्ञेयो ह्यनर्थः स्यात्तथा सति ॥६९॥

The preposition (lit. word), viz. *prati*, is (used) here in the sense of the preposition *anu* 'following', since the result is (securing or obtainment) of the end of (a human being's) life.¹ (As against this) it can be known in the sense of 'being opposed', but (*tu*), that being so, there would indeed² be an undesirable end.³ [69]

¹Read SP: *pratiśabdasya nipātatvenānekārthatvasambhavāt prakṛtopāstyanusāreṇānvarthatvam ucitam*. Also *puruṣārthataḥ* is for *puruṣārthavattvataḥ*.

²This is the force of *hi*.

³Read SP: *tathā sati prātikūlyārthatvābhyupagame satīti yāvat*.

श्रुतिस्मृतिसदाचारान्प्रति यः सततोद्यतः ।
प्रतिश्रुत्यादिरूपत्वात्प्रतिरूपस्ततोऽस्तु सः ॥७०॥

He, who is ever inclined towards (lit. bent on), (the teachings of) the Śruti and the Smṛti and (follows) the conduct of the good,¹ is² then, owing to his following each of the śruti etc.,³ has thence (a son born to him, that is) in accordance with (or, following) the Śruti etc. [70]

This is the meaning of *atho pratirūpo 'smāj jāyate*.

¹Or alternatively, the good conduct in keeping with the teaching of the Śruti etc. This is according to SP.

²*astu* is taken for *asti*.

³The word etc. refers to *smṛti* and *sadācāra*. Also, this refers to his adopting the worships (viz. *Upāsanās*) taught in the *śruti* etc. The son also is likewise a worshipper of the same.

Verses 71-73 explain the meaning of the ninth paryāya.
BU 2.1.9 is under reference.

रोचिष्णुपनिषत्कान्तमादर्शाक्षादिबुद्धिषु ।
उपास इत्यभिहिते काश्यः प्रत्याह पूर्ववत् ॥७१॥

When it was told (him) 'I worship (that Brahman)¹ in the intellect and organs etc. (which are reflected) in the mirror, viz. that which is brilliantly shining (and) delightful (as said) in the Upaniṣads.',² said Kāśya in return (once again) as before.

[71]

This explains *ya evāyam*

¹This is implied by *rociṣṇu* which is paraphrased as *upaniṣatkāntam* (neuter). Or, it is possible to understand the word *puruṣam* (accusative singular, masculine) which is qualified by the Karmadhāraya compound *rociṣṇūpaniṣatkāntam*. Also cf. NKL: *dīpyamānarahasyakāntisahitam ity arthaḥ*; read the note of the editor of NKL: *upaniṣatpadam rahasyārthakam iti bhāvaḥ*.

²Or, following SP, 'delightful though its refulgent lustre remains concealed (*dedīpyamānagopyakāntisahitam*)'.

यत्रोपास्यबहुत्वं स्यात्फलं तत्र प्रजास्वपि ।
शतहृदादर्शाद्यर्था बहवस्ते प्रसिद्धितः ॥७२॥

Wher(ever) there is plurality of the objects of worship, there is abundance (or lit. plurality) of the result in respect of the (forthcoming) offspring also.¹ Indeed many things like (the flashes of) lightning and the mirror etc. are known (to be

of this nature).²

[72]

¹Cf. SP: *svāmīno 'nyatrāpi vācanikam aviruddham iti bhāvaḥ*.

²SP explains this as *kvācītkam upāsyabahutvam eva sphorayati*.

फलं यद्गुणकं यत्र तद्गुणं स्यादुपासनम् ।
फलानुमानतस्तत्र न फलं ह्यनुपासितम् ॥७३॥

Wherever there is a result of whatever quality,¹ there is a worship of that (viz. similar) quality;¹ so is it inferred from the result²—indeed (*hi*) the result is not what is not worshipped for.³ [73]

This is to justify how in some modes of worship (*paryāyas*) the result is manifold.

Also, it explains *ya evāyaṃ yantaṃ*

¹This stands for quantity also.

²SP states the inference thus: *yasmin paryāye yadguṇakam phalaṃ dṛṣṭaṃ tatra tadguṇakam upāsanam phalena tatsāadhanasya ... tadvaicitrye saty upāsanavaicitryasyāvaśyakatvāt*.

³This is to state the inference in the form of Vyatireka.

In verses 74-76, BU 2.1.10 is under reference.

गच्छन्तमन यः शब्दो बहिर्वच्छ्रूयतेऽध्वनि ।
अध्यात्मं दैहिके शब्दे बुद्धौ चेति विनिर्दिशेत् ॥७४॥

In what sound is heard outside as following a walker on some path, and also in that in the intellect with respect to the (walker's) body should one point out (there is the Brahman).

[74]

पुंसोऽभिधावतस्तूर्णं देहदेशैः समाहतः ।
प्राणो वृत्तिविशेषेण बहिर्वत्कुरुते ध्वनिम् ॥७५॥

(For) it is (the wind called) Prāṇa which, struck by various

limbs of the (walker's) body, while (he is) running fast, that produces by its particular function¹ (or, makes) a sound as (belonging to) outside (the body). [75]

In verses 74 and 75 is expressed the view of Gārgya.

¹This is the walker's particular movement. Or, possibly, this refers to some function of the Prāṇa which is other than the usual inhaling.

वृत्तिक्षेपादसुरयमायुषश्च तदाश्रितेः ।
शतायुरेव भवति म्रियते नापमृत्युना ॥७६॥

This is (the deity called) Asu,¹ because there is snapping (or stopping) of the function (of Prāṇa). And because² the life (-span) is dependent on that, a man attains to the age of a hundred (years) and does not come to have (untimely) death (in that). [76]

This is Ajātaśatru's view.

¹This is to say that the sound (mentioned in the two preceding verses) is produced by *śabda-puruṣa*.

²This explains the Upaniṣadic sentence *sa ya etam*

In verses 77 and 78, BU 2.1.11 is under reference.

दिक्षु द्वितीयोऽनपगः सद्वितीयः सदैव सः ।
दुःसंभाव्या हि पूर्वा दिङ्मुक्त्वाशां परिचमां जनैः ॥७७॥

He (that Puruṣa) is the second in the quarters—he is inseparable and is ever the second¹—the eastern quarter (alone) is indeed difficult to be considered (alone),² the western quarter being left aside by men. [77]

This explains the significance of *sadvidyā* and *anapaga* connected with *dikpuruṣa*.

¹There is reference to the ears, corresponding to the quarters,

and the region of the heart. Also, the ears are connected with the Aśvins who are inseparable twins; the heart, covered in the body, refers to the cover of ignorance (about the real nature of the Brahman) on the part of Gārgya.

²This is the significance of *duḥsambhāvyā*; SP comments on this word: *diśāṃ sadvitīyatvaṃ lokaprasiddham iti hisābdaḥ*.

साधुभृत्यपरीवारः सर्वदोषासको भवेत् ।
पुत्रादिगणसंतानस्थैर्यमेव सदा भवेत् ॥७८॥

A worshipper (of this deity) becomes ever accompanied by his retinue (*parivāra*), viz. his good attendants; (also) there will ever result (for him) continuity in respect of sons and other offspring. [78]

This explains the Upaniṣadic sentence *sa ya etām ...* and also the worship of the deity having two qualities mentioned in the preceding verse.

This verse explains BU 2.1.12: sa evāyaṃ chāyāmayah

छायामये तथाज्ञाने बुद्धौ चैकैव देवता ।
मृत्युकालात्पुनः नास्य व्याधिरप्युपसर्पति ॥७९॥

There is only one deity in the shadow-*puruṣa*,¹ viz. that in darkness (or, ignorance) outside and in the intellect (inside of the worshipper) and, before the time of his death, there does not come to him any ailment also.² [79]

¹The shadow-*puruṣa* is described (or, qualified) as Death.

²This is the result of the worship of Death, viz. long life and absence of any disease—this is conveyed by *nainam purā kālāt* 'Even' has the force of conveying the delayed time for death.

Verses 80-84 discuss the import of BU 2.1.13: ya evāyaṃ ātmani

....

विराडात्मनि देहे च बुद्धावित्यादि पूर्ववत् ।
आत्मन्वीति च वश्यात्मा प्रजा चापि शमान्विता ॥८०॥

(In this *paryāya*) Puruṣa refers to Virāj, the Ātman 'individual self,'¹ and the intellect in the body (even) as before (i.e. in the preceding *paryāyas*). The adjective *ātmanvī* points to his being strong in himself (or, mind). Also, the offspring² (of the worshipper) is possessed of tranquillity. [80]

¹This refers to Hiranyagarbha (in making) as understood from the qualifying attribute *ātmanvī*.

²*prajā* is singular form, indicative of the plural sense.

व्यस्तानां पूर्वमद्देशः समस्तानां त्विहोदितः ।
विवक्षावसितिर्गाँगी तथा सत्युपपद्यते ॥८१॥

Earlier,¹ there was enumeration of (each of the) individual deities (to be worshipped), whereas there is here a general (or single) enumeration of them all. That being so, there is a reasonable conclusion of Gārgya's intended thought (lit. speech).² [81]

This is to explain how this *paryāya* is different from the earlier ones and a fitting conclusion of the thought.

¹This refers to the earlier *paryāyas* mentioned in the preceding verses. The intention there was to refer to the worship of each individual deity.

²This is warranted by the earlier modes of worship.

प्रत्याख्यातोपदेशः सन्संवादेन पुनः पुनः ।
ब्रह्मान्यदन्यदवददात्मन्वीत्यन्तमादरात् ॥८२॥
विशेषाणामनन्तत्वात्समस्तं ब्रह्म सोऽवदत् ।
तस्मिन्नपि निषिद्धेऽथ तूष्णीं गार्ग्यो बभूव ह ॥८३॥

By his repeated talk (with Ajātaśatru, Gārgya had) his instruction (regarding the Brahman) repudiated; for, (the former) instructed (lit. mentioned) the Brahman to be different (from that in each of Gārgya's *paryāyas*) with profound respect (for the Brahman having as its qualifying attribute) *ātmanvī*.

[82]

Thus, he (finally) mentioned the Brahman as a whole (*samasta*) on account of the numberlessness of its particular attributes. Then,¹ as that (Brahman, taken severally and jointly by him) was rejected (by Ajātaśatru as the Brahman), Gārgya indeed² came to maintain silence.

[83]

¹*atha* indicates Gārgya's ignorance of the ultimate reality.

²This is for *ha*. An expression of Gārgya's lowering of the head in the assembly of Ajātaśatru.

यत्कृत्स्नं ब्रह्म पूर्वोक्तं तदेवेदमविद्यया ।
एकधानेकधा मूर्धैः कल्प्यते रज्जुसर्पवत् ॥८४॥

All that Brahman, viz. which(ever) was earlier mentioned, is but so stated by ignorant persons in one way or in several ways, owing to their non-knowing (lit. ignorance, about it); it is so imagined in the same way as one imagines a rope to be a serpent.

[84]

The verse seeks to establish that the Brahman is variously, i.e. singly or jointly, understood by persons under the sway of ignorance—this is so indicated by the rejection of all the *paryāyas* by Ajātaśatru. The *paryāyas* had originated in only a partial view of the Brahman as variously delimited; that is to say: it was taken to be what was other than the *mukhya* Brahman, viz. the ultimate reality.

In verses 85-91 follows the explanation of BU 2.1.14 (and allied matter).

अवाकशिरस्कमालोक्य नृपो गार्ग्यमनुत्तरम् ।
एतावदिति तं प्राह शेषाशङ्कानिवृत्तये ॥८५॥

On seeing Gārgya having lowered his head and having no more to say in reply, the king said to him *etāvad* ... '(is it only) this much?'—this was with a view to clearing away whatever remained as doubt (in his mind).¹ [85]

¹This refers to Gārgya's wish to know the ultimate reality.

निगृह्यमाणयोगे च प्लुतिमत्र विनिर्दिशेत् ।
ब्रह्म ब्रवाणीत्यात्थ त्वमेतावद्ब्रह्म तच्च ते ॥८६॥

One should point out the *pluti* 'prolation' here (i.e. in the text) as associated with an individual's being checked (or, held, i.e. stopped):¹ (this is thus expressed in Ajātaśatru's intention, viz.) 'You said to me "Let me tell you about the Brahman", and your (statement of) the Brahman is (just) this much!' [86]

This has a reference to BU using *pluti* in *sa hovācājātaśatruḥ, etāvan nū3 iti*.

¹This is Suresvara's reference to Pāṇinian procedure regarding the use of *pluti* in Pāṇini Sūtra 8.2.94: *nigrhyānuyoge ca*.

अज्ञाते जगदज्ञातं ज्ञाते ज्ञातं च यत्र तत् ।
तदेव ब्रह्म पूर्णत्वान्न त्वदुक्तमकृत्स्नतः ॥८७॥

²That alone is the Brahman, which remaining unknown the entire world (remains) unknown¹ and which being known that (becomes) known—this is owing to its being the all-encompassing (or, whole)—that which you have told (or, declared) is not the Brahman owing to its not being the whole. [87]

The verse does not mean to convey that Gārgya had completely

gone wrong, since each of his *paryāyas* about the Brahman was included in the Brahman which is *mukhya* 'ultimate'. The only shortcoming was that, in each of the *paryāyas*, there was so-called partial expression of the Brahman (*akṛtsnatva*). This is further clarified in the following verse.

अव्यावृत्ताननुगतस्वतःसिद्धात्मवस्तुनि ।
मुख्यार्थो ब्रह्मशब्दः स्यान्न त्वदुक्तेऽतथात्वतः ॥८८॥

(Ajātaśatru meant to say:) 'The word Brahman, in its principal (or, real) sense, can be (i.e. is to be) used in respect of the thing (called) Ātman, which is not (i.e. cannot be) distinguished (from any other thing), which has no resemblance with (lit. has not been followed by any other thing) and which is self-established; not in respect of what you have mentioned, since that is not similar to it.'¹ [88]

¹Namely, it is not *avyāvṛtta* ... *svataḥsiddha*.

यस्मादेवमतो गार्ग्यमेतावद्धीतिवादिनम् ।
नृपो नैतावतेत्याह ब्रह्मत्वासंभवं स्फुटम् ॥८९॥

Since this was so, the king said to Gārgya, who declared the Brahman to be this much¹ 'It is not this much'—thus (declaring) clearly the impossibility of that being the Brahman. [89]

¹It referred only to the so-called expression of the Brahman.

अज्ञातब्रह्मतत्त्वस्य दुःसंभाव्यमिदं वचः ।
नैतावतेति ब्रह्मातः काश्यो वेत्तीति लिङ्ग्यते ॥९०॥

That such an expression (lit. this expression) cannot ever come from one who has not known the real nature of the Brahman is indicated by the expression 'not by this much is (declared/explained the Brahman)' and that therefore, Kāśya

knew (the real nature of) the Brahman.

[90]

This explains the significance of Gārgya's words *upa ivāyāni* 'let me approach you (for instruction)'. This is clarified in the following verse.

गार्ग्योऽनुमाय राज्ञोऽथ प्रावीण्यं ब्रह्मवेदने ।
उपायानीत्युवाचेमं परब्रह्मावबुद्धये ॥९१॥

Having then understood (lit. inferred) the king's ability for instructing about (the nature of) the Brahman, Gārgya said to him, 'Let me approach you (for instruction).'

[91]

In verses 92-99 follows the explanation of BU 2.1.15 (and allied matter).

परं ब्रह्म विजिज्ञासुरपेतोऽस्म्यहमादरात् ।
अनुशाधि यथातत्त्वमित्येवंवादिनं नृपः ॥९२॥
क्षत्रियं ब्राह्मणो जात्या यदुपेयादनापदि ।
प्रतिलोममिदं वृत्तं धर्मशास्त्रैर्निषिद्धतः ॥९३॥

(While Gārgya) said, 'Desirous of knowing the highest Brahman,¹ I have approached you respectfully; please teach me what (or, as) it is in reality', the king [92]
(said), 'That (you) a Brāhmaṇa by birth should approach (me) a Kṣatriya, (while you are) not in difficulty, this (your) doing (lit. behaviour) is against (or, not in accordance with Dharma), for there is prohibition (or, censure against it) of (lit. by) the Dharma texts.²

[93]

¹NKL edition reads *para brahma*; but that makes no difference.

²SP and NKL adduce support for the king's words thus:

abrāhmaṇād adhyayanam āpatkāle vidhīyate /
anuvrajyā ca śuśrūṣā yāvad adhyayanam guroḥ //
nābrāhmaṇe gurau śiṣyo vāsam ātyantikam vaset /
brāhmaṇe cānamūcāne kāṅkṣan gatim anuttamām //

(*Manusmṛti* 2.241-242). SP further supports this by a citation from *Gautamadharmasūtra*: *āpatkāle brāhmaṇasyābrāhmaṇād vidyopayogo 'nugamanam śūśrūṣāsamāpteh*.

योगक्षेमफलार्थाय गमनं न निषिध्यते ।
ब्रह्म मे वक्ष्यतीत्यर्थं निषिद्धं नृपसर्पणम् ॥९४॥

“(but) his (i.e. a Brāhmaṇa's) approaching (him, a Kṣatriya) is not prohibited (or, censured), (in case it is) for effecting (or, securing) (*arthāya*) the meaning of life;¹ (thus, your) approaching (me), a king, with the desire (*ity artham*) 'he would tell (declare to) me (the nature of) the Brahman' is (indeed) censured. [94]

¹I have translated *yogakṣema* thus, though against SP which states: *aprāptaprāpanam yogah prāptarakṣanam kṣemah* and supports the explanation by citing a Smṛti:

*vedārthān adhigacchec ca śāstrāṇi vividhāni ca /
upeyād īśvaram caiva yogakṣemārthasiddhaye //*
(*Yājñavalkyasmṛti* 1.99)

This is supported by NKL: *yogakṣemārtham īśvaram adhigacchet* (*Gautamadharmasūtra* 1.9.63).

अतोऽनुपेतमेव त्वां करविन्यस्तबिल्ववत् ।
ब्रह्म विज्ञापयिष्यामि यज्ज्ञाने सर्वविद्भवेत् ॥९५॥

“Therefore, I shall inform you¹—who have, in reality, not formally approached me—about (the nature of) the Brahman even like a *bilva* fruit placed on the palm of a hand, by securing whose knowledge, one would become the knower of all.” [95]

¹SP explains in this context: *varṇato gārgyasyādhikyād upasattyabhāve 'pi vidyāto rājño vaiśiṣṭyāt tatas tadgraho yuktaḥ* and supports 'his by a passage from the *Manusmṛti* 2.154:

*na hāyanair na palitair na vittair na ca bandhubhīḥ /
ṛṣayaś cakrire dharmam yo 'nūcānaḥ sa no mahan //*

इत्युक्त्वा तमथो पाणौ गृहीत्वोत्थितवानृपः ।
आजग्मतुश्च तौ सुप्तं नरं कार्यविवक्षया ॥९६॥

Having thus said to him and taking (lit. holding) him by his hand, the king rose up (i.e. began to walk). (Then) the two came to a man, who was sleeping, with the desire to make (that man) speak what was to be achieved. [96]

गार्ग्योक्तब्रह्माभोक्तृत्वं तथामीषामनात्मताम् ।
बालाकेर्बोधयिष्यामीत्यतः सुप्तमगानृपः ॥९७॥

With the intention to bring home to Bālāki the nature of a non-enjoyer of what was declared by him, i.e. Gārgya, as the Brahman and also the character of non-Ātmans (i.e. non-Brahman) of these,¹ the king went up to the sleeping (man). [97]

This explains *kāryavivakṣā* 'the desire of stating what was to be achieved, viz. to make (that sleeping man) speak'.

¹This should have been 'them', but owing to the force of *amīṣām* 'these' refers to the Sun etc. which Gārgya had earlier mentioned as the Brahman.

देवतानामभिः काश्यो गत्वा सुप्तं यथोदितैः ।
आमन्त्रयां तदा चक्रे बृहन्नित्येवमादिभिः ॥९८॥

Then, having gone up to the sleeping (man), Kāśya called¹ him by (various) names of the deity, as said (in the Upaniṣad), viz. Bṛhat and others.² [98]

This explains the BU sentence *tam etaiḥ*

¹The verb is *āmantrayāṃcakre*, it is separated into its two components *āmantrayām* and *cakre*, for metre's sake. Such tendency of separating the verbs is occasionally noticed in classical Sanskrit writers.

²These names are: Br̥hat, Pāṇḍaravāsas, Soma and Rājan.

संबोध्यमानोऽपि तथा सुप्तो नैवोदबुध्यत ।
यतोऽतो गार्ग्याभिमतो न भोक्तेत्यवगम्यते ॥९९॥

Since that sleeping (man) did not at all become awake, even when so addressed, therefore, it is understood that he was not the enjoyer as understood by Gārgya. [99]

This explains *sa nottasthau* in BU. It brings out the thought that the Prāṇa 'vital Prāṇa in the human body', which was functioning (i.e. active therein), was not *really* the enjoyer, i.e. experiencer (of the various names or words addressed to him).

Verses 100-108 bring out the significance of Ajātaśatru's approaching the sleeping man.

जाग्रत्कालं परित्यज्य सुप्तं किमिति जग्मतुः ।
स्पष्टता सर्वभावानां जाग्रत्काले हि लक्ष्यते ॥१००॥

(A question is asked:) 'Why did the two approach the sleeping (man), avoiding his state (lit. time) of waking (or, wakefulness)?' (The reason for the question is given thus:) Indeed it is only in the state (i.e. time) of waking that clear visibility¹ of all becomings (*bhāvas*) is noticed.² [100]

The implication of the question is: It is not proper (or, useful) to approach a sleeping man—it was proper to go to one who was awake, for it could only be in the case of the latter that the king was in a better position to explain the nature of the Ātman. Yet, see verse 103 below.

¹NKL reads *spaṣṭatvāt* for *spaṣṭatā*! difficult to decide the correct reading.

²SP clarifies the idea thus: *tatra sarvasyāpy ādiṣṭo 'rtho vivicya vaktuṃ śakyate na svāpe sarvavyavahāralopād atas tadgatir anarthikety arthaḥ*. This is clarified in the following verse.

प्राणानां देवतानां च पुरुषस्य च संकरात् ।
बोधे न शक्यते कर्तुं विवेको भोक्तृभोज्ययोः ॥१०१॥

(What is said in the preceding verse is so) because there is in the waking state an intermingling¹ of the *prāṇas*, (various) deities (of the organs) and Puruṣa (viz. the vital Prāṇa); it is not possible to make distinction (or, to distinguish) between the enjoyer (i.e. experiencer) and the objects enjoyed (or experienced). [101]

¹SP and NKL vividly clarify the idea of intermingling by citing the mixture of milk and water.

भोक्तृत्वमेव पुंसोऽस्ति भोज्यत्वं न मनागपि ।
काश्याभिप्रायतोऽनस्य भोज्यतैव न भोक्तृता ॥१०२॥

In the case of a man, there is the character only of an enjoyer (i.e. experiencer) and not at all the nature of what is enjoyed (i.e. experienced). And, in the opinion of Kāśya, the Prāṇa¹ has the nature of being enjoyed (i.e. experienced) alone and not the character of an enjoyer (i.e. experiencer).² [102]

¹*ana* is used for *prāṇa*.

²SP clarifies *bhoktr̥tva* as *sākṣitva* and *bhojyatva* as *sākṣya*.

संकीर्णत्वादशक्यः स्यात्प्रबोधे भोक्तृभोज्ययोः ।
कर्तुं विवेकोऽतो यातः सुप्तं पुरुषमादरात् ॥१०३॥

Owing to the intermingling of the two, viz. the enjoyer and the enjoyed, in the waking state (of an individual),¹ it is not possible to make any distinction between them (and), therefore, (Kāśya) approached the sleeping man respectfully.² [103]

¹This, i.e. *saṁkīrṇatva*, is used for emphasising the *sākṣitā-mātratva* of Prāṇa.

²That is, with proper care for achieving the desired end.

तस्माद्यद्यपि सांनिध्यं प्राणादीनां प्रजागरे ।
संकीर्णत्वान्मिथस्तेषां दुःशकं तद्विवेचनम् ॥१०४॥

Therefore, even though there is presence (lit. nearness, under view) of the *prāṇas* and others¹ in the state of waking, it is quite difficult to distinguish them (from *Prāṇa*) owing to their intermingling. [104]

This verse clarifies the idea of *spaṣṭatā* in verse 100 above and thus justifies Kāśya's approaching the sleeping man.

¹The deities of the various organs are meant.

आत्मनः प्रोषितत्वात्तु भोगोऽस्मै न प्रयुज्यते ।
उदासतेऽखिलाः सुप्ते देवताः करणैः सह ॥१०५॥
जाग्रद्भोगप्रयुक्तस्य कर्मणः प्रक्षयात्तदा ।
शेरते करणान्यस्य सह भोक्त्रात्मनात्मनि ॥१०६॥

And (*tu*) enjoyment (of objects) is not brought to it, since *Prāṇa* is in a state of separation (from the organs etc.); (for), in the state of sleep, all the deities together with their (respective) organs remain (wholly) inactive, [105]
(for), at that time, owing to the cessation (lit. loss) of any activity which is caused (or, employed) for enjoyment in the waking state, all the organs remain inactive;¹ though (they are) together with the enjoyer *Ātman* in (the so-far-unknown) *Ātman*.² [106]

This is said with a view to pointing out how in sleep state it is possible to distinguish between the *Ātman* and the deities, together with their respective organs, even though there is intermingling of them all (105). This is further reasoned out in verse 106.

¹That is, they have withdrawn from all activity.

²That is to say: they have not ceased to exist.

प्राण एकस्तु जागर्ति भोक्ता यो गार्ग्यसंमतः ।
प्राणेन रक्षन्निति च तथोदके प्रवक्ष्यते ॥१०७॥

The one alone (who is) awake is Prāṇa, the one accepted by Gārgya (also); so will this be said even later (in the words) *prāṇena rakṣan*.¹ [107]

¹Cf. *prāṇena rakṣann avaram kulāyam* in BU 4.3.12 which indicates how only Prāṇa remains active even in sleep. This is supported in the next verse by citing two Śrutis.

प्राणाग्नय इति स्पष्टं तथानस्तमितश्रुतेः ।
अश्रान्तः प्राण एवातो जागर्त्यत्र दिवानिशम् ॥१०८॥

(It is) clear in (the Śruti text) *prāṇāgnayaḥ*¹ ... and also from the (other) Śruti *anastamita* 'its not becoming inactive' (regarding Prāṇa) – thus only Prāṇa, who is not (at all) tired, remains here (in this body) awake, day and night. [108]

¹*prāṇāgnaya evaitasmin pure jāgrati* (Praśnopaniṣad 4.3).

²*na vyathate na riṣyati śaiṣānastamitā devatā yad vāyuh* (BU 1.5.22).

Verses 109-132 discuss how the vital force, i.e. Prāṇa, Hiranya-garbha, is non-Ātman.

यथा जाग्रदवस्थायां भोक्ता प्राणः पुराभवत् ।
स्वप्नेऽप्येष तथैवास्ते बोद्धा चेद्बुध्यतामयम् ॥१०९॥

As the enjoyer, Prāṇa has been there in the state of waking earlier, so is it, in the same way, there even in sleep state; (yes), if (as) the knower, then let it be knowing. [109]

This explains what is meant by 'Prāṇa is ever awake'.

प्राणस्येन्दोस्तथा चापां त्र्यन्नात्माविष्कृतौ यतः ।
ऐक्यमुक्तमतः प्राणो बोध्यते चन्द्रनामभिः ॥११०॥

Since, while revealing the nature of the triad of foods,¹ it has been pointed out that Prāṇa, the moon and the waters are (but) one in nature; therefore, is (here) Prāṇa addressed by the attributes (lit. names) of the moon. [110]

This explains why Prāṇa, though sentient, in sleep state is called by the names of another.

¹Here the reference is to BU 1.5.13: *athaitasya prāṇasyāpaḥ śarīraṃ jyotīrūpam asau candraḥ*.

बृहन्नित्येवमादीनि सन्तु चेहोपलक्षणम् ।
अनुक्तदेवतानाम्नां सामर्थ्यात्तद्ग्रहोऽथवा ॥१११॥

Or, let the attributes (lit. names) Br̥hat and others be considered here (i.e. in Kāśya's address) as indicative (of the other attributes/names also)—(that is to say:) Or, let there be the acceptance of the names of even (other) deities whose attributes (lit. names) are not stated; this, on account of the force (of oneness, i.e. *sāmarthya*).¹ [111]

An alternative understanding of the words is also acceptable here.

¹The reason for this is that Prāṇa is one with Sūtra, i.e. Hiranyagarbha.

यदि भोक्ता भवेत्प्राणो जाग्रद्वच्छब्दमागतम् ।
अश्रोष्यत्स न चेद्भोक्ता नाश्रोष्यदुपलादिवत् ॥११२॥

If Prāṇa were the enjoyer (i.e. experiencer), then it would have heard (even in sleep state) the word (i.e. various words of address) spoken unto it as in the state of waking; (as against this), if it were not the enjoyer (i.e. experiencer), it would not have as a stone etc.¹ heard (would not have heard). [112]

¹The word etc. implies a log of wood, a piece of some metal.

ननु सुप्तेऽपि पुंस्यस्मिन्बोधितः सन्स्वनामभिः ।
भोक्तैव भोत्स्यते शब्दं न त्वभोक्ता परो जडः ॥११३॥
नैवातोऽपि विवेकः स्यादुत्थितः कोऽनयोर्द्वयोः ॥११४॥

(A doubt is raised:) But, even if this sleeping man is addressed by his own attributes (lit. names), it is only the enjoyer (i.e. experiencer) who would hear (lit. enjoy or experience) the word and (*tu*) not the non-enjoyer (i.e. non-experiencer), (who is) other than that, i.e. the insentient. [113]

Indeed, for this (reason) also, there could be distinction made (between the Ātman and the non-Ātman); (for the question could be:) 'Which of these two is awakened?' [114]

This is to point out that making distinction between the enjoyer and the enjoyed is impossible even in sleep state, since only the enjoyer (Ātman) can experience the address. NKL puts it succinctly thus: *ātmā śabdopalabdhyā nānātmā ity etāvataṁ vivekāśiddhiḥ*.

This is pointed out in the next verse.

नैवं गार्गीयपक्षस्य विशेषावधृतेः सदा ।
अजातशत्रुवभिप्रेतब्रह्मणः प्राक्प्रमाणतः ॥११५॥

This is not so,¹ because there is ever held (or, determined) a (specific) distinction between what is held in Gārgya's opinion (lit. view, as the Brahman) and what is understood (or, accepted) as the Brahman² by Ajātaśatru, (as established) by the authoritative means (viz. the Śruti passages) already adduced.³ [115]

This is to answer away the doubt raised in verses 113 and 114 above.

¹That is, the doubt cannot be entertained.

²The Brahman in the view of Gārgya can be active only in the state of waking and inactive (or dormant) in sleep state, whereas the Brahman, as understood by Ajātaśatru, is ever active.

³This refers to passages meant in verse 108 above. Yet read SP: *gārgyeṣṭapraṇasya kāśyeṣṭātmanah sakāśād yo viśeṣaḥ sadā vyāpṛtatvaṁ tasya prabodhāt prāg api pramītatvāt prāṇotthāne śabdāśravaṇāyogāt pāṇipeṣānupapatteḥ sa na bhoktety arthaḥ.*

योऽनस्तमित एकोऽत्र वागाद्यस्तमयेऽमृतः ।
इन्द्रोऽसपत्नोऽब्देहश्च नामरूपसमावृतः ॥११६॥

That (Brahman in Ajātaśatru's view) is only that one who has not become inactive and who is active even when *vāc* and others have stopped to be active,¹ active (lit. alive, i.e. not dead), the one who is called Indra, having no enemy² and having a body in the (form of) waters³ and who is wrapped up by name and form.⁴ [116]

This justifies my translation of the preceding verse.

¹The language here is figurative: one who has not set down as against those who have set down.

²Cf. *sa indraḥ sa eṣo 'sapatnaḥ* (BU 1.5.12).

³Cf. *athaitasya prāṇasyāpaḥ śarīram* (BU 1.5.13).

⁴Cf. *nāmarūpābhyāṁ satyābhyāṁ prāṇaś channo naivam ātmā satyasya satyam* as cited by SP. However, cf. BU 1.6.3: *nāmarūpe satyam, tābhyāṁ ayam prāṇaś channaḥ*. (Also cp. BU 2.3.6) [so cited in the note of the editor of NKL].

अध्यात्माद्यखिलं विश्वं संव्याप्य समवस्थितः ।
ओतं प्रोतं जगद्यस्मिन्नरनाभिनिदर्शनात् ॥११७॥

(That Prāṇa) has remained after having pervaded the entire universe beginning with what rests in the (human) body (and) in this one is the world woven warp and woof (or, is the world pervaded) (as shown) by the illustration of the hub and the spokes (of a wheel).¹ [117]

This has a basis in BU 1.5.21-22 in particular. Also cf. BU 3.8.

¹The illustration is from BU 2.5.15. Cf. verse 137 note 1 below.

कुर्वाणस्तुमुलं शब्दं स्वव्यापारमशेषतः ।
कुर्वाण एव स्वप्नेऽपि प्राण आस्ते प्रबोधवत् ॥११८॥

Prāṇa keeps on producing (lit. making) a loud¹ sound) and also does the whole of its activity,² even in sleep, as in the waking state. [118]

¹SP points out that the word *tumula* 'loud' indicates that it is louder than that in the waking state.

²This is to bring out the peculiar character of Prāṇa, viz. its doing all of its activities; whereas the others (viz. organs and their deities) are inactive.

न च भोक्त्रन्तरं प्राणाद्गार्ग्येणेहाभ्युपेयते ।
तत्काले भिन्नकाले वा प्राणादन्यस्य भोज्यतः ॥११९॥

Again, here (i.e. in the sleep state) Gārgya does not accept any other enjoyer (than Prāṇa), since, at that time or at any other time, there is (i.e. can be) any enjoyable (i.e. worth experiencing) other than Prāṇa. [119]

तस्मादवश्यं बोद्धव्यं बोध्यं साक्षादुपस्थितम् ।
प्राणेन बोद्धरूपत्वाद्वाह्यं दग्धा यथा दहेत् ॥१२०॥

Therefore, it should be necessarily understood (or, known) by one that here (i.e. in sleep state) there is directly perceived in Prāṇa, the form of the perceiver, just like what burns (viz. fire) would burn (or, consume) what is to be burnt.¹ [120]

¹SP adds: *prāpte viṣaye śaktasya kāryakaratve dr̥ṣṭāntaḥ*.

न चासौ बोध्यमानोऽपि प्रत्यबुध्यत नाम तत् ।
प्राणोऽभोक्ता ततः सिद्धः स्वनामाप्रतिबोधनात् ॥१२१॥

And that the (sleeping man), even when addressed (by various names), did not become awake, therefore (lit. therefrom) is established the non-enjoyer Prāṇa,¹ on account of its not being awakened by its own attributes (i.e. names). [121]

¹SP carefully points out *abhokteti cchedaḥ* and invites attention to the reading *prāṇo 'bhoktā*.

स्वाख्याविशेषसंबन्धाग्रहणाच्चेन्न बुद्धवान् ।
अग्रहासंभवान्नैवं सर्वज्ञा देवता यतः ॥१२२॥

If it is held that he did not become awake because he did not grasp (its) connection with his own names, that is not so on account of the impossibility; since there the reason is that the deity is all-knowing. [122]

त्वत्पक्षेऽप्यग्रहो दोषस्तुल्यश्चेदिति चोद्यते ।
नैवं कृत्स्नाभिमानित्वादकदेशानहंकृतेः ॥१२३॥

(Also) if it is argued 'In your (i.e. the Siddhāntin's) view also, there is the same fault, viz. non-grasping (of Prāṇa's connection with the names)', that also is not tenable, because he has identified¹ himself with the whole body, viz. there is not (on his part) ego about (only) some one part of the body (which he is said to have assumed).² [123]

¹That is, he has entertained ego for the whole body.

²SP adds: *na tv abhoktrtvāt*.

अङ्गुल्याद्यभिधानोक्तौ न हि तद्वान्प्रबुध्यते ।
कृत्स्नदेहाभिमान्येवं नैकदेहाभिमानभुक् ॥१२४॥

As indeed, by the mention of the (different) name(s) of the

finger(s), a person who is possessed of the same is not awakened, so (also) a person who has identified oneself with the whole body¹ (does not wake up); (for) he does not identify (himself only) with some one part (of the body).² [124]

This is an illustration for supporting the argument in the preceding verse.

¹See note 1 under the preceding verse.

²SP and NKL add: *na tv anātmavāt*.

प्राणस्य तु समाप्तत्वात्समस्तव्यस्तवस्तुषु ।
नात्मवत्स्यादसंबोधस्तस्य सर्वाभिमानतः ॥१२५॥

As for Prāṇa, since it has pervaded the things in the universe jointly and singly, there cannot be on its part, non-waking; for, it has identified itself with all (the things in the universe).¹

[125]

¹SP and NKL point out the similarity of Prāṇa's pervading everything in the universe with 'cowness' pervading all cows.

बोधाबोधौ चित्तेर्न स्तः कटस्थज्ञप्तिमात्रतः ।
परायत्तप्रबोधो नाह्यप्पात्रौत्थाद्रवेरिव ॥१२६॥

Waking up and its absence cannot be (understood or accepted in the case) of sentience, owing merely to its nature of being immutable knowledge (or knowing). (But) a man¹ is indeed dependent on some other (person or thing) for his knowledge² in the same way as the reflection in the water-pot of the orb of the sun.

[126]

¹*nā* is in the sense of *amukhyātman*, i.e. *cidābhāsa* or *anātman*.

²Or, getting to know something which comes through the help of eye and other organs.

स्वसंज्ञयाप्यसंबोधो यथा दृष्टस्तदात्मनः ।

भोक्तृत्वे सत्यपि तथा प्राणेऽप्यप्रतिबोधनम् ॥१२७॥

As there is noticed non-waking of the Ātman, at the time of being called by its own name; so also in the case of Prāṇa, there is no waking (or, knowing) even though it has the nature of an enjoyer (or, experiencer). [127]

This is a reference to the individual self (Jīva) in relation to the organs.

सप्तासुप्तत्वसंभेदविशेषन्यायसंभवात् ।
नैव सुप्तग्रहो युक्तो न त्वसुप्तस्य युज्यते ॥१२८॥

Since there is possibly some reason¹ for distinguishing between the sleeping² and the non-sleeping³ who exist in union (*sambheda*),⁴ therefore the sleeping one does not grasp (the address) and (*tu*) that non-grasping is not reasonable in the case of the non-sleeping. [128]

¹This is for *nyāya*.

²This refers to Prāṇa.

³Reference here is to *prāṇas* and their deities.

⁴Both Prāṇa and the Puruṣa (possessed of a body) co-exist in a human body.

श्रोत्रादेर्गुणभूतत्वात्प्रधानं प्रति सर्वदा ।
तस्मिञ्जाग्रति जागर्ति सुप्ते स्वपिति तद्वशात् ॥१२९॥

Since the ear and others have¹ ever been subordinate to (i.e. dependent on) the principal (one),² they are awake (i.e. active) while that one is awake (active) and they sleep while that is asleep, owing to their dependence on it. [129]

This sets aside the idea that Prāṇa does not hear its own names owing to the inactivity of the organs and not because it is non-enjoyer.

¹Though the word *śrotrādi* is in the singular, I have used the plural to refer to various organs implied by the use of *ādi*.

²The word *pradhāna* here does not refer to the Pradhāna of the Sāṃkhyas, but it refers to the *mukhya* Ātman, only in an embodied state.

नेन्द्रियाणां भवेत्स्वापो यदि प्राणप्रधानता ।
नामात्याः शेरते यस्माद्वाज्ञि स्वामिनि जाग्रति ॥१३०॥

There would not be sleep possible in the case of the organs if they are having Prāṇa as their principal (i.e. governor or controller); this is because the subordinates (or, servants *amātyas*) do not sleep while their master is awake (i.e. is functioning). [130]

The thought here is: Since (or when) Prāṇa (i.e. Jīva) is the enjoyer, the organs cannot have withdrawn their functions while it is not asleep.

अप्रसिद्धार्थसंज्ञाभिरुक्तेष्वेदप्रबोधनम् ।
देवतात्मनिषेधार्थपरत्वात्तद्ग्रहोऽर्थवान् ॥१३१॥

(The opponent argues:) Since there has been the use of not well-known (i.e. unusual) names in that address, there is no wakening (of the sleeping one¹); (only) then the understanding of that (call) would be meaningful by the rejection of the nature of the deities. [131]

The intention of the opponent is to point out that the sleeping one cannot accept the call owing to the names which are unfamiliar/unusual; not because it is non-Ātman.

¹This refers to the non-Ātman, viz. the individual.

Now is explained *kevalasambodhana* ... in BUB 2.1.15 (p.254).

प्राणस्याभोक्तृतासिद्धिः स्वनामाग्रहणादपि ।

देवताप्रतिषेधार्थं बोध्यते चन्द्रनामभिः ॥१३२॥

That Prāṇa is non-enjoyer (or, non-experiencer) is established even by the non-utterance of what are not its attributes (lit. names), (for) it is addressed by the attributes (lit. names) of the moon, prohibiting (or, rejecting) thereby that it is a deity. [132]

NKL comments: *devatānāmabhiḥ iti siddhāntabhāgaṃ vibhajate.*

Verses 133-137 clarify the nature of the organs as non-Ātman.

स्मृतिज्ञानेषणादीनां संधानानुपपत्तिः ।
करणानामभोक्तृत्वं देहांशानामिवेष्यते ॥१३३॥

Since it is not reasonable to posit any relation (or, connection)¹ of memory, grasping and desire etc., it is accepted that the organs are, like (various) parts of a body, non-enjoyers (or, non-experiencers).² [133]

This is to set aside a possible notion that each of the organs could be the Ātman.

¹Namely, continuity of varied experience on their part.

²SP clarifies thus: *smṛtyādīnāṃ yo rūpam adrākṣaṃ sa śabdaṃ śṛṇomītyādipratisaṃdhānasya anupapatteḥ.*

अचैतन्यात्तथोक्तस्य कुतो भोक्तृत्वसंभवः ।
चिदन्यस्य च भोज्यत्वान्नान्यस्यातोऽस्ति भोक्तृता ॥१३४॥

How could there be the nature of the enjoyer (or, experiencer) of them, so described,¹ on account of their being insentient? And since (only) whatever is other than sentience is what is (or, can) be enjoyed, there is not the nature of the enjoyer in what is other (than sentience). [134]

¹This refers to the description of the organs taken singly or

jointly. The argument is well brought out by SP thus: *yathā samudāyaḥ samudāyibhyo bhedaḥbhedaḥbhyām (ayuktas tathā caitanyābhinnaṭvenoktasyācetanasya karaṇavargasya na bhoktrtā jadatvād ghaṭavad ity arthaḥ)*.

दण्डापिकनीत्यैव करणानामभोक्तृता ।
न च प्राणातिरेकेण देवतान्योपपद्यते ॥१३५॥

The nature of (all) the organs as non-enjoyers (i.e. non-experiencers) is (understood) in the manner of (understanding the nature of) the cakes tied on a pole.¹ And one cannot understand (or, accept) any deity other than Prāṇa,² beside it. [135]

¹SP gives this in brief, but clearly, thus: *daṇḍe 'pūpalagne grhyamāṇe balād apūpo 'pi grhyate tayā nityā*

²This refers to the individual self which is of the nature of Sūtra.

ननु तद्व्यतिरेकेण प्रागादित्यादिरीरितः ।
देवताविषयो भेदः स कथं विनिवार्यते ॥१३६॥

But, (it is said), the different deities,¹ viz. Āditya and others, are first (or, earlier) mentioned beside (lit. in addition to) that;² how can that be explained (away)? [136]

This stresses the opposition to Prāṇa (=Sūtra) as marked by the beginning of the story (*ākhyāyikā*).

¹Literally, variety or maniness in respect of deities.

²This refers to the individual self.

नैवं तस्य समस्तस्य प्राण एकत्वहेतुतः ।
अरनाभ्यादिदृष्टान्ताद्वायुप्राधान्यतस्तथा ॥१३७॥

(The answer to the question is:) This cannot be so (said or asked), since Prāṇa is the cause of bringing about the unity

of the many, (as is clear from the illustration of the spokes and the hub) etc.¹ and also from the vital breath's having principal importance.² [137]

¹The word etc. implies *eṣa u hy eva sarve devāḥ* and *katama eko devaḥ* The illustration occurs in BU 2.5.15.

²Cf. CU 4.3.1: *vāyur vāva saṁvargaḥ*.

Now, there is in verses 138-157 argument about the gross body as non-Ātman.

संघात एव भोक्तास्तु तस्य प्रत्यक्षसंगतेः ।
न तु तद्व्यतिरिक्तस्य भोक्तृता मित्यसंभवात् ॥१३८॥

(There is an argument of the opponent:) Let the conglomeration (of the elements)¹ be the enjoyer (i.e. experiencer), for it is in accordance with direct perception.² And, thus, there cannot be the nature of any one/thing beside that as the enjoyer (i.e. experiencer), since there is no means of proving it. [138]

¹SP and NKL point to *bhūtacatuṣṭayasamāhāra* as the gross body (i.e. *saṁghāta* 'conglomeration').

²See, for example, the direct awareness, i.e. experience, of a person as 'I am fair' (SP) or 'I am a human being' (NKL).

नाचेतनस्य भोक्तृत्वं कथंचिदवकल्पते ।
चिदन्यस्य च भोग्यत्वात्कम्बलौदनतोयवत् ॥१३९॥

(The answer to the argument is:) This is not so, because the nature of an enjoyer (i.e. experiencer) cannot somehow¹ be attributed to (lit. posited of) a non-sentient (thing) somehow,¹ since whatever is other than sentience is (merely) of the nature of what is to be enjoyed (i.e. experienced) in the same way as a blanket, cooked rice and water etc. [139]

¹It means: without reason, purely out of imagination. NKL brings out the import of this thus: *cidviśiṣṭaḥ kāyo bhokteti tad-abhyupagamaḥ* (clarified by the editor as *dehātmavādinō 'bhyupagamaḥ*), *tatra mānaṃ ca pratyakṣam eveṣṭam* (clarified by the editor thus: *pratyakṣātiriktapramāṇānānigīkārāt iti bodh-yam*).

न चापि चिद्विशिष्टत्वं प्रत्यक्षेणोपलभ्यते ।

चित्संबन्धोपलब्ध्यर्थं तज्ज्ञाता कः प्रकल्प्यते ॥१४०॥

And, further, the nature (of that conglomeration) as (what is) characterized (lit. qualified) by sentience cannot be grasped (i.e. perceived) directly; as such, who could be (imagined/postulated) as the knower of grasping its relation to sentience?

[140]

The argument is: The opponent holds the gross body characterized by sentience as the experiencer; but it is already pointed out that direct perception of a non-sentient conglomeration is impossible and no other means of perceiving that is available! SP is clearer (than NKL) on this point. Thus it states: *cidviśiṣṭasya meyatve 'pi jñātā deho 'nyo vā nādyā ekasya jñātrjñeyatvāyogān netaro jñātrantarasya te (= ākṣepakasya) ani-ṣṭeḥ*.

नेह चिद्व्यतिरेकेण स्वार्थं किञ्चिदपीष्यते ।

नापि स्वार्थातिरेकेण प्रमाणफलभागभवेत् ॥१४१॥

Here¹ is not accepted anything else than sentience as its (desired) object;¹ nor also does (sentience) come to enjoy the result of any means of knowing which is other than (lit. beside) itself.³

[141]

¹That is 'in this world and in the scriptures' as SP clarifies.

²Or, its own end, i.e. aimed thing.

³This is another meaning of *svārtha*.

न ह्यचित्कं प्रमेयं सच्चिन्मिदं चिदपीक्ष्यते ।
न चानुभूतिः प्रात्यक्ष्यमन्यतोऽपेक्षते जडात् ॥१४२॥

It is not accepted that a non-sentient, being itself an object of knowing, is knower of sentience (or, the sentient).¹ Nor again does any experience (i.e. knowledge)² expect direct perception by some other (who is) non-sentient.³ [142]

¹This argument proceeds from the non-existence of another sentient knower.

²Experience is *jñāna* which is here accepted in the sense of the experiencer (*jñātr*).

³Or alternatively, by someone other than a non-sentient. Cf. SP: *jadād ajadād iti vā chedaḥ*; thus it reads alternatively ... *pekṣate 'jadāt*.

देहात्प्रात्यक्षनिष्पत्तौ न च प्रात्यक्षमिष्यते ।
लिङ्गस्य चाप्रमाणत्वात्कुतः प्रात्यक्षमानिता ॥१४३॥

Also, direct perception¹ is not accepted (lit. desired) in securing the direct perception of it² by³ the body and (*ca*), since *liṅga* 'characteristic (mark)' is not (in this respect) a means of knowing;⁴ how can the body be the direct perceiver? [143]

The argument is based on the opponent's holding *deha-viśiṣṭātman* as Reality.

¹This *pratyakṣa* refers to the means.

²This is *pratyakṣa jñāna*, of sentient, viz. the result, for the opponent holds the body as identical with the Ātman (*dehātmavāda*).

³*dehāt* is *hetau pañcamī*, i.e. *dehadvārā*.

⁴This, i.e. *liṅgasya apramāṇatva*, is owing to the impossibility of any characteristic mark by which the *dehātmavādin* can find any *liṅga* as the means of knowing the *dehātman*.

तथार्थान्तरसंबन्धे प्रत्यक्षे देहनिष्ठिते ।
अनुसंधानसंसिद्धौ न किञ्चिन्मानमिष्यते ॥१४४॥

And, further,¹ in relation to the direct perception of the body, there is not (i.e. cannot be) accepted any means of knowing for ascertaining its connection with (any other object necessary) towards a recollection (*anusandhāna*) of it. [144]

¹In place of *tathārthāntara* ... NKL reads *yathārthāntara* ... the purport of that reading cannot be pointed out significantly.

वागभिव्याहृतिश्चेयं लिङ्गाप्रामाण्यवादिनः ।
अप्रत्यक्षात्परज्ञप्तिसंगतेः स्यादनर्थिका ॥१४५॥

Furthermore, for the advocate of the non-authoritativeness of the characteristic mark, this statement would be meaningless on account of the impossibility of (its) association with any other (thing) owing to the absence of direct perception (of it).¹ [145]

¹Translation accepts NKL reading *apratyakṣāt* instead of AnSS edition *āpratyakṣyāt*.

स्वात्मदृष्ट्यनुरोधेऽपि मौढ्यमेव प्रसज्यते ।
व्युत्पत्तेः साधुलोकस्य न कश्चिदपि दित्सति ॥१४६॥

Even if one's¹ own theory is followed, there would follow foolishness only as contingent. None among the good people would give (to this view any credit) of wisdom (as of any specific information). [146]

¹NKL specifically mentions the name of Cārvāka.

अधर्मादिभयाभावाद्धन्युरेनमशङ्किताः ।
आदद्युश्च बलाद्वित्तमेतद्व्युत्पत्तितः फलम् ॥१४७॥

And this would be the result of (such) knowledge, viz. they¹ (the followers of this view), would kill this one (viz. the wise one)² being free from any fear and since there is no danger of any irreligious behaviour etc., they would perforce snatch away (this one's) wealth. [147]

¹SP points out the over-bearing nature of the follower of Cārvāka: *unmattapakṣe nikṣiptaḥ san* and then remarks that they are worth ignoring (*upeksyaḥ*).

²That is, the one mentioned in the preceding verse.

आपेक्षणे विशेषस्य दृष्टत्वाद्देहसंहतिः ।
न भोक्त्री सुखदुःखादिफलानां स्यात्कदाचन ॥१४८॥

(And) since there is seen a particular person¹ (as related to) the action of shaking (by hand), the conglomeration (of the four elements) in the form of a body would never be the enjoyer (i.e. experiencer) of the results, viz. happiness, sorrow and others.² [148]

This is one more reason for holding the body as non-Ātman.

¹The touch of only one particular body is meant.

²SP explains: *ādipadam tadavāntarabhedasamgrahārtham*, signifying other experiences.

यदि संघातमात्रस्य भोक्तृत्वमिह कल्प्यते ।
संघातस्याविशिष्टत्वान्नातिशीतिर्भवेत्सदा ॥१४९॥

If it is accepted here (i.e. in respect of the object to be enjoyed/experienced) that the nature of an enjoyer/experiencer is only a conglomeration (of four elements); then, that conglomeration being unspecified, there would not ever be a special mention (of any particular body). [149]

These statements are made by way of the Vyatireka form of argument.

ईषत्संपृष्टमात्रस्य बलाच्चापेषणात्तथा ।
 देहादिभिन्नजातीयो भोक्ता यस्य च वादिनः ॥१५०॥
 धर्मादिहेतुसंबन्धबहुत्वात्स्यात्समञ्जसम् ।
 पेषणापेषणकृतवेदनायां भवेद्विदा ॥१५१॥

So also, (there would not be a special mention of any particular body), caused by just a gentle (lit. little of a) touch or vigorous shaking by a hand. But (or, as against this (*ca*)), in the case of one who holds (lit. speaks) that the enjoyer (or, experiencer) is of a nature different from (that of) a body etc.,¹ [150] (the specification arising from different ways of touch) would be understandable (i.e. reasonable) owing to the variety (lit. maniness) of the cause(s) such as merit (*dharma*) etc.,² (for) there would be difference(s) in respect of the feelings³ caused by his being shaken by a hand or non-shaking (thereby). [151]

¹What this 'etc.' means is not clear; but 'SP' states there is *avāntarabheda-saṃgraha*.

²The word etc. here refers to *adharma* and *vāsanā*.

³This is clarified in the following verse.

सुखदुःखादिहेतूनामुत्तमाधममध्यतः ।
 तत्प्रबोधविशेषोऽयं युक्त एव भवेत्तदा ॥१५२॥

Only then would it be reasonable that this particular (type)¹ of the (resulting) waking of that (person)² owing to the (causes of) pleasure, sorrow (i.e. feeling of some trouble) etc.³ which may be of the highest, the lowest and the ordinary⁴ types. [152]

¹This explains *bhidā* in the preceding verse.

²Reference is to the *Jīvātman*, in the view expressed from verse 150b onwards.

³This is related to *dharmādharmādi* in the preceding verse. The word etc. refers to the different articulations or the loud

or gentle calls in the address which accompany the shaking by a hand.

⁴*madhya* is for *madhyama*.

अस्ति चायं विशेषोऽत्र यत्संस्पर्शनमात्रतः ।
अबुध्यमानः संसुप्त आपिष्यापिष्य बोधितः ॥१५३॥

Furthermore, this is the (specific) difference here (i.e. in this view): the sleeping one, who did not become awake by mere (or gentle) touch, was awakened after (Ajātaśatru) had shaken him again and again (by his hand). [153]

अत आपेषणाद्योऽसावुत्थितः करणैः सह ।
राजेव सचिवैः सार्धं स भोक्तेहेति गम्यताम् ॥१५४॥

Therefore that one, who, together with the organs, became awake is to be understood, like a king by his servants, as the enjoyer (or, experiencer) here.¹ [154]

¹That is, in this body (SP).

मृतकल्पमिमं देहं स्वचित्तावेशयन्निव ।
ज्वलन्निव समुत्तस्थौ यः स भोक्तेति गम्यताम् ॥१५५॥

That one, who rose up, like a burning fire flashing forth,¹ putting his own sentience² into the almost dead body,³ as it were, should be understood as the enjoyer (or, experiencer). [155]

This explains *jvallann iva sphurann iva kutaś cid āgata iva* in BUB.

¹*svacittāveśayan* is to be split as *svacittā* (i.e. *cit-tā*)-*aveśayan* Yet read *Vārtikasāra* 2.1.37: ... *svacitaavezayann iva* which is better. translation is in agreement with it.

²Or, the dead-looking body.

³Cf. *na hi jvalanam agner iva cid ātmano 'sti kiṃ tu tathā*

sphuraṇam grhītvā jvalann ivety uktam (SP).

क्रोधहर्षभयोद्वेगज्ञानधर्मैर्विशेषयन् ।

शरीरं यः समुत्तस्थौ स भोक्तेत्यवसीयताम् ॥१५६॥

That one is to be understood as the enjoyer (or, experiencer) who rose up modifying the (dead-looking)¹ body with the properties, viz. anger, joy, fear, dejection and *jñāna*. [156]

This explains *piṇḍam ca pūrvaviparītam bodhaceṣṭākāraviśeṣā-dimattvenāpādayan* in BUB (p.256).

¹Cf. the word *mṛtakalpanam* in the preceding verse.

Now follows in verses 157-62 another explanation as to why *Prāṇa* (viz. the vital force) is non-*Ātman*.

अपि प्राणस्य पारार्थ्यं संहतत्वाद्गृहादिवत् ।

ततश्च भोग्यरूपस्य भोक्तृत्वं नोपपद्यते ॥१५७॥

Also, since, in the case of *Prāṇa* (viz. *Sūtra/Hiraṇyagarbha*), there is subservience to someone else, as is in the case of a house etc., on account of its being a conglomeration (*saṃgraha*) and, being as a result (*tataś ca*), of the nature of what is to be enjoyed (or, experienced), it is not reasonable to hold its being the enjoyer (or, experiencer). [157]

देहस्यान्तर्गतः प्राणः स्थूणावद्देहभृत्सदा ।

संहन्यते शरीरेण यथा वायुस्तथैव सः ॥१५८॥

Prāṇa 'the vital force', being fixed inside a body, just like some pillar (in a house), is ever possessed of a body; it is fixed just like the wind¹ that is bound to a body. [158]

¹SP points out that this wind is the breath or *mukhya Prāṇa*.

यत एवमतः प्राणो गृहादिवदिहेष्यते ।

देहाच्च देहधर्मेभ्यो विधर्मात्मावभुक्ततः ॥१५९॥

Since this is so, therefore, Prāṇa 'the vital force' is understood here (i.e. in the body) like a house (viz. a conglomeration subservient to someone else); therefore, it is, in respect of properties, different from a body and the properties of that body and therefore a non-enjoyer (or, non-experiencer).¹ [159]

¹See SP: *saṃhatatvahalaparāmarśī*.

स्वात्मांशान्सिसजातीयविविक्तफलसद्भवत् ।
 संहतत्वात्तथा प्राणोऽसंहतात्मोपभोगकृत् ॥१६०॥
 स्वजन्मोपचयग्लानिनाशाख्याकृतिजन्मदिग्- ।
 धर्मानपेक्षसंलब्धसत्त्वादिस्वार्थरूपकः ॥१६१॥
 तद्गोचरैकसंद्रष्टृविज्ञात्रर्थं समीक्ष्य हि ।
 प्राणस्य तद्गुणानां च तथार्थत्वं प्रतीयताम् ॥१६२॥

So also, being bound (in a body), Prāṇa 'the vital force' is of help to (or, of use for) the (ever) bound Ātman,¹ just like a house which is a result (lit. fruit) distinct from those that are its likes (or similar ones) which are its own parts² or any (other) house(s) having similar parts.³ [160]
 Indeed, on seeing that it⁴ is (useful) only for the seer and the knower (of its objects), the one who comes to manifest itself and to have its own form without depending on the birth, growth, decay, death, name and the form, together with the space (lit. direction) of its rise,⁵ [161-162ab]
 let it be understood that Prāṇa 'the vital force' and its properties have a similar purpose.⁶ [162cd]

We have ignored the NKL edition which reads *svajanma ... nāśākhyākṛti dṛgjanma dharmāna ... rūpaka ... tadgocaraika ... trartham* as one word, since it is metrically faulty. Yet, *janma* which is repeated in the first line of verse 161 offers some difficulty, and which I have somehow solved! Therefore, it appears that the text given does not stop as ... *rūpakah* in 161d.

¹The Ātman is not combined with the body; it is taken as bound to it through ignorance.

²This refers to the pillars and such other parts of that house which, being combined together with it, are subservient/useful to it (*svātmāmśa*).

³Some similar (*sajātīya*) houses made of these (i.e. similar) parts (*aṃśas*).

⁴The idea of the house (*aṃśin*) persists here also.

⁵Literally, the birth and the space of the Ātman. Or does it refer to the properties of the house (*aṃśin*)?

⁶*tathārthatva* is *parārthatva*.

It is to be noted how, by this single word, Sureśvara conveys the similarity of a house etc. with Prāṇa and its accompanying properties (*dharma*s) which is brought out in BUB, in its fullness.

Read NKL: *prāṇataddharmāṇāṃ ca tathātvam anumeyam ity arthaḥ*.

In verses 163-174, there is now a discussion on the nature of the Ātman in respect of which some division (into parts) is (only) imagined.

ननु वेदान्तसिद्धान्ते न वस्त्वन्तरमिष्यते ।

सांख्यराद्धान्तवर्तिकचित्प्रत्यगात्मैकवस्तुनः ॥१६३॥

(An objection is raised:) But, in the Vedānta doctrine, they do not accept (i.e. hold as existing) anything other than only the single inner self, as in the Sāṃkhya doctrine.¹ [163]

The objection proceeds from the basic impossibility of Anvaya and Vyatireka method of inference. For this method, see our book [Vol.1:1982] Introduction.

¹The Sāṃkhyas accept many Puruṣas, i.e. as many inner selves are there as there are bodies and, therefore, Anvaya and Vyatireka method of argument is possible for them.

Incidentally, a fastidious person might point to the word *rāddhānta* as indicative of the rejected view! See Belvalkar's

Note on BSB 2.2.17 (*The Brahma-Sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa with the Comment of Śaṅkarāchārya Chapter II, Quarters I & II* third edition, p.114, Poona: Bilvakuṇja Publishing House, 1938). But this is hardly meant.

ऐकात्म्याविद्यया सर्वं प्रतीचि परिकल्पितम् ।
प्राणाद्यनात्मजातं यद्रूपं नाम च कर्म च ॥१६४॥

(The objector says further:) It is owing to the ignorance about the singleness of the Ātman that all is imagined (to be existing) in the case of the inner self—all, viz. *prāṇas* etc. which is the entire collection of the non-Ātman, viz. what are called a form, a name and (any) activity. [164]

This averts the notion of *prāṇa* and other things as existing beside the Ātman.

कल्पिताकल्पितं सर्वं यदात्मैवाभ्युपेयते ।
अन्वयव्यतिरेकोक्तिस्तदैक्यान्नेह युज्यते ॥१६५॥

Since all, viz. whatever is imagined and whatever, not imagined, is accepted to be just the Ātman; therefore, owing to this singleness of the Ātman, there cannot be (made) any reasonable statement (on the basis) of Anvaya and Vyatireka. [165]

This re-assertion by the objector aims at pointing to the imaginary nature of non-Ātman conceived as existing in the inner self. The thrust of this argument is noticed in the following verse. Also, see verses 171ff. for discussion on this point again.

नान्वयो व्यतिरेको वा कल्पितस्यानृतत्वतः ।
अकल्पितस्य चैकत्वान्नितरां न प्रसिध्यति ॥१६६॥

Since the (thing) imagined is false (or, unreal), therefore, there cannot be (any statement made about it, basing it on) Anvaya and Vyatireka. And,¹ the non-imagined (viz. the real, i.e. the

sthānam.

ऐकात्म्यसिद्धौ दोषः स्यात्तत्सिद्धिश्च न वास्तवी ।
 प्रामाणिकी हि तत्सिद्धिरतो नासौ विरुध्यते ॥१७१॥
 न चापि मानव्यापारव्यपेक्षैकात्म्यनिश्चितौ ।
 तत्फलस्य समाप्तत्वादपेक्षा निष्फला यतः ॥१७२॥

(If it is argued:) 'The singleness of the Ātman being taken as established,¹ there will follow the fault (viz. impossibility of the method of Anvaya and Vyatireka),'² (the answer is:) 'No, (that is not so), its establishing (thereby) is not real; (for) that establishing (of it) is depending on the means of knowing³ and, therefore, it is not opposed. [171]

Furthermore, there is no need whatever of the function of any means of knowing⁴ with respect to deciding the singleness of the Ātman, since any expectancy about it⁵ is useless (lit. unproductive), for its result is already obtained.⁶ [172]

The argument in verse 165 is the basis of the argument here. In these two verses, it is taken that the singleness of the Ātman is known.

¹This refers to *svaprakāśatva* of the Ātman, i.e. its singleness.

²If singleness is already established, there is no usefulness of the method of Anvaya and Vyatireka.

³This refers to understanding the sentences of the Śruti, i.e. their verbal level can be taken as *pramāṇagocara* and, therefore, Avidyā.

⁴The *pramāṇavyavahāra* is understood as *mithyā* 'false'.

⁵This refers to any *pramāṇa*.

⁶That is, self-established.

यावत्त्वागमतः साक्षात् वेत्त्यात्मानमद्वयम् ।
 अन्वयाद्यात्मबोधार्थं तावत्तत्केन वार्यते ॥१७३॥

But, so long as one does not directly know (i.e. learn) from the Śruti (the nature of) the Ātman as without any duality,

who would set aside for that while Anvaya etc. (is available) for getting to know (the nature of) the Ātman? [173]

This verse grants the use of the method of Anvaya and Vyatireka, if, i.e. while, the singleness of the Ātman is not known.

अज्ञानं च तदुत्थं च ह्यात्मैवाज्ञाततत्त्वकः ।
तत्तत्त्वबोधात्तद्बाधः सर्परज्ज्वादिबाधवत् ॥१७४॥

Ignorance and what arises from it are but (i.e. nothing else than) the Ātman alone, its nature remaining (for that while) unknown; therefore, by the knowing the nature of it (viz. the Ātman), there follows the stultification (i.e. removal) of that,¹ just like the stultification of a serpent (etc.) by (knowing the nature of) a rope etc.² [174]

¹This refers to 'Ignorance and what arises from it'.

²The word etc. refers to the other things that are taken wrongly through superimposition on them of the nature of others.

Here also, Sureśvara uses *ādi* only after *rajju*, implying it also after *sarpa*.

कलृप्तानामपि रज्ज्वादौ कल्पितान्तरसंश्रयात् ।
कलृप्तान्तरापनुत्तिः स्याद्यथा तद्वदिहात्मनि ॥१७५॥

Further, as there is (lit. would be) removal of the other things which are imagined in the place of a rope etc. among (objects that are) imagined, in the same way, (there is removal of what is imagined) in the Ātman. [175]

The verse proceeds from the argument that all *pramāṇa-vyavahāra* being false, the result, viz. knowing thereby the nature of the Ātman from the Śāstras, is also false.

प्रत्यङ्मानैकमेयोऽतो भोक्ता भोग्यं ततोऽपरम् ।
भोग्यानां व्यभिचारेऽपि भोक्तैकोऽव्यभिचारवान् ॥१७६॥

Therefore, the enjoyer (or, experiencer) alone is the one inferred from the experiencer of the inner self and the enjoyed (or, experienced) is different from (lit. other than) that. (And) even in variation (*vyabhicāra*) of the objects that are enjoyed (or, experienced) is (the Ātman) alone invariably (to be understood). [176]

This concludes the discussion of 'individual self' and others, being perceived (*drśyamāna*), are only false (or imagined).

Now follows in verses 177-182 the explanation of the BU sentence: *tam pāṇināpeṣam bodhayamcakāra*.

बृहन्नित्यादिभिः प्राणो बोध्यमानोऽपि यत्नतः ।
 नैवान्वबुध्यत यदा चक्रे यत्नान्तरं तदा ॥१७७॥
 पाणिनापिष्य बहुशः सुप्तं काश्योऽप्यबोधयत् ।
 आपेषोद्धृतसंक्षोभस्ततोऽसौ प्रत्यबुध्यत ॥१७८॥

When Prāṇa (the vital force in the body of the sleeping man), though addressed again and again (*yatnataḥ*) by (the names/attributes) Brhat and others, did not become awake, then (Kāśya) made another effort. [177]

Having many times shaken the sleeping (man) by his hand, Kāśya (finally) awakened him and then, being disturbed by the shaking, he (also) became awake. [178]

कारणानामिदं वृत्तं यन्निमित्तान्तराश्रयात् ।
 स्वात्मकार्यसमुद्भूतिरम्बरादभ्रभूतिवत् ॥१७९॥

This is the happening in the case of causes that there followed (lit. arose) the effect of their own operation in the same way as there is the rise (or, movement) of clouds in the sky. [179]

The argument is: The sky does not function in any way, yet there is rise or movement of the clouds in the sky, thanks to

the winds blowing in various directions. So also, the shaking of the limbs caused the waking of Prāṇa 'the vital force' in the body—but not the Ātman that is ever awake (and is thus free from any effect of the shaking). This is clarified in the following verse.

आपेषाल्लीनबुद्ध्यादिसमुत्पत्तौ परात्मनः ।
घटाकाशवदुत्पत्तिर्नाञ्जसैव सदा दृशेः ॥१८०॥

The waking of the highest Ātman consequent upon the rise of (i.e. being active/operative of) intellect and others, which had merged (in sleep), by the shaking (by Kāśya's hand), is not acceptable (or, reasonable), even like the origin of sky in a pitcher, because (that highest Ātman) is ever the seer (i.e. always awake). [180]

The argument is: In the creation of a pitcher, there is consequently a supposed (i.e. false) creation of 'sky in a pitcher'. So also, the waking up of intellect and other organs is assumed to be the waking of sentience in the sleeping man.

तस्मादप्रतिबोधेन प्राणोऽभोक्तेति गम्यताम् ।
पुंसस्तु प्रतिबोधेन भोक्तृतैवावसीयते ॥१८१॥

Therefore, from this non-waking, let it be understood that the vital force (within) is the non-enjoyer (or, non-experiencer). Its being the enjoyer (or, experiencer) is concluded by the man's waking. [181]

This explains the BU sentence: *tau ha puruṣaṃ suptam*

The conclusion that the vital force within the earlier sleeping man is the enjoyer (or, experiencer) is reached through the force of only verbal argument. This becomes clear from the following verse.

अदाहवगनां दग्धृत्वं यथा दाहकसंगतेः ।

भोक्तृसंयोगतस्तद्वद्वोक्तृत्वं देवतात्मनः ॥१८२॥

As the nature of a burner (or, what burns) is attributed to a non-burner (also), on account of its association (i.e. being together with) what (really) burns; so also, the nature of an enjoyer (or, experiencer) is attributed to the vital force, which is of the nature of a deity, on account of its association (lit. conjunction) with a (real) enjoyer (or, experiencer). [182]

Now follows in verses 183-207 the explanation of BU 2.1.16 (and allied matter).

देहेन्द्रियमनोधीभ्यो विविच्यात्मानमेकलम् ।
भोक्तारं दर्शयित्वाथ राजा गार्ग्यमपृच्छत ॥१८३॥
आपेषणेन बुबुधे यः प्राणादिविलक्षणः ।
क्वामूदयं पुरा बोधात्कुतश्चागतवान्पुमान् ॥१८४॥

Having thus understood the Ātman, who is single, as different from the body, its organs, *manas* and intellect, and shown it to be the enjoyer (or, experiencer), the king then asked Gārgya: [183]

Where was this one before waking up, (the one) who has a nature different from that of Prāṇa 'individual self' and others and was awakened by (Kāśya's) shaking him by his hand and where has this Puruṣa come from? [184]

अन्तःकरणसंबन्धे विज्ञानमिति कर्तरि ।
प्रत्ययः करणार्थः स्यात्क्रियायां भावसाधनः ॥१८५॥
प्रमेयार्थविवक्षायां शब्दः स्यात्कर्मसाधनः ।
यथोक्तानामसद्भावात्प्रायार्थः प्रत्यगात्मनि ॥१८६॥

In relation to the internal organ, the word *vijñāna* is expressive of the agent;¹ the (same) suffix is expressive of the means (or, instrument)² if it would be expressive of the action (proper), being a conveyer of process,³ [185]
(and) that (same) word is a conveyer of the object (of action),

when the intention would be to convey (the meaning of) the object to be known.⁴ Of these many meanings which are thus stated, the meaning is, according to our intent (or, interpretation), that which is '(mostly) consisting in'⁵ the inner self.

[186]

In these two verses, Sureśvara resorts to grammatical erudition and explains the meaning of *vijñāna*, as he accepts it. He has done this, keeping in view the opinion of Bhartṛprapañca (conveyed in BSB in the word *kecit*, and as annotated by the editor of NKL: *bhartṛprapañcamatanirāsārtham*) that by the word *vijñāna* is meant the inner self as the product of the Brahman—read NKL: *vijñānamayaḥ ity atra vijñānapadena brahmābhīdhānāt tadvikāratvaṃ jīvasyocyate*. Sureśvara's opinion is clarified by both SP and NKL (which almost fully concurs with SP) and, therefore, read SP: *pratīci kūṭasthe yathokta-kartṛtvādyabhāvād atrāsyā kartṛvyutpattyāntaḥkaraṇaviṣayatvāt pratīcas tadavikāratvāt prāyārtho mayat ity āha*.

¹ Cf. Pāṇini Sūtra 3.3.113: *kṛtyalyuṭo bahulam*.

² Cf. Pāṇini Sūtra 3.3.117: *karāṇe lyuṭ*.

³ Cf. Pāṇini Sūtra 3.3.115: *bhāve lyuṭ*.

⁴ Cf. Pāṇini Sūtra 3.3.116: *karmaṇi lyuṭ*.

⁵ Cf. Pāṇini Sūtra 5.4.21: *prāyārthe mayat* (according to *Kāśikā*).

स्वाभासवदविद्योत्थबुद्ध्यादिव्याप्तिविभ्रमात् ।

तदात्मत्वाभिमानित्वाद्विज्ञानमयतात्मनः ॥१८७॥

The Ātman is taken to be *vijñānamaya* 'mostly consisting in' the internal organ (viz. intellect) owing to the error of its (supposed) pervasion by intellect which has arisen from ignorance that is (merely) its (viz. the Ātman's) semblance and also because it identifies itself with it.

[187]

This verse explains why the Ātman, the *kṣetrajña*, is *antaḥkaraṇaprāya*.

साक्षित्वेनोपलभ्यत्वात्साक्ष्यबद्ध्यादिसंश्रयात् ।
अकारकफलत्वेन तेन प्रायार्थतेष्यते ॥१८८॥

(Or alternatively/in addition) because it is noticed as of the nature of the witness¹ and has a resort in intellect and others,² which are to be witnessed, and because it is not of the nature of a result of any agent;³ therefore, it is understood as a thing mostly consisting in (intellect). [188]

¹This is because it is not a modification (*vikāra*).

²*manas*, *ahamkāra* and other organs are meant.

³Because it is not a *kriyā* etc. (Is it *prāpti* 'reaching (something)' or *saṃskāra* 'polishing'?)

यतो विज्ञानमानी सन्सर्वं वस्त्ववगच्छति ।
विज्ञानमयता तस्मात्प्रतीचोऽबोधकारणात् ॥१८९॥

Since, identifying itself with intellect, it grasps all things (as existing outside); therefore, the inner self is taken as mostly consisting in intellect, there being absence of the knowledge (of its own true nature) on the part of it. [189]

This is to answer a possible doubt: 'How could the all-knowing be a witness depending upon intellect and others?

विज्ञानेन विशिष्टं वा यस्मान्मेयं प्रपद्यते ।
प्रायार्थत्वं प्रतीचोऽतस्तदभिन्नग्रहाद्वेत् ॥१९०॥

Or, since it comes to know the object of knowing which is specified by *vijñāna* 'intellect', therefore, the inner self becomes a thing 'mostly consisting in' (it), viz. that is taken as non-distinct from (it). [190]

विज्ञानमय इत्युक्त्वा पृथिव्यादिमयोक्ततः ।
षड्विकारनिषेधाच्च प्रायार्थत्वं समञ्जसम् ॥१९१॥

The nature of the inner self as 'mostly consisting in' (intellect) is reasonable (by the Śruti's) having said (that the inner self) is 'mostly consisting in' *viññāna* 'intellect', and by (first) calling (the same) as 'mostly consisting in' earth etc. and thereafter by rejecting the six (known) modifications (of the same).¹

[191]

¹This is on the basis of SP.

अनात्मनो यतोऽशेषान्कल्पितत्वादकल्पितः ।
पूरयन्पुरुषः प्रत्यक्सर्पादीन्नशना यथा ॥१९२॥

The inner self is (called) *Puruṣa*, since, itself unimagined it (is ever) creating (lit. filling this world with) all the non-Ātmans (which are so called) on account of their being imaginary (even) as a girdle (that is real, creates) a serpent etc.¹ [192]

This is Sureśvara's etymology of the word *Puruṣa* for the inner self, viz. it is from verb root *pṛ*, 'to fill'—it is offered in the Brāhmaṇical style.

¹The use of 'etc.' is really unintended; yet see verse 174 above for similar mode of writing.

व्युत्पत्तिरियमेवात्र तात्पर्यस्य समीक्षणात् ।
स वा इति ह्युपक्रम्य नैनेनेत्यादिनिर्णयात् ॥१९३॥

It is reasonable to accept only this derivation in view of the purport (of the BU passage), for it has first begun with (the words) *sa vā* and then finally concluded in (the words) *nainena*¹

[193]

Sureśvara states the reason for offering his own etymology of the word *puruṣa* in preference to BUB's *puri śayanāt* SP states the following in this regard: *pūrṇatvāt puruṣa ity eṣaiva vyutpattir atra grāhyā pratyakpūrṇatve vākyatātparyadrṣṭer ity arthah*.

¹This refers to BU 2.5.18: *sa vā ayam puruṣaḥ sarvāsu pūrṣu puriśayo nainena kiñcanānāvṛtaṃ nainena kiñcanāsamvṛtaṃ*.

It appears that Sureśvara is ignoring here the word *puriśaya* which BSB maintains! (Also cf. BUBV 2.5.120 on BU 2.5.18.)

इयं तावत्पदार्थोक्तिः संबन्धोक्तिरथाधुना ।
प्रश्नस्य क्वैष इत्यादेः किमर्थोऽयमुपक्रमः ॥१९४॥

This then (*tāvat*) is the statement of the meanings of the (different) words;¹ now is a statement (made) about the relation (of them to what follows); as such, there is a question: 'What is the purpose of this introductory, viz. of the question, "where (was) this ...?"'. [194]

¹These are *vijñāna* and *puruṣa*.

In verses 195-201, there follows a statement of Bhartṛprapañca's view on the question and its answer.

चोद्यैकमूलां प्रश्नोक्तिं केचिद्व्याचक्षतेऽपरे ।
याथात्म्यप्रतिपत्त्यर्थमुत्थितस्य प्रचक्षते ॥१९५॥

Some others¹ explain that the question is rooted in some objection: They state that (the question) which has arisen is for understanding (clearly) the true nature (of the Ātman)² — [195]

¹This is a reference to Bhartṛprapañca (NKL).

²The second half of the verse seems to be parenthetical.

पुंसोऽस्य ज्ञस्वभावत्वे करणेष्वपि सत्सु च ।
कादाचित्कोऽवबोधोऽस्य कुत इत्युच्यतां यथा ॥१९६॥

viz. "How is it then that this Puruṣa, being of the nature of a knower, and the (various) organs also are (present), this one can have knowledge belonging to (or, arising at) only

some (particular) time?"; let (this) be told.

[196]

The argument is: The inner self is an ever knowing (agent) and has the help of all the organs. As such, it should ever be knowing, i.e. not ever asleep. See how SP refers to the Bhāṣya of Bhartṛprapañca: *bhoktur jñānasvabhāvatve karaṇeṣu vidyā-māneṣu katham kadācit prabodha iti tadīyabhāṣyārtham āha.*

विहायैतच्छरीरं वा गतो देशान्तरं पुमान् ।
विनष्टो वा कुतो भूयो देहमागादितीर्यताम् ॥१९७॥

'Either this Puruṣa left the body and went to (some) other region (or, place), or being lost (somewhere), whence has he come back to the body (again)?' Let this be told (or, explained).

[197]

SP appears to quote Bhartṛprapañca thus: *uktaṃ hi atha punar vihāyaitad asaṃnihito 'bhūd vinaṣṭo vā kutaḥ pratyāgamanam iti.*

प्रष्टव्यमेतद्गार्गेण शिष्यत्वान्न त्वचूचुदत् ।
नैवोदास्ते तथापीनो बोधाभ्युपगमात्स्वयम् ॥१९८॥

Being a pupil (now), Gārgya should have asked this; and (*tu*) he did not raise any doubt! Even then (*tathāpi*) the king (*ina*) did not remain silent because he himself had accepted to enlighten (him).

[198]

Under this verse also, SP quotes Bhartṛprapañca thus: *yathāhuh— tad etad gārgyeṇa praṣṭavyam āsīt sa hi śiṣyaś codayiteti.* Then again: *uktaṃ ca yadā codayituh śiṣyasya pratipattir na bhavaty ācāryaś ca tam artham vyācikyāsur bhavati tadā svayam eva codyam utthāpya vyācaṣṭa iti.*

अर्थिनेऽर्थं प्रतिज्ञाय नासंपाद्य निवर्तते ।
यथार्थितं सत्पुरुष इति सत्पुरुषव्रतम् ॥१९९॥

A good man, having promised to a suppliant (to give) some particular thing, does not hold himself back if (i.e. till) he has not granted it in accordance with the supplication; this is the vow (i.e. unfailing behaviour) of a good man. [199]

This general statement implies that, being a good man, Kāśya does not withhold himself from imparting to Gārgya the instruction regarding the Brahman, even if he was silent and yet wishing to have it.

कूटस्थोऽस्यावबोधश्चेत्कादाचित्कं कुतो भवेत् ।
मतोऽवबोधोऽनित्यश्चेत्कादाचित्कं तदार्थवत् ॥२००॥

If the waking (i.e. knowledge) of this one is immutable, how could (this waking) be belonging to (or, arising at) only some (particular) time? If again it is held that the waking (i.e. knowledge) is not-always-obtaining; in that case alone, its belonging to (or, arising at) only some (particular) time would have been meaningful (i.e. reasonable). [200]

This is said in view of verse 196 above.

Translation follows SP's second alternative explanation, NKL agreeing with it. SP's first alternative is: If the knowledge on the part of the Ātman is immutable and not belonging to (or, arising at) only some time, it should follow that the Ātman is neither asleep nor gone elsewhere. On this, the objector might say: But this is against the usual experience (expressed in) 'I did not know (or feel) anything.' If alternatively, the Ātman's waking is taken as not-always-obtaining, then one cannot explain away the knowledge that belongs to (or, arises at) only some particular time. This explanation, though not altogether impossible, appears laboured or not naturally occurring.

देहादिष्वभिमानोऽस्य कादाचित्कः सहेतुकः ।
आगमापायिसाक्षित्वं नित्यमेवानिमित्ततः ॥२०१॥

(In answer to the above question, which is clarified further, Bhartṛprapañca answers it away thus:) The identification of itself by this one with the body etc. is occurring only at some particular time and is having some cause(s)¹ for it; (but) its being the witness of what comes into existence and goes out (or dies)² is (certainly) perennial owing to its having no cause(s). [201]

¹These are *dharma*, *adharma* etc. The identification by the Ātman with the body and the organs of itself is the basis of its experiences of the results of *dharma*, *adharma* etc.

²Cf. *Gītā* 2.14:

*mātrāsparśās tu kaunteya śītoṣṇasukhaduḥkhadāḥ /
āgamāpāyino 'nityās tāṃs titikṣasva bhārata //*

इदमेव यतो वृत्तं कारणापेक्षिणां सताम् ।
अभूत्वा भवनं तस्मात्कादाचित्कं न दोषभाक् ॥२०२॥

Since, in the case of the existent objects, which expect some cause(s), this (i.e. such)¹ is the behaviour, viz. coming into existence after it has not been there; therefore, the belonging to (or, arising at) some (particular) time (of them)² does not involve any fault. [202]

It follows from the argument in this verse that the *kādācitka* of *dehādyabhimāna* (mentioned earlier) is only natural.

¹Their character as *āgamāpāyin*.

²*dharma* and *adharma*, together with their results, are meant. Cf. SP: *dharmādeś ca pravāhāvicchede 'pi vyaktivicchedān na sadā sattvaṃ na ca sati hetau kāryaniyamaḥ sāmāgryāṃ tanniyamād ato na susūptyasiddhir iti bhāvaḥ (kādācitkaṃ dehādyabhimānasyeti śeṣaḥ)*.

In verses 203-204, there is repudiation of Bhartṛprapañca's view.

प्रतीच्येव यतश्चाभूदागाच्च प्रत्यगात्मनः ।
प्रश्नार्थप्रतिकूलत्वात्प्रत्युक्तेर्नेदृगर्थता ॥२०३॥

Such is not the situation,¹ since 'The individual self was (i.e. had merged) in the inner self and also came (i.e. arose) from (that) inner self.' is an answer opposed to the content of the question (viz. the *codya*), (which you have posited).² [203]

This argument is based on verse 200 above.

¹That is, *paroktārthatā* 'the nature of what another person has said' which is for *īdṛgarthatā*.

²In verse 195 above.

गत्यादिसाधनानां च देह एव स्थितेः कुतः ।
देशान्तरगतिः पुंसो नापि नाशोऽस्य युक्तिमान् ॥२०४॥

"Also, since the means of going (elsewhere)¹ exist only in the body; how can there be the Puruṣa's going to some other region? So also, the being lost (somewhere, of this one) is not reasonable." [204]

This verse keeps in view verse 197 above.

¹These are feet, wish, decision.

²Or, it does not stand to reason, because there would not be waking up (or, coming back) again possible. Read SP: *punarutthānāyogād akṛtābhyāgamādiprasaṅgāc ca*.

Now follows Sureśvara's own explanation of the question and its answer.

साक्षाद्ब्रह्मावबोधस्य प्रतिज्ञातत्वकारणात् ।
भोक्तृभोक्तव्ययोस्तत्त्वं वक्तुं युक्तमतोऽञ्जसा ॥२०५॥

Owing to (the situation that) there is a promise¹ of directly informing (Gārgya) about (the nature of) the Brahman, it is (only) proper to declare (i.e. explain) clearly the (true) nature

of the enjoyer (i.e. experiencer) and the enjoyed (i.e. experienced). [205]

This verse fulfils the suggestions in verses 195-196 and 201.

¹Cf. the sentence *vy eva tvā jñāpayiṣyāmi* in BU 2.1.15.

कर्मादिहेतुजं रूपमतत्त्वं तदनन्वयात् ।
अनिमित्तं स्वतस्तस्य सर्वदाव्यभिचारतः ॥२०६॥
अकारकक्रियाकार्यं रूपं प्राक्प्रतिबोधतः ।
बुबोधयिषितं भोक्तुरस्मद्भोचरवर्तिनः ॥२०७॥

The form,¹ (of the *bhoktavya*) which is produced by action etc.,² is false (lit. not its true nature), since it does not follow (i.e. continue to be, in sleep state) and the nature of it (viz. the *bhoktr*) itself does not invariably have any cause (for its existence), [206]

(and) its form is devoid of any agent(s) of activity, action and what is to be done (i.e. to be effected or achieved by an action); (this) nature of the enjoyer (or, experiencer) was sought to be explained (by Kāśya to Gārgya), that which (existed even) before waking (up of the man) and which is within the experience of (all of) us.³ [207]

¹This stands for name, action.

²It refers to *dharma*, *adharma* etc., i.e. *avidyā* and its effects.

³Read SP in this context: *asmatpratyaśābdāyor gocaro 'haṁkāras tatra sākṣitvena vartamānasyātmano nirvikāraṁ rūpaṁ svāpe*

यतोऽस्य न पुरा बोधात्कर्मादेः कार्यमण्वपि ।
प्रतीचो गृह्यते मानादतोऽयं तत्स्वभावकः ॥२०८॥

(This is so explained by Kāśya) since, before waking (up of a person from sleep), not even any effect of (some) action etc., is grasped by any means whatever, as done by the inner self; therefore, this one (viz. the inner self) does not have

that as its nature.¹

[208]

¹This is to say *akāra-kakriyākārya*. Cp. *paśyan vai tan na paśyati* (BU 4.3.23).

क्वाभूदेष पुरा बोधात्कृतरचायमुपागतः ।
आचक्ष्वैतद्वयं गार्ग्य स्थितावागमनेऽवधिम् ॥२०९॥

(Therefore,) where was this one before becoming awake? Whence has this one come? Tell (me) these two (things), O Gārgya. What again was the duration of that condition (of sleep, *sthiti*) and the coming (i.e. waking)? [209]

This is the meaning of the question in BU according to BUB.

अभूत्प्रतीचोऽन्यत्रायमन्यस्माच्चचायमागतः ।
यदि चेत्कारकत्वं स्यान्नो चेद्भ्रान्तिरियं भवेत् ॥२१०॥

(Possibly) this one (while sleeping) was elsewhere than in the inner self and this one has come back from another (i.e. not from within the inner self); then (in that case) there would be agency (on the part of the inner self)!¹ If that is not so,² then this is mere error.³ [210]

¹That would mean not accepting *akriyākārya rūpa* of the inner self. One wonders why SP adds: *sthitāṁ āgatau ca svayam evāvadhīr nānyaś cet*, though actually it is not mentioned in this verse. (It is mentioned in the preceding verse.)

²Understand after 'so', 'and that is not so' as parenthesis.

³That is false attribution of the non-existing.

यत्र वा अन्यदित्येवं यत्र त्वस्येति चापरम् ।
अविद्याविद्ययोः कार्यं तथा च श्रुतिरब्रवीत् ॥२११॥

And so has the Śruti declared (about) the result(s) of ignorance and knowledge, viz. in *yatra vā anyat*¹ and also elsewhere

in *yatra tv asya*.²

[211]

¹Cf. BU 4.3.31: *yatra vā anyad iva syāt*

²Cf. BU 2.4.14: *yatra vā asya sarvam ātmaivābhūt.*

वक्तुं प्रष्टुं च बालाकिर्न यतो जज्ञिवांस्ततः ।
प्रश्नयोः स्वयमेवार्थं काश्यो वक्तुं प्रचक्रमे ॥२१२॥

Since Bālāki did not know (what) to speak and/or to ask, therefore, Kāśya himself began to explain the meaning of the two questions. [212]

This explains *tad u ha na mene gārgyaḥ* in BU.

पृष्टेनापि न विज्ञातं भवता तदिदं मया ।
उच्यमानं यथा तत्त्वं सम्यक्त्वं श्रोतुमर्हसि ॥२१३॥

You have not known that, even if you are asked (about it); therefore, this one—the truth (or, essence)—as it is, is being explained by me, Therefore, you should hear (it) alternatively. [213]

Verses 214-262 discuss the meaning of BU 2.1.17 (and allied matter).

यत्रैष एतत्सुप्तोऽभूत्स्वनामामन्त्रणध्वनिम् ।
नाश्रौषीद्यन्निमित्तं ज्ञस्तन्निमित्तमिदं शृणु ॥२१४॥

Why, while this one was asleep here, he did not hear the sound of the call of his own names; (and) why he came to know (lit. became a knower of) that—this, (now) listen. [214]

This explains *yatraiṣa etat supto 'bhūt ...* in BU. It refers to the *upādhi* and *upādhyupasaṃhāra* in relation to the Brahman.

त्रैविध्यं लक्ष्यते यस्माद्बुद्ध्यादिप्राणभूमिषु ।
तदेषामिति षष्ठीयं श्रुत्या तस्मात्प्रयुज्यते ॥२१५॥

Since there is noticed threefold (functioning) of intellect up to *prāṇas*, therefore, there is use of the genitive case in the word *eṣām*¹ in the Śruti. [215]

¹This is *nirdhāraṇe ṣaṣṭhī*, i.e. for specifying 'among them'. It means: *teṣām madhye ye prāṇāḥ*.

The three are mentioned in the next verse thus: The inner self, its semblance and *prāṇas*, i.e. organs in the body.

प्रत्यक्चिदवभासश्च कारणानुगमोऽपरः ।
तथा च करणात्मानो बाह्यगोचररञ्जिताः ॥२१६॥

The inner self and the other, viz. the semblance of sentience, which is understood (or, inferred) from its cause(s)¹ and so also those which are of the nature of the organs that are affected (lit. coloured or tinted) by external objects² (are the three meant in *eṣām*). [216]

¹Or alternatively, which comes to exist, as it were, owing to the cause, viz. ignorance.

²See SP on this: *karaṇātmanāṃ karaṇāmatvaṃ vinā svarūpenābhivyaktyarthāṃ viśinaṣṭi*.

बुद्ध्यादेः कृत्स्नकार्यस्य पुंस्कर्मोद्भूतिहेतुतः ।
बुद्ध्याद्युत्क्षेपसंहारौ तस्मात्कर्मनिबन्धनौ ॥२१७॥

Since the effects in their entirety,¹ viz. intellect etc.¹ are owing to the person's (own) *karman*² operative, the rise as well as the inactivity (lit. withdrawing) of intellect etc. are therefore dependent on *karman*. [217]

¹The word etc. stands for organs.

²This is not any activity on the part of the person, i.e. done

by any of his organs. It is his merit and/or demerit. Cf. SP: *tasyotkṣepasamhārāv utthānābhibhavau karma haiva*.

स्वात्मावभासतो भोक्ता कर्ता त्वज्ञानहेतुतः ।
द्वयाविविक्तो हि परो भोक्ता कर्तेति चोच्यते ॥२१८॥

It (i.e. the Ātman or the inner self) of a person is the enjoyer (i.e. experiencer) owing to its being the semblance of it and is the agent (of activities) because of (its) ignorance (about its own true nature). Indeed, the highest self which is not distinct (or distinguished) from duality (in the state of ignorance) is called both the enjoyer (i.e. experiencer) and the agent (of activities).¹ [218]

¹SP brings out the force in the last part of the verse thus: *bhoktaiva kevalam na karteti nirasitum cakārah*.

जाग्रत्फलप्रयोगस्य यदा कर्म प्रहीयते ।
व्युत्थानहेत्वसद्भावात्तदाकर्ता सुषुप्सति ॥२१९॥

When activity, which is related to the rise of results in the waking state, is missing (lit. lost), then the (real) non-agent¹ (of activities) goes to sleep (lit. wishes to sleep), as there do not exist here any causes of the rise (of the organs to act). [219]

This is to explain the sleep state of an individual. This explanation is occasioned by the continuous existence of the *bhoktr*.

¹SP points out *akarteti cchedaḥ* (in *tadākartā*) and remarks *akartṛtvam abhokṛtvasyāpy upalakṣaṇam*.

भोक्तृप्रयुक्तं कर्तृत्वं कर्त्रा कर्म प्रयुज्यते ।
कर्मप्रयुक्तो भोगश्च ततः संस्कारसंभवः ॥२२०॥

(In sleep state), agency (of activities) is caused by the enjoyer

(i.e. experiencer), the activity is caused by the agent and the enjoyment (i.e. experience) is caused by activity and from that there follows the possibility of impression(s). [220]

This is for explaining that the sleep state is not the state of liberation. NKL points out more clearly: *bhoktrtvāder anyo-nyahetutvād avicchedaḥ* (= *saṃsārāvicchedaḥ*, note by the editor of NKL).

सुखदुःखादिसंस्कारसंस्कृतोऽयं जडः पुमान् ।
रागद्वेषादिनाक्षिप्तस्ततो भूयः प्रवर्तते ॥२२१॥

This ignorant Puruṣa,¹ affected by the impressions such as happiness, misery etc.² (and) therefore overcome by attachment, hatred etc.,³ proceeds to act again. [221]

This explains why there is no liberation in this state.

¹This refers to the transmigratory being, *jada* cannot be insentient, it should mean 'ignorant'.

²The word etc. appears to indicate ignorance.

³The word etc. here indicates hankerings and wish for more of happiness.

अन्योऽन्यं कार्यता चैषां कारणत्वं तथैव च ।
तेनानुच्छिन्नसंस्कार आत्मायं प्राक्प्रबोधतः ॥२२२॥

Furthermore, these (viz. *bhoktrtva*, *kartrtva* and *saṃsāritva*) have (among them) mutual relation of being cause and effect; therefore, the Ātman (i.e. the individual self) is, before its waking (up to its real nature), not devoid of impressions(s).¹

[222]

¹That is, with the impressions on it not removed.

अविद्यानाभिसंबन्धो मिथ्याधीचक्रसंस्थितः ।
आब्रह्मास्थाण्वयं योनीर्बभ्रमीत्यनिशं परः ॥२२३॥

This highest (Ātman), having a relation to the hub (in the form) of ignorance and resting on (*saṁsthita*) the wheel of wrong (or, false) knowledge, continuously (*anīṣam*) keeps on revolving among (numerous) species of life, beginning (*ā*) with the Brahman up to (*ā*) a pillar. [223]

This is a stress on the continuous flow of impressions responsible for transmigration of the life for a person.

जाग्रत्कर्मक्षये सोऽयमादायाशेषभावंनाः ।
 असंबुद्धात्मकोद्भूतमनोबुद्ध्यादिरूपिणा ॥२२४॥
 आधिस्वभावजेनेति कर्तादानस्य भण्यते ।
 प्रत्यक्चिदवभासान्तः कर्ता क्षेत्रज्ञ उच्यते ॥२२५॥

This one is called the agent, after it has taken up (i.e. received) all the impressions (of the waking state) as the activity of the waking state ceases (lit. comes to be lost) and is called the agent of taking up (various objects), being possessed of the form of *manas*, intellect and others¹ which have the nature of what is unawakened and which have the nature of what have been born from the limiting adjuncts² (of the Ātman)—yes, this (real) agent and knower of the field (revealing itself) as the end of the semblance of the sentience which is the inner self. [224-225]

After the explanation of the threefoldness connected with *eṣām* (in verse 216 above) and of *buddhi* etc. (in verse 217 above) are given, there now follows the explanation of their working as expressed in *viññānena viññānam ādāya* in the BU sentence.

The editor of NKL writes a note on *kartāraṁ vivicyāha* (in NKL) thus: *ādānakriyāyāṁ cidavabhāsāntaḥ cidābhāsāśrayaḥ jīvaḥ kartā; buddhyādigataḥ cidābhāsaḥ karaṇam (viññāneneti karaṇe tṛtīyā); vāgādiprāṇānām arthadhīśaktirūpaṁ viññānam karma iti viveko bodhyaḥ.*

¹The word 'others' refers to various organs of activity.

²ādhi is for upādhi.

आदीयमानं विज्ञानं सामर्थ्यं विषयोन्मुखम् ।
वागादीनामिह ग्राह्यं प्राणानां विषयाञ्जनम् ॥२२६॥

viññāna is what is being taken up (i.e. received), the capacity which is ready (or, about) to take up the objects (of desire etc.). In this regard, one has to understand that there is colouring (i.e. tinting) of *prāṇas*, viz. *vāc* and others, by the objects. [226]

This is the explanation of *prāṇānām* ... in BU.
SP points out that *ādānakarmaviññāna* is called *pūrvabhāvanās*.

शक्तयः करणान्यत्र गृह्यन्ते कारणात्मना ।
परमात्मा ग्रहीतात्र स्वाभासाभिन्नविग्रहः ॥२२७॥

Here,¹ the organs, viz. *śaktis* 'capacities'² are taken up (i.e. assumed or used) by that (Jīva) whose nature is the cause;³ (for), here,¹ the one who takes up (i.e. uses, the same) is the highest Ātman⁴ which has a body that is non-distinct from its own semblance. [227]

This is another way of understanding the BU sentence: *prāṇānām viññānena viññāya eṣo 'ntar hṛdaya ākāśaḥ tasmin śete* (in relation to sleep).

¹That is, in the happenings or actions mentioned in verses 224-225 are meant.

²This is another meaning of *viññāna* in the accusative case.

³It stands for the agent of activities (*viññāna*).

⁴Add: who is under the influence of ignorance (*avidyā*).

तथा संवर्गविद्यायां प्राणवाय्वात्मना श्रुतिः ।
वागग्न्याद्युपसंहारं वक्ति नान्येन कारणात् ॥२२८॥

To this effect (*tathā*),¹ the Śruti states in the lore of Saṃvarga²

the merging (*upasaṁhāra*)³ of *vāc*, Agni and others in the form (*ātmanā*) of Prāṇa-Vāyu; and not by any other cause (of their merger).⁴ [228]

¹Or, in this (very) sense.

²Cf. CU 4.3.2.

³Cf. CU 4.3.3.

⁴Cf. SP: *na ca kāryasya kāraṇād anyātmanopasaṁhārah.*

नामाद्याशावसानं च प्राणे सर्वं प्रतिष्ठितम् ।
प्राणबन्धनवाक्याच्च सूक्तमेतद्यथोदितम् ॥२२९॥

The merger of name etc., all (of them) in *āśā* 'hope' is fixed on (or, has rested in) Prāṇa (i.e. the Ātman); (and) this is well said in the statement (of the Śruti) about the fixture in Prāṇa.¹ [229]

This is yet another support for verse 227 from another Śruti.

¹The word *prāṇabandhana* occurs in CU 6.8.2. NKL points to CU 7.15.1: *prāṇo vā āśāyā bhuīyān, yathā vā arā nābhau samarpitāḥ evam asmin prāṇe sarvaṁ samarpitam.* SP merely points to the discussion of *bhūmavidyā*.

आविर्भूतस्वकार्यस्य संसर्गः कारणात्मना ।
वागाद्यादानमत्र स्याद्बुद्बुदानां यथाम्भसा ॥२३०॥

The contact (i.e. identity) of its effect(s) which are manifest, viz. assuming (or, taking up) of *vāc* and others with the Ātman, which is the cause,¹ is like (the oneness) of the bubbles with water. [230]

¹Here the origin is meant. That explains *ādāna*.

सहार्थे वा तृतीयेयं विज्ञानेनेति या श्रुता ।
सह प्रमातृज्ञानेन वागादेरुपसंहतिः ॥२३१॥

Or rather (*vā*), this (use of the) instrumental case which is heard in the word *vijñānena* is in the sense of 'being joint (or, together) with';¹ therefore the cessation (or withdrawing) of *vāc* and others is together with (the arising of) the knowledge of the knower (viz. the Ātman, the inner self).²

[231]

Already, the instrumental form *vijñānena* is explained in the sense of *karaṇa* 'an instrument or a means'; now another explanation is offered.

¹Cf. Pāṇini Sūtra 2.3.19: *sahayukte 'pradhāne*. SP brings out the meaning thus: *mātrā tanniṣṭhajñānena ca saha karaṇānām saṃhṛtiḥ*.

²The idea that the Ātman is the agent of activities also ceases to be.

यदि वास्तु तृतीयेयमित्थंभूतार्थवाचिनी ।
प्रत्यग्ज्ञानस्वभावेन कार्यकारणसंहतिः ॥२३२॥

Or perhaps (*vā*), let this (use of the) instrumental case be expressive of the indicative mark;¹ (accordingly, the meaning would be:) there is cessation (or, withdrawing) of the cause and the effect(s) by the inner self's (assuming) its own nature, viz. knowledge.²

[232]

This is yet another explanation in the light of *itthambhūtārtham*.

¹Cf. Pāṇini Sūtra 2.3.21: *itthambhūtalakṣaṇe* (*trītyā* is taken over from Pāṇini Sūtra 2.3.18).

²Cf. NKL: *sahetoḥ kāryasya caitanyātmanopasaṃhṛtir ity arthaḥ*— this is clear from SP thus: *sve mahimni tiṣṭhaty ātmety arthaḥ*.

अनन्यबोधप्रत्यक्षो य एष इति भण्यते ।
तस्य संप्रतिपत्त्यर्थमन्तर्हृदयकीर्तनम् ॥२३३॥

In the words *ya eṣaḥ* ...¹ is mentioned the one who is directly

known by itself (lit. by none other),² (and) the mention of (its being) inside the heart is for well conveying (only) that.³ [233]

¹This is BU sentence: *ya eṣo 'ntar hr̥daya ākāśaḥ*

²This refers to the self-illuminating Ātman (*svapprakāśa*).

³Namely, the Ātman, which is self-illuminating. The idea is: The inner self rests in the heart and so also does the highest self. This brings out well the identity of the inner self and the highest self.

पराक्प्रमेयभूमिभ्यो व्युत्थाप्य मन आदरात् ।
प्रत्यक्प्रवणया दृष्ट्या पश्यात्मानं त्वमञ्जसा ॥२३४॥

Having therefore respectfully taken away (your) *manas* from the objects which are known as (existing) outside,¹ do you well see the Ātman with the notion (lit. view) inclined towards the (acceptance of) the inner self.² [234]

¹Or literally, from the (bases of) the objects of knowing that are outside the body.

²Or, adopting the view that the inner self is nothing else than the Ātman, i.e. Brahman.

आत्मबुद्धिरियं पुंसां लक्ष्यतेऽव्यभिचारिणी ।
व्यभिचारिणीष्वनात्मोत्थबुद्धिषु प्रत्यगात्मनि ॥२३५॥

It is noticed that among men the awareness (i.e. knowledge), viz. (I am) Ātman,¹ is never varying (or absent) even while the awarenesses of the non-Ātmans are varying (i.e. are not always present), in relation to the inner self. [235]

This clarifies the distinction between the Ātman and the non-Ātmans.

¹*ātmabuddhi* is to be understood as *ātmā iti buddhiḥ*.

बुद्धात्मनोऽपि सा बाह्यपदार्थज्ञानविभ्रमात् ।
संकीर्यमाणेवाभाति तमसोपहतात्मनाम् ॥२३६॥

(And) in respect of the Ātman that is awakened¹ also, that appears like varied³ (in nature) to those whose inner selves are affected (i.e. overpowered) by darkness⁴ on account of the error that there is knowledge of outside objects. [2]

¹This refers to the inner self which has come to realise its true nature, viz. its being the Ātman.

²This is *ātmabuddhi* mentioned in the previous verse.

³Literally, mixed, as it were. That is to say: having the distinct things as the knower and the knowable(s).

⁴That is, ignorance or Avidyā.

जग्धे कार्ये च निःशेषे कारणे चात्मविद्यया ।
अपूर्वाद्यात्मनात्मायमात्मन्येवावसीयताम् ॥२३७॥

When the entire (mass of) effect(s) and also the cause¹ are destroyed (lit. eaten up) by the lore of Ātman,² let it be concluded that this Ātman is in one's self (i.e. in the inner self) in the nature of *apūrva* etc.³ [2]

¹This refers to Avidyā (cause) and *tajja*.

²Actually this should mean: by knowing the true nature of the Ātman.

³Cf. BU 2.5.19: *tad etad brahmāpūrvam anaparam anantaram abāhyam ...*; and BU (Mādhyandina) 3.8.8: *apūrvam anaparam ... abāhyam*.

आदायाकाशशब्दाभ्यामैकात्म्यं प्रतिपाद्यते ।
क्षेत्रज्ञेश्वरयोः साक्षाच्छ्रुत्येहाज्ञानहानतः ॥२३८॥

By the words *ādāya* and *ākāśa* is directly established here the singleness of the Ātman,¹ viz. of the knower of the field and the Lord (i.e. the highest self), as (resulting) from the

destruction (lit. loss) of ignorance.

[238]

NKL clarifies: *tvamarthaḥ ādāya ity ucyate, tadarthaḥ ākāśe iti, śete iti tadekatvam* (i.e. *tayor ekatvam*).

¹That is, in *aikyajñāna*.

तात्स्थ्याद्बुद्धयशब्देन बुद्धिरत्राभिधीयते ।

ऐकात्म्यप्रतिपत्त्यर्थं क्षेत्रज्ञपरमात्मनोः ॥२३९॥

By the word *hṛdaya* 'heart' here is expressed *buddhi* 'intellect', because of its staying in that.¹ (This is so done) for conveying the oneness of the knower of the field and the highest Ātman.

[239]

This explains the meaning of *hṛdaya* in *antar hṛdaye*.

¹That is, since the individual self and the Ātman stay together in the *hṛdaya*, their oneness is proved. Also the meaning of *hṛdaya* as (only) a lump of flesh in the body is thus precluded.

घटाकाशो महाकाश इत्युक्तौ खैकधीर्यथा ।

तथेहापि कथं नाम प्रत्यग्धीः स्यादिति र्यते ॥२४०॥

This is said in order to answer the question (*iti*) 'how is the inner self called intellect?'; viz. thus: "As in the statements 'sky in a pot' and 'great sky (that is all pervading)', there arises (the knowledge of) the oneness of sky"; so is it understood here also.

[240]

It is interesting to note how there is to be understood oneness of the knower of the field and the highest Ātman, despite two (apparently) distinct words. The purpose of the illustration is thus clarified by SP thus: *tayor aikyātmyam tādātmyam aikyam vādye bhedo 'pi syād dvitīye padāntaravaiyarthyam ity āśaṅkya tadaikye 'pi vyāvartyabhedaṁ na padāntarānarthakyam iti man-vānaḥ sann āha ghaṭeti*.

बुद्धेरन्तः प्रतीचोऽन्यो नार्थः संभाव्यते यतः ।
तस्मादाकाशशब्देन प्रत्यगात्माभिधीयते ॥२४१॥

Since there cannot possibly exist in the intellect anything else than the inner self, therefore, (it is only) the inner self (that) is expressed by the word *ākāśa*. [241]

This is to answer away an objection that might arise from the linguistic usage of *ākāśa* in the sense of the elemental sky (*bhūtākāśa*).

प्राणादीनां यतो जन्म वक्ष्यते प्रत्यगात्मनः ।
तस्माच्चाकाशशब्देन ब्रह्मैवात्राभिधीयते ॥२४२॥

Since it will be stated that the *prāṇas* and others have their origin in the inner self,¹ therefore also² it is just the Brahman that is expressed by the word *ākāśa*. [242]

This is to clear away a doubt that the *ākāśa* which is said to exist in the *hṛdaya* can be the elemental sky also, for it is all-pervasive.

¹This refers to *evam evāsmād ātmanah sarve prāṇāḥ sarve lokāḥ sarve devāḥ sarvāṇi bhūtāṇi vyuccartanti* (BU 2.1.20).

²*ca* invites reference to *sarvāṇi ha vā imāni bhūtāny ākāśād eva samutpadyante* (CU 1.7.1).

अथाकाशो ह वै नाम सता सोम्येति च श्रुतिः ।
ब्रह्माकाशात्परो नान्य आकाश इह गृह्यते ॥२४३॥

Also, there is a Śruti passage (which says the same thing): *athākāśo ha vai nāma, satā somya*;¹ (thus) here (in this context)² *ākāśa* is not taken as other than *Brahmākāśa*, viz. the Brahman that is *ākāśa*. [243]

Here is cited one more support from the Śruti.

¹This is a reference to two passages, CU 8.141 (without *ha*)

and CU 6.8.1.

²This refers to *ākāśe śete*.

स्वतोऽवगमरूपेऽस्मिन्कूटस्थे कारणात्मना ।
कात्स्न्येनावसितिर्भोक्तुः शेत इत्यभिधीयते ॥२४४॥

Thus is expressed in the word *śete* the merger in this immutable (Ātman) which is of the self-knowing nature of the enjoyer (i.e. experiencer) in its fullness, in the form of the cause(s).¹

[244]

¹This aims to justify repeated/varied experiences due to ignorance.

दृष्टान्तश्च कुमारादि तथा च घटतेऽञ्जसा ।
प्रत्यक्चैतन्यमात्रत्वान्न तु निद्रेह युज्यते ॥२४५॥

And (this is to be understood thus, because) the illustrations of Kumāra and others¹ would also be smooth to understand;² (as against this, the usual) sleep will not be properly understood³ owing to the inner self being only sentience. [245]

This explains why the familiar sense of *śayana*, viz. *nidrā*, is not accepted.

¹Cf. BU 2.1.19.

²That is, be smoothly construed.

³That is, will not be supported by reason.

देहाद्यध्यक्षतां हित्वा यदायं वर्तते तदा ।
स्वात्मन्येवास्त इत्येतत्कुतश्चेत्स्वपितीत्यतः ॥२४६॥

Whence is it understood, 'While this one gives up superintendence over the body etc.¹, it remains in its own form'? (In answer to this, it is said) 'Because (then) it sleeps'. [246]

¹The word etc. refers to the organs, the objects of desires

and so on.

इतश्च प्रत्यगात्मस्थो नान्यत्रागादयं पुमान् ।
सुषुप्ते स्वपितीत्युक्तेस्तदेतदभिधीयते ॥२४७॥

From the statement ¹ 'This one (viz. the individual self) sleeps when that (Ātman) goes to sleep' is understood that this man resting in the inner Ātman has not gone elsewhere. (Also) ² it is said (in other Śruti statements as well). [24

¹SP points out, *itaḥ* is connected with *svapiti*. But NKL refers *itaḥ* to *ca*.

²Also *ca* conveys, according to SP, that CU 6.8.1: *satā somya* is to be understood together with the statement in BU. But NKL refers to CU 8.3.2: *aharahaḥ brahmalokaṃ gacchantyaḥ*.

Now follows in verses 248-254ab Bhartṛprapañca's interpretation of the sentences *tad eṣām ... and others*.

अन्ये व्याचक्षते बुद्धिविज्ञानेनेति विस्मिताः ।
वागादिज्ञानमादाय हृत्खे शेते य उत्थितः ॥२४८॥

Others, ¹ who are stunned by the *buddhivijñāna* (in the case of the inner self) ² explain (*tad eṣām ...*) thus: That, who has (now) become awake, is the one that sleeps in the sky (covered) in the heart, ³ having taken with it the knowledge (that arises from) *vāc* and others. ⁴ [248

¹This is the reference to Bhartṛprapañca.

²Both NKL and SP appear to be here putting the cart before the horse. NKL just remarks: *asmadvyākhyāne vismitāḥ doṣaṃ manvānāḥ*. But SP is more to blame while stating: *asmadvyākhyānaṃ duṣṭaṃ svavyākhyānaṃ cāduṣṭaṃ paśyanto vismayāviṣṭadhiyaḥ*. Are we to hold from statement of thme this that Bhartṛprapañca knew the explanations offered by Sureśvara? Or, for that matter, Śaṅkara? Does it mean that he was not an

earlier commentator of BU? But, since both Śaṅkara in BUB and Sureśvara in BUBV refer to his views in a number of places, would it be reasonable to hold *anye* in the sense of Bhartṛprapañca? It may not be unwarranted, therefore, to hold *anye* in the sense of the followers of Bhartṛprapañca, while Sureśvara used the words *buddhi- vijñānena vismitāḥ* with a double sense, the second being the one proposed by SP and NKL.

³This refers to *bhūtākāśa* in the heart.

⁴These are various organs and their objects.

सुषुप्सुर्मनसैवात्मा मनस्येव समूहति ।
प्राणान्स्वशक्तिभिः साकं मनोऽप्यात्मनि लीयते ॥२४९॥

When wishing to sleep, the Ātman (viz. the inner self) absorbs (lit. collects together) the *prāṇas* 'organs' and with them their powers¹ in the *manas*² also by means of *manas*³ and (at that time) *manas* also merges into the Ātman.⁴ [249]

¹These refer to their various capacities to grasp the different objects outside.

²I have not translated *manas* as mind, since this latter has the element of *cit* 'sentience' associated with it. Here, *manas* is just *antahkaraṇa* 'internal organ'. (The Sāṃkhyas' notion of *trividha antahkaraṇa* has to be remembered; this will explain the occurrence of *buddhibhāvanā* in the following verse.) And it may be noted in passing that the *Yogasūtra* state *yogaś cittavṛttinirodhaḥ* and not *manovṛttinirodhaḥ*, just for this very reason.

³This explains *manas* in the sense of *karaṇa* 'instrument or means' (i.e. *karaṇe tṛtīyā*). It is possible to understand *manasā* alternatively as *manorūpeṇa* (SP and NKL) to mean 'in the form of *manas*'; this can be justified thus: In the dream state (which can occur in sleep state), *manas* performs the various functions of the different organs. This explains the dream state that is mentioned in the following verse.

⁴That is, *manas* also, in its own turn, gets absorbed into the Ātman. That explains the dreamless sleep state.

विशीर्णकरणग्रामो बुद्धिभावनया युतः ।
हृद्याकाशात्प्रसृत्यात्मा नाडीभिः स्वप्नमश्नुते ॥२५०॥
मनोवागादिविज्ञानविग्रहः करणाख्यया ।
विजानातीति कर्तृस्थे परस्मिन्भावसाधनः ॥२५१॥

The Ātman (i.e. the inner self or, the knower of the field) which has the collection (*grāma*) of the organs absorbed (lit. rendered in a power) within ¹ and is bearing (lit. accompanied by) the impressions on the intellect (received in the waking state), ² proceeds from the sky in the heart through (various) veins (*nādīs*) and experiences dream(s); [250]
(and) since it, being possessed of a form made up of various organs (*viññāna*), ³ viz. *manas*, *vāc* and others, experiences (lit. knows), ⁴ by (means of intellect) called *karana* 'organs'; ⁵ therefore, in relation to the highest (Brahman), that is (really) the agent, it (viz. the knower of the field) brings about the various experiences (lit. becomings). ⁶ [251]

This is Bhartṛprapañca's explanation of *tad eṣām prāṇāṇāṃ viññānena viññānam ādāya* in BU.

¹Cf. the preceding verse.

²*buddhi* is to be understood, with the Sāṃkhyas, as one of the three aspects of the *trividha antahkaraṇa*.

³Here, *viññāna* specifically refers to the organs.

⁴This points to *viññāna* in the sense of the inner self. It is worthwhile to note what SP quotes, viz. *yathāhuḥ: ubhayatrāpi karaṇasādhana eva viññānaśabda iti* (Probably, Bhartṛprapañca's Bhāṣya itself). Also, read in this context NKL: *parasmin viññānaśabdapravṛttau viññānam iti paraḥ syāt, na cehobhayaṃ yuktam ādāyeti prthak karṇnirdeśat*.

⁵It refers to intellect as an organ that helps in dream towards knowing various objects.

⁶This is for distinguishing the real knower (viz. Ātman) from

what has appeared as the knower (viz. *kṣetrajña*).

प्रकाशवृत्तिर्या ज्ञस्य सा हृद्धर्मानुगा सती ।
उद्गच्छति यतस्तस्माद्द्विशेषे लयं विदुः ॥२५२॥

Since (that) which is the (very) being¹ viz. the (self-) illuminating nature, flashes forth (lit. comes up), becoming in accordance with the properties of the heart;² therefore, they have known (its) lying down³ in the particular part of the heart.⁴ [252]

This brings out the purport of *ya eṣa* ... in BU.

¹This is *vṛtti* from verb root *vṛt* 'to be', not in the sense of function (or even, modification).

²These are desires, attraction etc. which belong to a human heart.

³This refers to the sleep state; therefore, the alternative translation could be 'becoming dormant'.

⁴This refers to the elemental sky that is in the heart. Read in this context SP (quoting probably from Bhartṛprapañca's Bhāṣya): *yathoktam tasya hi jñānātmano yā ca svaprakāśavṛttiliṅgā sā hṛdayadvāreṇa vyuccaratīti hṛdayaṃ viśeṣāyatanaṃ iti*.

स्वगोचरोन्मुखं ज्ञानं वागादीनामशेषतः ।
आदाय भावनाबुद्ध्या शेते जो हृदयाम्बरे ॥२५३॥

The knower (i.e. the Ātman) remains (lit. sleeps) in the sky of¹ the heart, with the intellect having on it the impressions (of the waking state), receiving the knowledge of *vāc* and others,² in its entirety,³ that has come to become their own objects (to be known). [253]

This is yet another interpretation of *vijñāna*; cp. verse 248 above. And also the completion of the sentence-sense.

¹Again, this is a reference to the elemental sky existing in the heart.

²That is, organs.

³This refers to the various objects of all the organs.

भावनारूपविज्ञानमभिव्यक्तं यदा हृदि ।
क्षेत्रज्ञस्यार्थवद्भाति शेते हृदीत्यतो वचः ॥२५४॥

When this knowledge in the form of impressions¹ (*viññāna* on the part of the knower of the field) is revealed to the heart,² then the statement 'It sleeps in the heart' appears meaningful in the case of the knower of the field.³ [254]

¹These are gathered in the waking state.

²Because they are really not existent outside; they are only appearances.

³Read SP (quoting probably Bhartṛprapañca himself): *yathāhuh tatra hi bhāvanāvijñānam viśeṣeṇābhivyaktam āste yata evaṃ kṛtvā tasmiṇ śeta ity ucyata iti.*

एवं श्रुतिरियं कैश्चिद्व्याख्यातातिप्रयत्नतः ।

Thus is this Śruti explained by some with a great effort.¹ [255ab]

¹*atiprayatnataḥ* is explained by SP thus: *śrutitātparyam atikramya svakīyotprekṣaya vyākhyānasya pravṛttir iti prayatnaḥ*; This is SP's introductory to verses 255cd-256.

Thus Sureśvara concludes the interpretation by Bhartṛprapañca.

In verses 255cd-256, Sureśvara has made a brief remark on the interpretation by Bhartṛprapañca.

परीक्षयैतद्द्वयं ग्राह्यं स्वयमेव परीक्षकैः ॥२५५॥

Having well examined these two interpretations,¹ let the examiners give their acceptance (to what appears to them faultless). [255cd]

सह भावनया बुद्धेः श्रुतत्वादुपसंहतेः ।
न स्यात्तथोपसंहारस्तेनैयं कल्पना मुधा ॥२५६॥

Since there is heard (in the Śruti) the absorption of (even) intellect, together with the impressions,¹ there would not be absorption (of *vāc* and others) in that way² and, therefore (*tena*), this notion (of Bhartṛprapañca) is purposeless. [256]

Not feeling satisfaction by making a simple remark in 255cd, Sureśvara states why the view of Bhartṛprapañca deserves rejection.

¹These (despite the singular form) are gathered in the waking state. Here, *manas* and *buddhi* are not taken as distinct—this is in the Sāṃkhya manner of treating them as one *antaḥkaraṇa* ‘internal organ’.

²That is, ‘in the way Bhartṛprapañca has stated’. But, NKL edition reads *na syāt tayopasaṃhārah*.

Verses 257-261 are the explanation of the BU sentence tāni yadā

स्वगोचरेषूत्सृष्टानि यदा गृह्णात्ययं स्वयम् ।
वागादीनि तदैवैनं स्वपितीति प्रचक्षते ॥२५७॥

When this one (viz. the inner self), of itself, absorbs (within itself)¹ *vāc* and others, among their own objects,² then do they describe (or, call) it by the name (*iti*) Svapiti.³ [257]

This is a brief restatement of Sureśvara’s own interpretation of *tāni*

¹Literally, takes (back):

²Which are unreal, i.e. the products of the same.

³Read SP introducing the next verse thus: *svapitināmanir-deśasya phalam āha*.

समाख्यासंश्रयात्तस्मादभूत्प्राक्प्रत्यगात्मनि ।
व्यभिचारोऽपि चेन्नामिन् ततो युक्तिरपीर्यते ॥२५८॥

If one would say, 'As there has already been given a derivation (of the word *svapiti*),¹ therefore, there has been variance² also as regards the name', then (i.e. in that case) also there is a reason given (lit. stated).³ [258]

¹Cf. CU 6.8.1: *svam apīto bhavati, tasmād evaṃ svapitīty ācakṣate*

²The sentence in the preceding note gives untruth to the remark in the preceding verse. This is to say that a name and the named would show variance (*vyabhicāra*), as, for example, an individual may be named Aśvakarṇa while that person is not a horse's ear (so pointed out by SP).

³This is stated in the following verse.

वागादिप्रकृतौ प्राणशब्दो घ्राणेऽवगम्यते ।
मुख्यस्यानुपसंहारात् तद्वाचक इष्यते ॥२५९॥

(See, for example, in the Śruti itself)¹ when the relevant (topic) is of *vāc* and others, the word *prāṇa* is understood as (i.e. having the meaning of) the sense of smell and there is no (reference to) principal Prāṇa in the absorption (by the inner self); therefore, it (viz. that word *prāṇa*) is not taken as expressive of it (viz. principal Prāṇa). [259]

¹This is: *tadgrhīta eva prāṇo bhavati* in BU 2.1.17 itself. It is pointed out with a view to giving unreasonableness in the objection understood in the preceding verse. Thus the argument regarding *nānni vyabhicāra* does not hold.

वासनामात्रहेतुश्च स्वप्ने कर्मेन्द्रियाश्रयः ।
सर्वेन्द्रियाणां लीनत्वाद्वापारो न प्रबोधवत् ॥२६०॥

Again, in the sleep state, the functions, which are dependent

on the organs of activity, as also of knowing,¹ are caused only by impressions and, further, the activity (in the sleep state) is not like that in the waking state, owing to (the fact that) all the organs have merged (in the inner self). [260]

¹This is by the force of *ca* (SP); *cakāro jñānendriyāśraya-vyāpārasamuccayārthaḥ*.

वागाद्युपाधिसंबन्धे संसारित्वमिवेक्ष्यते ।
ते तूपसंहताः सर्वेऽसंसारित्वमतो दृशेः ॥२६१॥

It is noticed that being transmigratory occurs (in the case of a self) when there is (its) relation to the limiting adjuncts such as *vāc*;¹ but since they have merged (in the inner self in the sleep state) and, therefore, the seer (viz. the Ātman) does not have transmigratory nature. [261]

¹Here are meant, two states, viz. that of waking and of sleep. In the second half of the verse, only the sleep state is meant. *dr̥śi* is to be understood, in relation to the first half, as 'appearing to be transmigratory'.

In verses 262-306, there is discussion on the contents of the BU 2.1.18 (and allied matter).

ननु स्वप्नेऽपि जाग्रद्वत्प्रत्यक्षमुपलभ्यते ।
सर्वेन्द्रियवियोगेऽपि सुखिदुःखित्वमात्मनः ॥२६२॥

But (it may be argued now), in dream state¹ also, there is the direct experience, as in the state of waking; for, even in the absence (lit. separation) of all organs, there is (noticed) the condition of the self as happy or miserable. [262]

It is related to the BU sentence *sa yatra*

¹This is in view of verse 264 below.

मैवं मृषात्वात्स्वप्नोत्थसुखदुःखादिलक्षण- ।
संसारस्येत्यतो वक्ति श्रुतिस्तस्य मृषार्थताम् ॥२६३॥

(In answer, it is said: This is) not so, because the transmigratory existence is characterized by happiness and misery which arise in dream state and are unreal (i.e. false) in nature. For this reason, the Śruti states the falseness of that (viz. transmigratory existence then). [263]

नास्य स्वापः प्रबोधो वा कुतः स्वप्नस्य संभवः ।
प्रत्यक्स्वभाव एवास्य जाग्रत्स्वप्नसुषुप्तयः ॥२६४॥

For this one (i.e. the highest Ātman) there is neither sleep nor waking up as well, how could there be the possibility of a dream? It is (in) the nature of the inner self that it has (all the three states of) waking, dream and sleep.¹ [264]

This is clarified in the following verse.

¹SP supports this by a quotation from a Smṛti: *svabhāvas tu pravartate* (Gītā 5.14d).

सुप्तः प्रबुद्ध इत्येवं स्वप्नं पश्यति चेति यः ।
विकल्प एष भूतानामविद्यात्रिशायिनाम् ॥२६५॥

That this one is asleep or awake and also that one sees a dream is an option (i.e. an optionally made statement) about the beings (one has to say: human beings) who sleep (during) the night of ignorance. [265]

मायामात्रमिदं सर्वं जगत्स्थावरजङ्गमम् ।
सर्पादेरिव रज्ज्वाद्विस्तृतत्वमस्ति परं पदम् ॥२६६॥

All this world, steady and moving, is merely *māyā* (i.e. what is conceived). As in the case of a serpent etc. (there is truth) viz. a rope etc.;¹ so, the truth is the highest (Ātman).² [266]

¹In this verse, Sureśvara is careful in citing an illustration. The word etc. refers to other well-known instances of Adhyāsa.

²The translation of this last sentence follows the reading in NKL edition, viz. *sarpādeḥ ... tattvam asti param padam*. I have adopted that reading for the text in the AnSS edition.

चित्तसंमोहमात्रेऽसिंमल्लोकोऽयं परिखिद्यते ।
दिङ्मोहाकुलविज्ञानो नष्टमार्ग इवाध्वगः ॥२६७॥

In this (happening), which is merely delusion of the mind (*citta*), this people¹ feels troubled (i.e. is sorry), like a traveller (lit. way-farer) who has his knowledge (of the ways) affected by confusion about the directions and lost his way. [267]

¹That is, the people in this world. They cannot see only one thing (viz. the Ātman) as truth; they entertain various notions owing to Avidyā.

अस्मिन्नर्थे जगादेमौ श्लोकौ यदुकुलोद्वहः ।
पुराणः शाश्वतो विष्णुः प्रपन्नाय किरीटिने ॥२६८॥

In this sense, the scion of Yadu family, viz. the ancient and eternal Viṣṇu, has recited two verses to Arjuna,¹ who respectfully resorted to him. [268]

¹This is a reference to Śrī Kṛṣṇa, who is considered to be an incarnation of Viṣṇu. He recited to Arjuna (lit. the wearer of a crown—which has become his proper name) two verses, viz. *Gītā* 7.15 and 7.14—these are quoted below.

न मां दुष्कृतिनो मूढाः प्रपद्यन्ते नराधमाः ।
माययापहतज्ञाना आसुरं भावमाश्रिताः ॥२६९॥

The wrong doers, the foolish ones, viz. the wretched men do not resort to (i.e. take shelter with) me, since they have their correct knowledge destroyed (lit. carried away) by *māyā*

'delusion' and have resorted to the demoniac feeling (or, way of behaviour). [269]

This is *Gītā* 7.15.

दैवी ह्येषा गुणमयी मम माया दुरत्यया ।
मामेव ये प्रपद्यन्ते मायामेतां तरन्ति ते ॥२७०॥

This my *māyā* (i.e. delusion caused by me) is divine, made up of (three) Guṇas, and difficult to get over. (And) those who resort only to me, (do) get over this *māyā*. [270]

This is *Gītā* 7.14.

आत्मैवेदं जगत्सर्वं सत्यापर्वदिलक्षणम् ।
वेत्ति यस्तत्त्वतो वाक्यात्तस्यैवेह कृतार्थता ॥२७१॥

This entire world is (in reality) only the Ātman which has the nature of Truth, unpreceded (i.e. not caused) by anything etc.¹ He who knows (it) in the real nature of it (*tattvataḥ*) from the sentence(s) (of the Śruti) has for himself here the fulfilment of the end (of life).² [271]

¹Cf. BU 5.5.1: *satyam brahma* and BU 2.5.19; see verse 237 note 3.

प्रत्यक्तमोवसाय्येव पराज्ञानमशेषतः ।
प्रत्यगात्मन्यविद्येति त्वविद्यापरिकल्पना ॥२७२॥

The entire knowledge about the outside (objects) is invariably (*eva*) ending in ignorance about (the real nature of) the inner self. And (*tu*) the concept of Avidyā 'ignorance' is (i.e. is rooted in) the non-knowing (*avidyā*) of the inner self.¹ [272]

¹This is to mean: non-knowing in respect of the real nature of it. SP has already pointed out *vastuvṛtṭyā na tatrāvidyeti*

tuśabdah. SP refers also to SV 106ff.

स्वार्थं प्रत्येव विज्ञेयाः सदसत्त्वादिकल्पनाः ।
जाग्रत्स्वप्नावतः सिद्धौ स्वार्थं प्रत्येव न स्वतः ॥२७३॥

The notions of *sat* 'existent' and *asat* 'non-existent' have to be taken as related to the objects for an individual's own self (i.e. known by one as obtaining outside). Therefore, the (two) states of waking and dream are established (i.e. understandable), not in their own right but only in relation to the (outside) objects for an individual. [273]

This is an echo of Gauḍapāda's statement about these objects being unreal on account of the well-known cause, viz. *drśyatva*.

वागादिसाध्यसंदृष्टेः स्वप्नो बोधसमो यदि ।
अवस्थान्त्रितयस्यास्य कुतः सिद्धिरितीर्यताम् ॥२७४॥

(A question is here asked:) If the dream state is (to be taken as) similar to the waking state on account of perceiving (lit. seeing outside)¹ what is grasped (lit. obtained) by *vāc* etc., how can there be established² this triad of the states?;³ let this be explained. [274]

¹See *drśyatva* in the note on the preceding verse.

²Literally, the establishing of the triad.

³This refers to *jāgrat*, *svapna* and *susupti*; SP refers to *trayaḥ svapnāḥ* (*Aitareyopaniṣad* 1.3.12).

आदायेति च क्त्वान्तोक्तेः पूर्वकालैककर्मणः ।
स्वप्न एव तु संसिद्धिरादावन्तै ह्यसंभवात् ॥२७५॥

On account of the use of the verbal form *ādāya*, which has an ending *ktvā* and has therefore an object belonging to some previous (moment(s)) of time, the (existence of the object(s)) is proven to be belonging only to a dream; (this is) for the

reason that their existence before and after is impossible (to accept).¹ [275]

¹Cf. *Gauḍapāḍakārikā* 2.4ab: *ādāv ante ca yan nāsti vartamāne 'pi tat tathā*.

इति भूतार्थसंबोधज्ञानोन्मीलितचक्षुषाम् ।
नास्ति व्याधिर्जरा नास्ति नास्ति देशपरिभ्रमः ॥२७६॥

Thus,¹ in the case of persons, who have their eyes opened by the proper (*sam*) knowledge of the thing, that has been an existential entity, there is no disease, (there is) no old age and (there is) no movement around many regions.² [276]

This verse expresses the result of one's knowing the true nature, viz. falsehood, abiding in the three states discussed above and naturally the consequent, viz. the knowledge of Reality, i.e. the Ātman, in its true nature.

This thought is continued in the following two verses.

¹That is 'by knowing the nature of the three states as caused by ignorance about the Ātman'.

²In other words: transmigration, or movement from place to place; one *yoni* to another and so on.

नास्ति रोगो न संतापो नास्ति कामादिसंप्लुतिः ।
न स्युर्हर्षभयोद्वेगहानोपचयमृत्यवः ॥२७७॥
न शोको नारतिः काचिन्न कर्तृत्वं न कार्यता ।
न ज्ञेयं नापि च ज्ञाता तदभावोऽपि नेष्यते ॥२७८॥

(In that case) there is no disease, no mental affliction, no overpowering by (lit. plunging or drowning in) desire etc.;¹ (also) there would not be joy, fear, dejection, loss, profit and death; [277]

there is no grief, no uneasiness (or rather, restiveness) of any kind, no (real) agency (in any activities), no nature of being an effect/product (of something or some activity or some

person); there would not be any object to know; there would not be any knower (of them) and there would not (ever) be accepted any absence of them. [278]

Translation ignores the extreme brevity of Sanskrit language and expresses itself somewhat freely. Also, the much erudite explanations of SP are not considered.

¹The word etc. should refer to the six well-known enemies of man. SP, however, explains it as the beginning of desire, viz. Avidyā. Hardly probable!

इति क्षरार्थसंबन्धज्ञानेऽस्मिन्नल्लोकचक्षुषा ।
विकल्पहेत्वविद्यायाः प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यनिष्ठितः ।
सम्यग्बोधाग्निना द्रवस्तौ विकल्पो नावशिष्यते ॥२७९॥

Thus, the variety of notions (about objects etc.), which arises from this relation of the perishing objects before the eye¹ of the people, which (has arisen) from ignorance (Avidyā) that is the cause of that variety, which (really) rests in the true nature of the inner self² and does not remain (even a little), when there occurs its destruction by the fire of proper (*saṃ*) knowledge (about the inner self, the Ātman). [279]

Here is the concluding remark about the falsehood of worldly experiences.

¹*cakṣus* indicates other organs.

²Namely, 'in somehow being overpowered by Avidyā'.

विजिज्ञापयिषुर्गार्ग्यमिममर्थमतो नृपः ।
स यत्रेत्यादिकामाह परामुक्तिपरंपराम् ॥२८०॥

Therefore, the king who wished to inform/instruct Gārgya about this matter made unto him the subsequent statements, one after another, viz. *sa yatra* [280]

Now follows in verses 281-285 the explanation of *sa yatra* itat

svapnyayā carati.

स्वप्ने भवत्वात्स्वप्न्येति जाग्रत्स्वापाद्विवेचनम् ।
मिथ्यात्वप्रतिपत्त्यर्थं स्वप्नस्य क्रियते स्फुटम् ॥२८१॥

(The world) *svapnyā*¹ is used, because it occurs in dream state. The distinction of dream from waking and sleep states is made clear for establishing the unreality (of it). [281]

¹This is based on the reading in the Mādhyandina recension of BU: *svapnyayā carati*. *svapnyā* as reported and paraphrased in SP and NKL as *darśanākhyā vṛtti* 'the function called seeing'. However, the printed edition of that recension does not show any difference from the Kāṇva recension.

निशायां संप्रवृत्तायां संहताक्षस्य निद्रया ।
जाग्रत्कर्मण्युपक्षीणे स्वप्नभोग उपस्थिते ॥२८२॥
बोधावस्थां तिरोनीय देहाद्याश्रयलक्षणाम् ।
कर्मोद्भावितसंस्कारस्तत्र स्वप्नरिरंसया ॥२८३॥
अवस्थां प्रययावन्त्यां मायावीवात्ममायया ।
उच्चावचान्बहूनर्थान्सोऽसृजत्सृजतेऽनृतान् ॥२८४॥
अविद्याकामकर्मादिसाधनैः समुपार्जितान् ।
बोधे साधारणा येऽस्य स्वप्ने तेऽनन्यद्रष्टृकाः ॥२८५॥

When, at the advance of night, a person's eyes are overcome by sleep, the activity of the waking state has come to a halt (lit. to be lost) and the experience of a dream is imminent, [282]

(the person, having) the impression, which has been raised (or, produced) by (his) *karman*, after it has suppressed (or, concealed) the waking state, that which is characterized by its resorting to the body etc., has a desire (as it were) to enjoy a dream [283]
(and therefore) has gone to another state and created false (objects), in the way a magician who, by his magic, creates

(lit. lets forth) many things, high and low,¹ [284]
 (the objects) of the dream which are brought forth by means
 of desire and activity² (being produced by) ignorance (Avidyā)
 and which are the same as in the waking state, have really
 no seer other (than the inner self). [285]

¹High and low are meant to qualify the objects of the waking
 and the dream state.

²Singulars in desire and activity imply the plural sense.

In verses 286 to 300, there is clarification of the meaning of
 te hāsyā lokāḥ

लोकाः कर्मफलानीति तेषां मिथ्यात्वमुच्यते ।
 उतेवेत्यादिना स्पष्टमैकात्म्यप्रतिपत्तये ॥२८६॥

The word *lokāḥ* stands for the results of *karman*. Their false
 nature is now described in (the statement) beginning with *uteva*,
 in order that there is a clear understanding of the singleness
 of the Ātman. [286]

ननु बोधे यथा लोकास्तत्कालाव्यभिचारिणः ।
 स्वप्नेऽपि स्वप्नकालस्थास्तद्वत्सन्तिवति भण्यते ॥२८७॥
 ननु जाग्रत्स्थलोकानां मिथ्यात्वं प्राक्प्रपञ्चितम् ।
 अविद्यामात्रहेतुत्वं पाणिपेषप्रबोधनात् ॥२८८॥
 तथा च सति दृष्टान्तो भवतो नोपपद्यते ।
 मिथ्यात्मकत्वात्सर्वस्य नैतदेवं कुतो यतः ॥२८९॥
 विवेकमात्रसिद्धयर्थो भोक्तृभोग्यपदार्थयोः ।
 पाणिपेषादिको ग्रन्थः शुद्धिस्तत्र विवक्ष्यते ॥२९०॥

But, (it is stated by an objector:¹) 'As in the waking state
 the *lokas* do not differ in point of time (of that state), so
 also let them belong to the same time as of the dream.' [287]
 (In answer, the Siddhāntin states:) 'Indeed, the false nature
 of the *lokas* in the waking state is already fully explained,

viz. that they have only ignorance (Avidyā) as their cause, (as this is noticed) from awakening (the sleeping man) by the shaking of the hand, [288]

and, that being so, your illustration² does not become reasonable, (for you will have to tell) why this (viz. what is given in the illustration) is not (false) since all (things, as you have already stated) are false (i.e. unreal). [289]

(And further) the text relating to (lit. beginning with) the shaking him by hand is only for differentiating between the things (known as) the enjoyer and the enjoyed (i.e. the experiencer and the experienced). (Therefore) an explanation in that regard (*tatra*) has to be given.³ [290]

¹This is raised by one who holds that the objects seen or experienced in a dream are real.

²The argument is regarding the illustration of the sleeping man, being awakened by shaking him by his hand. This illustration is faulty in that it is included in false experiences.

³Or, one could alternatively translate: that being the case (*tatra*) (an explanation of) the unaffected nature of the inner self (*śuddhi*) is desired.

तस्मात्कृतकदृष्टान्तमुपादायात्मनोऽञ्जसा ।
आध्यात्मिकादिलेपानां विशुद्धिरिह भण्यते ॥२९१॥

From that, viz. an artificial illustration,¹ here (i.e. in respect of a dream) is clearly stated an explanation of the effects² on the Ātman which appear to have come from the body etc.³ [291]

¹Namely, the use of what is made to appear as illustration.

²Literally, smearing, tints etc. (caused by Avidyā).

³*ātman* in *adhyātman* → *ādhyātmika* refers to body, its organs, their activities and their relation to objects.

किञ्चित्सामान्यमाश्रित्य जामित्वं प्रतिपद्यते ।

न्यायः सर्वोऽपि येनातो नैतत्साधु प्रचोदितम् ॥२९२॥

Relationship (viz. being closely related)¹ is accepted (or, understood) by one after resorting to some kind of common property (or, purport);² this is the general rule everywhere (*sarvo nyāyah*).³ Therefore, this objection is not rightly raised.

[292]

¹It means: the sameness, which amounts to mean repetition (so SP and NKL).

²This refers to volitionally accepted or attributed property; not an actual common property.

³In the case of *dr̥ṣṭāntas*, this is a universally accepted way of understanding; viz. not an actually existing commonness is taken as existing. This is so well-known in *Alaṃkāra Śāstra*. Therefore, SP states it to be only *vācanika* 'at the word level'; cf. *śrauta* in this very sense (NKL). NKL clarifies this specifically thus: *pūrvavākye* (referring to *pāṇipeṣaṇavākya*) ... *ātmanah samvidekarasatvād ārthikam* (i.e. real) *mithyātvam, iha tu lokaśabdena karmaphalamātratvasvīkārāt śrautaṃ tad iti bhedād ity arthaḥ*.

महाराजादयो नास्य स्वप्नानुभवगोचराः ।

आत्मभूता इति ज्ञेयास्तद्वेदेनोपलम्भनात् ॥२९३॥

For this one (who is dreaming), the great king (or, emperor) and others are not the (actual) objects of his experience in the dream state, since they are to be taken only as products (lit. properties) of the *Ātman* (viz. inner self); there is the knowledge (*upalambhana*) about them as distinct (from what are taken as real objects).

[293]

पर्यङ्कशयिताद्राज्ञः प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणकात् ।

बहिः समीक्ष्यते राजा स्वप्नदृग्भिर्वनं गतः ॥२९४॥

A king is seen by the dreaming persons to have gone to a

forest outside (his palace, viz. as one different) from that (very) king who is (in reality) sleeping on (his) couch (as noticed by others) by the means of knowing such as direct perception.

[294]

स्वानुभूत्यनुरोधेन राज्ञो राजामृषा गृहे ।
स्वप्ने प्रबुद्धस्य सतो मृषा स्याद्वनमाश्रितः ॥२९५॥

For the king (himself), he is truly a king¹ in his (own) home (and) for the person who is (now) awakened (from the dream, that (same king) who had gone to a forest is unreal. [295]

In the preceding verse, there was difference shown between the experiences of the persons who were awake and those who were dreaming. Now, in this verse, the experiences of both of them are shown as not different, the dreaming persons realising the error. The significance of these two verses (viz. 294 and 295) is well brought out in the following verse.

¹SP rightly (and usefully) points to the resolution the Saṃdhi in *rājāmṛṣā* as *rājā amṛṣā*.

जाग्रदृष्टं मृषा स्वप्ने स्वप्ने सज्जागरे मृषा ।
अन्योऽन्यव्यभिचारित्वात्स्वप्नजाग्रत्पदार्थयोः ॥२९६॥

(Thus) on (one's) knowing the king seen in the waking state as false (while one is) in the state of dream and (what was seen as) real in the dream is known as false in the waking state—(this is) on account of mutually differing things seen in a dream and in the waking state. [296]

अहः क्षपायां च कुतः संहताक्षस्य चेक्षणम् ।
मृतानां जीवनं तद्वद्वद्वानां यौवनं कुतः ॥२९७॥

Whence¹ can there be seeing of what is seen by day (as the same) by night?² How¹ can there be seeing by one who has closed his eyes?³ So also, whence can there be living

state of those who are (already) dead and youth (in the case) of those who are (already) old? ⁴ [297]

¹Whence and also how for *kutaḥ* which is connected with both parts of the line.

²This implies that night is not proper time for seeing what are the real objects. It is the time for seeing objects in the dream—naturally not real.

³This refers to the absence of proper means of seeing.

⁴The fourth line refers to things opposed to actual experiences.

न चक्षुरादिदृष्टीनामन्तर्देहसमीक्षणम् ।
हिमवत्प्रभृतीनां च कुतोऽन्तः संभवो हृदि ॥२९८॥

There is no perceiving (lit. seeing) by organs,¹ viz. the eye and others, within the body; how can there be the existence of Mt. Himālaya and others² in the heart? [298]

Verses 298-300 point to the unreality of the objects seen in dreams; this is done with the help of the experiences of the waking state.

¹The word *dr̥ṣṭi* is used in distinction from the eye and, therefore, must be taken to signify the function of the organs, not only that of the eye.

²The organs cannot perceive Mt. Himālaya as existing within a body; whereas they are taken to be there by a dreamer. As such, the false nature of them when seen as objects in a dream.

The word 'others' refers to Mt. Vindhya, Mt. Malaya and so on.

नापि देहाद्विनिष्क्रम्य पर्वतादीन्समीक्षते ।
देहं विना कथमगाद्गतिसाधनवर्जितः ॥२९९॥

Not also does (a dreamer actually) go out of his body and see mountain(s) and others; for, how could he go (to see them)¹ without having a body and not possessing² any means?

[299]

¹This is because they are actually outside the body.

²Literally, devoid of any means; these are vehicles etc. beside the body.

अन्तरेणापि देहादींस्तत्कार्यं चेत्करोत्ययम् ।
व्यर्थं देहाद्युपादानमस्य प्राप्नोत्यसंशयम् ॥३००॥

If this one (viz. the dreamer), not possessing (or, devoid of) a body etc.¹ does perform the functions² of them; then it certainly follows that his actually having a body etc. is futile.

[300]

Here, Sureśvara points to the contingent futility of the dreamer's body.

¹The word etc. refers to the organs of the body and their functions.

²*kāryam* is singular, yet signifying plurality.

ननु पर्यङ्क आसीनो गच्छन्निबिकया वनम् ।
वेश्मतो बहिरात्मानं द्रक्ष्यतीति न तद्यतः ॥३०१॥
अमात्यादीन्यथादाय स्वात्मभोगप्रसिद्धये ।
नृपः स्वदेशमध्यस्थो यथेष्टं परिवर्तते ॥३०२॥

(And) it is not that ¹ (viz. what one might say:) 'But, indeed (*nanu*) he (viz. the king) is resting on his bed sees himself outside his house, going to the forest in a palanquin. [301]

For, taking (with himself) his attendants,¹ for securing his own pleasures, the king would move at will, within his own territory. [302]

These two verses explain *sa yathā mahārājah*.

¹Namely, the statement that the experience in the dream is real.

²This does not necessarily mean 'ministers'.

स्वदेहराष्ट्रसंस्थोऽयं जाग्रद्भावनिरूपिणः ।
प्राणानात्मा तथादाय स्वप्नान्पश्यति कामतः ॥३०३॥

(In the same way) this Ātman (i.e. the inner self) staying in the territory in the form of its own body and taking with it the *prāṇas* 'organs', sees, at its will, the dreams, viz. those that display (or, assume) the forms (and objects) of the waking state. [303]

This is the explanation of *evam evaiṣaḥ* ... clarifying the illustration in the two preceding verses.

असत्योपाधिभिः सोऽयं कूटस्थासङ्गविग्रहः ।
अविद्यारोपितमलो विद्ययात्मा विशोध्यते ॥३०४॥

(Thus) this Ātman (i.e. the inner self), the immutable and (the one) who does not have any connection with a body, has impurities (or, dirt) superimposed on it by the unreal limiting adjuncts, is purified by knowledge (of its true nature). [304]

The argument in this verse pertains to the unreal nature of all the experiences in the waking and dream state, their being the products of ignorance (Avidyā).

निःसङ्गस्य ससङ्गेन कटस्थस्य विनाशिना ।
आत्मनोऽनात्मना योगौ वास्तवो नोपपद्यते ॥३०५॥

There cannot (ever) be a real union of (i.e. connection between) the Ātman (inner self), which is devoid of any attachment and is immutable, with the non-Ātman that is full of (or, affected by/with) attachment and perishable. [305]

This statement about the never possible union is to clarify more the mention of *avidyāropitamala* on the Ātman, mentioned

in the preceding verse.

कूटस्थादत्तानुज्ञं सत्प्रत्याख्यातं सहान्वयम् ।
कारकाद्यन्यतो मोहान्नात्मानं प्रति द्वैकते ॥३०६॥

The (notions of) *kāraka* etc.,¹ together with what follows them,² being never allowed³ by the immutable, do not drive themselves⁴ unto the Ātman, (even) through infatuation caused by another.⁵ [306]

¹That is, *kārya* 'effect(s)'.

²Namely, desires, hatred, attachment etc. which are caused by them.

³Literally, disallowed, that means 'not tolerated'.

⁴That is, they cannot affect the Ātman. The Ātmepada from *dhaukate* is significantly used. The plural is forced by *sahānvayam*.

⁵Such a thing does not really exist. Yet the statement is made with a proviso 'if at all it did exist'.

Verses 307-390 are a discussion of the BU 2.1.19 (and allied matter).

ननु कामवशादस्य त्वयोक्तं परिवर्तनम् ।
द्रष्टृदृश्यादिभावश्च कथं शुद्धस्तथा सति ॥३०७॥

(A question is raised:) 'But, whatever changes you have mentioned have come to this one (viz. the dreaming inner self) on account of its desire(s), as also the relations such as¹ the seer and what is seen;² that being so, how could there be purity (of the inner self as said by you)?' [307]

¹'Such as' is for 'etc.'; they refer to the listener and what is listened to and other organs and what are perceived (or grasped) by them.

²Literally, what is to be seen.

मैवं स्वतोऽवबुद्धत्वात्कुतोऽज्ञानेन संगतिः ।
अज्ञानसंगतिं मुक्त्वा न स्यात्तज्जेन संगतिः ॥३०८॥

(An answer is given:) 'Do not say so. Since that one is (already) awakened by itself, how could there be its association with ignorance? (Indeed) leaving (aside any) association with ignorance, there could not be its association with what is its outcome (or, product). [308]

एवं यस्मात्स्वतः शुद्धो द्वितीयासंगतेरयम् ।
आत्मा तस्मात्स्वतो मुक्तः कूटस्थज्ञप्तिमात्रतः ॥३०९॥

Since it is thus pure in itself (or, in its own right) on account of (all) non-association with another, therefore, the Ātman (i.e. the inner self), is of itself free (or, liberated), on account of its being merely immutable knowledge.¹ [309]

¹*kūṭastha ... mātrataḥ* is for *kūṭastha ... mātratvataḥ*. Or perhaps, as SP suggests: *kūṭastha ... mātrataḥ* is for *kūṭastha ... mātraḥ* 'for it is merely immutable knowledge'.

न यथा श्रोत्रविज्ञानं रूपेणैति समागमम् ।
संसारेण तथैवात्मा कौटस्थ्यान्नैति संगतिम् ॥३१०॥

As the perception (*viññāna*) by ear(s) does not come to be related to (or, to have any connection/conjunction with) a form, in the same way, the Ātman (i.e. the inner self) does not, owing to its being immutable, come to have (any) relation to transmigratory existence. [310]

इत्यर्थस्यावबोधार्थं परो ग्रन्थोऽवतार्यते ॥३११॥
विशुद्धिं व्यतिरेकं च स्वप्नजाग्रदवस्थयोः ।
उक्त्वात्मनोऽद्वयत्वं च सुषुप्ते चाधुनोच्यते ॥३१२॥

For the explanation of this (very) matter is (now) introduced the subsequent text. [311]

Having (thus) stated the purity and also the absence of the Ātman (i.e. the inner self) in the two states of dream and waking, the Śruti has now stated the non-duality of (or, the absence of duality in) the Ātman in the sleep state also. [312]

This is regarding the introductory to BU sentence *atha yadā suṣupto bhavati*.

Verses 313-318 explain the meaning of the BU clause *yadā na kasya cana veda*.

न वेदेत्यात्मनः श्रुत्या कर्तृत्वं प्रतिषिध्यते ।
पश्यन्नपि यतः प्राज्ञः कौटस्थ्यान् प्रपश्यति ॥३१३॥

In (the words) *na veda* is rejected by the Śruti the agency (of any activity) on the part of the Ātman (i.e. the inner self),¹ since this Prājña² (viz. the inner self), even while it is (i.e. appears to be) seeing, does not really (*pra-*) see, on account of its immutability. [313]

¹It is worthwhile to note how the Śruti is equating the meanings of the verb roots *vid* and *kr*; see for a similar use *brahma veda brahmaiva bhavati* where the verb roots *vid* and *bhū* do not convey two sequential actions, they represent just one action (or what one would call simultaneous actions!).

²This is the (proper) name of the inner self in the sleep state—cf. *Maṇḍūkyaopaniṣad* 5 and *Gauḍapāḍakārikā* 1.11 related to it. Cf. verse 330 below.

अथ यो वेदेति तथा ज्ञातृसाक्षित्वमात्मनः ।
प्रतीचोऽकारकत्वं नः सर्वत्र प्रतिपाद्यते ॥३१४॥

So (also) in the sentence *atha yo veda ...*,¹ the nature of the Ātman (i.e. the inner self) as the knower and the witness and also is the non-agency of the inner self is explained to us everywhere.² [314]

¹This is reference to CU 8.12.4: hereby is explained how the Ātman is *really* the witness and so on.

²Cf. for instance, Śvetāśvataropaniṣad 1.9; 6.11 (SP quotes this); Maitrāyaṇyupaniṣad 2.7; 6.7.

क्वचित्प्रमातृवित्साक्षी क्वचित्प्रत्ययवित्परः ।
क्वचिद्वाह्यार्थविच्चात्मा तत्कर्तृत्वं निषिध्यते ॥३१५॥

At times (or at places or in some situations), the highest self is the knower and the witness of the knower (viz. the experiencer self), the knower of experience (viz. the experiencer's doing) or the knower of external objects (which, in reality, only appear to exist); but ¹ (its) agency is (totally) ¹ denied (or, rejected). [315]

¹This is by implication.

परप्रयुक्तं वेत्तृत्वं यदस्य प्रत्यगात्मनः ।
संबन्धजत्वात्तस्यातः कस्येत्यत्राभिधीयते ॥३१६॥

Since the nature of the knower in the case of this inner self is caused (or, produced/brought to it) by the highest self and also by its relation (to ignorance), therefore, for this reason (*ataḥ*) is used (lit. expressed) here the word *kasya*.¹ [316]

¹In the sentence *na kasya cana veda*, the word *kasya* implies *sambandha* to mean *hetu*; this then means: *na kasyāpi sambandhasya* (viz. *kim api*) *veda*, or, in other words, 'it did not know of any relation (to objects)'. Thus *kasya* is a genitive form expressive of relation (*sambandhe śaṣṭhī*). This is clarified in the following verse.

कर्मोत्थत्वात्प्रमात्रादेस्तत्क्षये क्षयवत्त्वतः ।
षष्ठीयं कर्मणि न्याय्या द्वयाभावविवक्षया ॥३१७॥

Since the knower etc.¹ have arisen from (i.e. produced by) *karman* and have an end (lit. exhaust) when that (viz. *karman*) comes to an end (lit. has exhausted); the genitive expressive of the object (viz. grammatical *karman*) is (to be accepted as being) in conformity with the grammatical practice (*nyāya*).

[317]

Read the introductory of SP on this: *tām (śaṣṭhīm) viśeṣe yojayati*.

¹The word etc. refers to *prameya* and *pramāṇa*.

अप्यर्थे चनशब्दोऽयमभावस्यापि वारकः ।
शेषशेषितरोभावे सुषुप्तिरिह भण्यते ॥३१८॥

The word *cana* in the sense of *api* is (useful in) warding off even *abhāva* 'absence' (of being an object of knowing itself) (and to convey the concealment of the sense of) the relation of *śeṣa* and *śeṣin* (between *abhāva* and *bhāva*) (and) therefore, in (the word) *iha* is conveyed the sleep state in the case of the individual self.¹

[318]

¹Cf. SP: *iheti saptamī puruṣam adhikaroti*.

In verses 319-342, there follows the explanation of *hitā nāma nāḍyaḥ* ...; i.e. to begin with, there is the description of various *nāḍīs* 'veins' and then follows the explanation of the process of sleep coming over a *Puruṣa*.

अथ केन क्रमेणायं सुषुप्तं प्रतिपद्यते ।
इति क्रमविधानार्थं हिता नामेति भण्यते ॥३१९॥

Now, in order to convey the order (of the process) of the sleep state to which this one (i.e. the inner self) comes, the words *hitā nāma* ... are used (i.e. stated).

[319]

आ नाभितस्तथा कण्ठाद्धृदयं मध्यतः स्थितम् ।

सनालं पद्मकोशाभं पञ्चच्छिद्रमधोमुखम् ॥३२०॥

The heart (*hr̥daya* of this *puruṣa*) is situated (in the region) from the navel and (*tathā*) to the throat; it is having a stem, has the colour of the interior of a lotus, has five holes and has an opening (lit. a face) downwards.¹ [320]

¹SP quotes a Śruti: *padmakōśapratīkāśaṃ hr̥dyaṃ cāpy adho-mukham* (*Tittirīya Āraṇyaka* 10.11.6).

Also it refers to CU as the source for the word *pañcacchidra*.

स्वप्नाश्रयाणि हृन्मध्ये नीलाद्याभानि देहिनः ।
स्थानानि सुरमर्त्यादिजुष्टान्यस्य भवन्त्युत ॥३२१॥
बिलानि सुषयश्चैता जाग्रद्वत्प्रत्ययोद्भवाः ।
एकोत्तरं नाडिशतं विष्वक्ताभ्यो विनिर्गतम् ॥३२२॥
प्रतीन्द्रियं दश दश निर्गता विषयोन्मुखाः ।
नाड्यः कर्मादिहेतूत्थाः स्वप्नादिफलभुक्तये ॥३२३॥

In the heart of this *Puruṣa* (lit. the embodied one) there are in the dream state the bases, having blue and others as their colours, and they are accepted by gods, mortals and others (for their abodes or supports); [321]

the openings and these holes which have arisen from the experience(s) of the waking state—viz. these are a hundred and one of the veins that have come out (or proceeded forth) from the same,¹ on all sides, [322]
to each organ in groups of ten (of them) they eager (to meet or receive) the objects—these veins, which have arisen (i.e. have been produced) from the causes *karman* and others,² are for the enjoyment of the results, viz. the heaven etc.³ [323]

¹This refers to the experiences.

²The impressions, desires etc. are meant.

³For a full enumeration of the veins etc., refer to SP and NKL—as known from the Śruti—could these be only mythical? Cf. *Kaṭhopaniṣad* 6.16, CU 8.6.6 and *Praśnopaniṣad* 3.6.

वहन्त्यम्भो यथा नद्यो नाड्यः कर्मफलं तथा ।
अनन्तैकोद्वर्गा नाडी तथा गच्छन्विमुच्यते ॥३२४॥

As the rivers carry (or, take) waters in them, so do the veins, the result of *karman* (etc.)¹ (Only) one of the veins has no end, it goes upwards and (the Puruṣa, i.e. Jīva), going by (or, in) that, is liberated.¹ [324]

¹SP quotes the Śruti: *tayordhvam āyann amṛtatvam eti*; *Kaṭhopaniṣad* 6.16 and CU 8.6.6 are referred to in note 3 on the preceding verse.

एकैकस्याः पुनर्नाड्याः सूक्ष्मभेदाः प्रकीर्तिताः ।
द्वासप्ततिसहस्रैस्ते संख्याता योगचिन्तकैः ॥३२५॥

Again, there have been described more subtle varieties of (or, differences among) them in relation to (or, connected with) each vein—they are described as seventy two thousand in number by those who meditate in *yoga*.¹ [325]

¹SP refers to some Śruti (only cryptically) and cites, in support of this. But see *Yājñavalkya Smṛti* 3.108-109ab and 3.101. Also cp. *Skanda Purāṇa* 5.3.159.45.

कदम्बकुसुमोद्भूतकेसरा इव सर्वतः ।
प्रसृता हृदयान्नाड्यो याभिव्याप्तं शरीरकम् ॥३२६॥

The veins have proceeded (lit. spread out) from the heart, on all sides, like pollen produced (or, given out) by a Kadamba flower, and whereby (i.e. thereby) is occupied the whole of this body.¹ [326]

¹In *śarīraka*, the suffix *-ka* is *svārthe*.

हितं फलं प्रयच्छन्ति यस्मात्तस्माद्विताः स्मृताः ।
हृदयात्ता विनिष्क्रान्ता यथार्काद्रश्मयस्तथा ॥३२७॥

Since they yield a fixed¹ result, therefore, they are known (by the name) *Hitā*. They have gone forth from the heart as the rays from the Sun. [327]

¹'Fixed' means determined (by the *karman*, impressions, desires etc.). The meaning 'agreeable' 'pleasure' also cannot be ruled out.

पुरीतदभिधानेन हृद्वेष्टनमिहोच्यते ।
तत्तूपलक्षणं विद्यादेहव्याप्तिविवक्षया ॥३२८॥

In this (happening),¹ the name *Purītat* conveys the sense of what wraps the heart; and (*tu*) one should know it as indicative (of the desire (or, wish)) to convey the pervading (by it) of the whole of the body. [328]

¹This refers to the experience of the three states.

स्वप्नकर्मसमुद्भूता वासना या हृदि स्थिताः ।
नाडीभिस्ता वितत्यात्मा स्वप्नान्पश्यति कामतः ॥३२९॥

The impressions, which have come out from (or, which are produced by) the activity in the dream state (and) which have remained in the heart—they does the *Ātman* (i.e. the inner self) first extend to (*manas*, i.e. scatter over it) and then see dreams (i.e. them in his dreams) according to its desire(s). [329]

स्वाप्नान्भोगानशेषेण भुक्त्वा स्वप्नक्रियाक्षये ।
ताभिरेवोपसंहृत्य प्राज्ञो याति सुषुप्तताम् ॥३३०॥

Having enjoyed all the enjoyables of the dreams (in their entirety), (the inner self) first withdraws them by those very (veins), and, at the end of the activities¹ in the dream, this Prājña² goes to sleep. [330]

¹This plural is implied by 'dreams'.

²Refer to verse 313 above.

जाग्रत्स्वप्नक्रियोद्धूतान्भुक्त्वा भोगानशेषतः ।
इन्द्रियाण्युपसंहृत्य शेते नाडीभिरात्मनि ॥३३१॥

Having (thus) enjoyed the enjoyables in their entirety, viz. those which have arisen from the activities in the waking and the dream states, it (i.e. the inner self) first withdraws by means of the veins (all) the organs within itself (*ātmani*)¹ and enjoys sleep.² [331]

¹This is reflexive pronoun.

²Or alternatively, goes to sleep.

सामान्यप्रज्ञया देहं संव्याप्यान्तर्बहिः श्रमात् ।
श्येनवत्परमं स्थानमात्माभ्येति सुषुप्तताम् ॥३३२॥

As a falcon¹ approaches (i.e. returns to) its nest (lit. resting place) out of fatigue, so does the Ātman (i.e. the inner self), owing to fatigue (caused) both inside and outside² finally³ return to the body, and, pervading it by its common character of knowing (*prajñā*),⁴ it goes to sleep. [332]

¹The example of a falcon (*śyena*) is taken because of its immense power of hovering high and long in space and also because of its large size and great strength.

²This refers to the inner self's activities in and out of the body, i.e. in the dream and the waking states.

³*paramam* is taken alternatively.

⁴It is present in all the states, even in sleep; yet, in this

(last), it does not become related to any object of and for knowing.

धियोऽन्तःकरणस्येह स्थानं हृदयमिष्यते ।
तत्रेन्द्रियाणि सर्वाणि बुद्धितन्त्राणि सर्वदा ॥३३३॥

In this (state), the heart is accepted as the (resting) place for the inner organ, viz. intellect.¹ There (rest in it), all the organs, depend as they do ever on the intellect. [333]

¹Though, by definition, the inner organ comprises the three, viz. *manas*, *ahaṅkāra* and *buddhi*, only the last one is meant; this is clear by the use of the word *dhiyaḥ* in apposition to *antaḥkaraṇasya*.

यत एवमतस्तानि नाडीभिः कर्मणो वशात् ॥३३४॥
प्रसारयति धीर्वृत्तीर्मत्स्यजालकवद्वहिः ।
प्रसार्यायतनस्थानि तानि धीरधितिष्ठति ॥३३५॥

Since this is so;¹ therefore, under the influence of *karman*, does intellect spread them and their activities by means of (or, through) the veins outside,² [334]
as (a fisherman spreads) his net, and, (thus) having spread those abodes of them (all),³ intellect superintends over them. [335]

¹That is, as said in the second half of the preceding verse.

²*bahis* refers to the area or locus of the functions or activities of the organs other than intellect; in other words, the world of the external objects of knowing.

³Here, there is reference to the organs as the source of activities.

जाग्रत्काले ततो ज्ञोऽयमभिव्यक्तविशेषधीः ।
व्याप्नोति निष्क्रियः सर्वान्भानुर्दश दिशो यथा ॥३३६॥

Then, this knower (i.e. the inner self), which has, during the time of the waking state, intellect with some special (or, particular) powers revealed in it,¹ though not (at all) active, pervades all (the objects of knowing), just like the sun (which pervades) the ten quarters. [336]

¹This refers to the influence of Avidyā.

ता एवेन्द्रियवृत्तिः स्वाश्चैतन्यखचिता यदा ।
संयच्छति प्रतीच्यात्मा स्वपितीति तदोच्यते ॥३३७॥

When the Ātman (i.e. the inner self) withdraws (or, restricts) within itself those very modifications¹ of (various) organs of itself, which are marked by (lit. studded with) sentience, then it is said that it is a sleep. [337]

¹This is for *vṛttis* identified as *vṛttimats*, viz. the active organs.

बुद्ध्युपाध्यनुरोधेन प्रतीचः प्रभवाप्ययौ ।
विक्षेपलयहीनस्तु स्वतः कुम्भखवत्परः ॥३३८॥

The rise and merger¹ of the inner self are through (i.e. owing to) the limiting adjuncts, viz. intellect (etc.)². However, this one, being (really) the highest self, is devoid of (i.e. not marked by) flashing forth and merger—it is like the sky in a pitcher.³ [338]

¹These are the waking and the sleep states.

²The word etc. in round brackets stands for the other organs which are also active and thus, like intellect, modify the inner self.

³Sureśvara has expressed the simile in very brief: The all-pervading sky which, by its nature, remains outside the pitcher and gets inside it also; in a similar way, the inner self appears active both outside and inside the body, though it is naturally all-pervading.

ताभिः प्रत्यवसृप्यात्मा वृत्तीर्नाडीभिरानयन् ।
तप्तायोवच्छरीरं स्वं व्याप्य शेते स्व आत्मनि ॥३३९॥

(Thus) having crept all around by means of the veins and (finally) withdrawing (them all within) and pervading its own body, the inner self sleeps within itself,¹ like a heated piece of iron.² [339]

This completes the meaning of *tābhiḥ pratyavasṛpya purīṭati śete*.

¹The word itself is for *ātmani* which is a reflexive pronominal form; cf. verse 331 above.

²The simile is somewhat unclear! There is doubt (i) if it is compared with the inner self or its body and also (ii) about the common property, viz. *vyāpti-kriyā* or *śayana*.

स्वहेतुमात्रया स्थानमिन्द्रियाणां न कार्यतः ।
यतोऽतश्चिन्निभेनैव व्याप्तिः स्यात्कारणात्मना ॥३४०॥

The resting (within the body) by (the various) organs is by assuming the nature of their own cause (and) not by (doing their various) activities; for, there is the pervasion (of the body) by the inner self (which is of) the nature of (their) cause; the one that is like (the all-pervading) sentience. [340]

The meaning of the resting of organs within the body is thus explained.

सुषुप्तौ न शरीरेण संगतिः प्रत्यगात्मनः ।
नापि बुद्ध्यादिभिः साक्षात्तत्स्थानासंगतेर्भवेत् ॥३४१॥

In sleep state, there is no (actual) connection (i.e. contact) of the inner self with the body,¹ not also with intellect etc.,² owing to the absence of its association with their resting places (in the body) in a direct way.³ [341]

¹This refers to the contact with the external organs. The sentience within has nevertheless a contact with them, i.e. its presence in them is admitted.

²These are the three internal organs; they have a place inside the body.

³Though the internal organs, especially intellect, would be resting inside the body, there is not any special contact with the same, since the heart, which is described as their resting place (cf. verse 333 above) is wrapped up by the vein called Purītat (in verse 328 above).

तीर्णो हीति तथा चैतदुत्तरत्राभिधास्यते ।
सुषुप्तेऽत्र पिता चेति सर्वसंबन्धवारणम् ॥३४२॥

Also, it will be later said (about the inner self) *tīrṇo hi...*, and in the sleep state, there is a rejection of all relations in the words *atra pitā*¹ [342]

¹Cf. BU 4.3.26: *atra pitāpitā bhavati ... tīrṇo hi kadā sarvān śokān hr̥dayasya bhavati.*

There is now, in verses 343-362, an explanation of the BU passage *sa yathā kumāro vā*

सर्वसंसारदुःखौघव्यतीतेयं परात्मनः ।
अवस्थेत्यत्र दृष्टान्तः स यथेत्यभिधीयते ॥३४३॥

This state¹ of the Ātman (viz. the inner self) is beyond all the influx of misery (caused by) transmigratory existence; in this regard, an illustration is stated in (the words) *sa yathā* [343]

¹This refers to the sleep state.

स्तनंधयो यथा बालो रागद्वेषविवर्जितः ।

तदभावाद्विकुर्वन्ति चेतो न विषयाः सदा ॥३४४॥

As a suckling is free from any attachment and/or hatred, (so) ¹ are the objects of desire (infested by the same) and, owing to their absence (in them, never affect the *manas* (of this one, i.e. the individual). [344]

¹This is for *evam* in the BU passage; the usual correlative *tathā* of *yathā* is not used by Sureśvara. Also, the simile is somewhat unhappily (or, clumsily) expressed!

अप्ररूढेन्द्रियत्वाच्च रागद्वेषाद्यसंप्लुतिः ।
मृदुकण्टकवत्तद्धीर्नालं वेद्धुं स्वगोचरान् ॥३४५॥

In the case of young baby, there is no possibility of being overpowered by attachment, hatred etc., owing to the organs not being (fully) developed, its intellect is not capable of grasping its objects, as the soft thorns ¹ (are not strong enough to pierce them that come its way). [345]

This is yet one more reason for the absence of *rāgādi* on the part of the inner self. There is a deliberate or intentional use of the word *aprarūḍhendriyatvāt* in a double sense; it is related to both a baby and the inner self. It may be said that the simile has become somewhat over-worked!

¹This is to mean that the thorns are not fully developed and, therefore, not sharp.

सर्वत्राव्याहताज्ञश्च विधेयप्रकृतित्वतः ।
राजा वातिसुखी लोके प्ररूढेन्द्रियवानपि ॥३४६॥

And even if the king has his organs fully developed, he is one whose orders are everywhere unchallenged owing to his subjects being under his control and he is therefore very (lit. extremely) happy. (Even so is the inner self very happy). ¹ [346]

This is in contrast with *apradūḍhendriyatva* etc. in the case of the baby in the preceding verse.

¹In this simile, the common property is 'extreme happiness'. One need not seek further point(s) of similitude. Also may be marked the use of *vā* in the sense of *iva* (as sanctioned by *Alaṃkāraśāstra*). See the next verse also for this.

विज्ञाताशेषतत्त्वो वा ब्राह्मणः कृतकृत्यतः ।
आनन्दस्य परां काष्ठामतिघ्नीमेत्य निर्वृतः ॥३४७॥

Or (the inner self is like) a Brāhmaṇa,¹ who has known the entire truth (of transmigratory nature of life), has achieved (the proper end of all) his duties (lit. doings), and having reached the farthest end of happiness,² the highest happiness (or, bliss), has become³ utterly happy (*nirvrta*). [347]

¹The use of *mahābrāhmaṇa* in BU does not relate to the later accepted derogatory sense.

²This is the meaning of *atighnī*; it is later explained in verse 350 below.

³SP refers to the Brāhmaṇa's happy sleep!

बालादित्रयमप्येतदेको दृष्टान्त इष्यते ।
बालमौढ्यमदान्धत्वनिवृत्त्यर्थं तथोच्यते ॥३४८॥

The triad, beginning with a baby is accepted (lit. desired) to be but (*api*)¹ one illustration; (but) it is so² expressed (only) to avert (the notions of) the baby's ignorance (lit. folly) and (the king's) blindness by passion. [348]

¹Read SP: *yad etad bālāditrayaṃ dr̥ṣṭāntatvenoktaṃ tan na tathā kiṃ tv eko mahābrāhmaṇo dr̥ṣṭānta ity arthaḥ apis taddhīr nālam ity ato nañam anukarṣati*. The second line explains the significance of the first line.

²That is, in the form of three illustrations.

बालस्य निर्विवेकत्वात्सविवेकः क्षितीश्वरः ।
तन्मदान्ध्यनिषेधार्थं महाब्राह्मण उच्यते ॥३४९॥

Because a baby has no capacity for differentiating (between things and things) and (in contrast with it) the king (lit. lord of the earth) has a capacity of differentiating (between them); therefore, rejecting his blindness caused by pride, there is mention¹ made of a great Brāhmaṇa. [349]

This explains how the illustration is not 'expressed' in fullness.

¹This is in the sense of 'the use of the illustration'.

अतीत्य दुःखहेतून्या हन्ति दुःखान्यशेषतः ।
आनन्दस्य परा निष्ठा तेनातिघनीति भण्यते ॥३५०॥

That state of happiness which transcends all unhappinesses (or, sorrows) and destroys all the miseries in their entirety is therefore expressed in the word *atighnī* 'the highest happiness (or bliss)'. [350]

This explains the word *atighnī* in verse 347 above.

निर्विकारात्मनां यस्माद्बालादीनां स्व आत्मनि ।
अतीव जायते ह्लादो दृष्टान्तः स विवक्षितः ॥३५१॥

Since, in the case of a baby and others, who are devoid of (i.e. unaffected by) what have the nature of modifications of the original state of mind, there arises (lit. is produced) in one's own self¹ a great joy; therefore that² is intended as an illustration. [351]

¹*ātmani* is used as a reflexive pronoun, and yet the sense of the inner self cannot be neglected.

²The word that refers to all the three sentences which convey different examples to form a *mahāvākya*; i.e. *vākyasamuccaya*,

as the writers on Poetics call it; cf. *Sāhitya Darpaṇa* chapter 1.

परसंबन्धमेत्यात्मा कार्यकारणरूपिभिः ।
ऐकात्म्यलक्षणं साक्षाच्छेत इत्यभिधीयते ॥३५२॥

What is said in the above is: Having come into direct connection with (or, relation to) the highest self, which is characterized by singleness, through (organs) which had assumed the forms of causes and effects, the Ātman (i.e. the inner self) goes to sleep. [352]

This is the proper meaning of *śete* in BU.

अत्यन्तसंनिकृष्टानामपि भिन्नात्मनां मितेः ।
लोचनस्थाञ्जनादीनां न दृष्टिपथतेष्यते ॥३५३॥
किमु प्रध्वस्तनिःशेषभेदहेताविहात्मनि ।
ग्राह्यग्राहकसंबन्धः सर्वभेदापनोदिनि ॥३५४॥

It is accepted that the collirium etc. in the eye, though they are extremely near (to the eye), being (known) as having different natures though, cannot become visible; [353]
what then to say in respect of the relation between what is to be grasped and the one who grasps (it), viz. the Ātman here (i.e. in the stage of sleep, or, in the inner self)¹ who is the cause of the complete (*pra*) destruction of all the differences in their entirety and who removes far away all distinct (objects)?² [354]

This argument is adduced for bringing out that the highest Ātman and the inner self in the sleep state, though very near to each other, are not known as one, owing to the difference in their natures. This is done by *kaimutikanyāya* in verse 354.

¹ Better, however, is to understand the sleep state.

² The word *bheda* seems to have, in this verse, two senses: (i) difference, and (ii) distinct objects.

स्वस्थावस्थैव यैतेषां प्रसिद्धा जगतीक्ष्यते ।
दृष्टान्तत्वेन स्वापस्य सैव साक्षाद्विवक्ष्यते ॥३५५॥

By the use of the illustration of the sleep state, here is intended to speak about that very state by which is known (or, accepted) in (our) worldly life (*jagati*) the most (*pra*) familiar condition of them.¹ [355]

¹This refers to *bāla*, *mahārāja* and *mahābrāhmaṇa* in the 'so-called' one illustration.

दाष्टान्तिकत्वेन यतः सुषुप्तोऽत्र विवक्षितः ।
नापि बालादिस्वापस्य विशेषः कश्चिदीक्ष्यते ॥३५६॥

Since as the *dārṣṭāntika* 'that for explaining which an illustration is given' is accepted here a person in sleep, therefore, there is not any particular nature of the sleep of a baby and others kept in view. [356]

अव्याहतमतिर्बालः सर्वातिशयवर्जिताम् ।
आनन्दस्य परां निष्ठामतिघ्नीं प्रतिपद्यते ॥३५७॥

A baby whose intelligence (or, sense of knowing) is not obstructed (by any outside influence) reaches the farthest end of happiness, the highest happiness (i.e. bliss) which is devoid of all excellences of other (states). [357]

यावद्यावत्प्ररूढत्वं रागादेर्जायते शिशोः ।
तावत्तावत्प्ररूढत्वं दुःखस्याप्यभिजायते ॥३५८॥

In the case of the baby, the more is the development (of its) attachment (to things) etc., the more is the intensity (of its) sorrow also. [358]

यथैव तत्तनुत्वं च यावद्यावदिहात्मनः ।

दुःखस्यापि तनुत्वं स्यात्तावत्तावत्सुखात्मनः ॥३५९॥

(And) as there would be smallness¹ of its sorrow (in proportion to its wants or needs), so also there would be in the case of the Ātman (i.e. the inner self) here (i.e. in worldly life or at the level of worldly existence) smallness in the sorrow, viz. of the one in the state of happiness. [359]

¹What is expressed in the preceding verse is stated in this verse in *vaidharmya* form.

उत्तरोत्तरवृद्ध्यातो दुःखहेतुक्षयाच्छ्रुतौ ।
सहस्रदशभागेन निष्ठानन्दस्य भण्यते ॥३६०॥

Therefore, there is stated in the Śruti a gradual subsequent increase in the limit of the happiness (of the inner self) on account of (the gradual) loss (or, decrease) of sorrow, in relation to the ten thousand measures of them.¹ [360]

¹This is on the basis of *Taittirīyopaniṣad* 2.8 beginning with *sa eko mānuṣa ānandaḥ* up to *sa eko brahmaṇa ānandaḥ*. Read SP for a little more explanation of the increase of the limit of happiness as *sukhabāhulayasiddhi* under reference.

अव्यावृत्ताननुगतप्रत्यङ्मात्रसमाप्तिः ।
भूमन्येव तु परा निष्ठानन्दस्येति श्रुतेर्वचः ॥३६१॥

(Also) there is a Śruti statement¹ that conveys the farthest limit of joy (or happiness) in only *bhūman* 'plenty' arising from obtaining only (the pure, i.e. unaffected, state of) the inner self which is not (i.e. cannot be) distinguished from or similar to (any other object).² [361]

¹This refers to CU 7.23.1.

²This is said, because that does not exist.

आनन्दः स्वयमेवात्मा भेदसंसर्गवर्जितः ।
दुःखहेतुविनिर्मुक्तावतिघ्नीमेत्यतः स्वतः ॥३६२॥

The Ātman (here, the inner self), (then) becoming devoid of any contact with distinct objects, is itself happiness and when there is release from the causes of sorrow (or, miseries), attains, of itself,¹ to the farthest limit (of happiness.) [362]

¹The significance of this word, viz. *svataḥ* 'of itself', is to point to the absence of the final release from transmigration (SP).

Verses 363-366 are for pointing out the relation of the preceding to the subsequent *Kaṇḍikā*: *sa yathorṇanābhīḥ*

गार्ग्यं काश्यो यदप्राक्षीत्क्वाभूदेष तदेति तत् ।
सप्रपञ्चं यथावच्च सर्वमुक्तमशेषतः ॥३६३॥
अनेन च यथोक्तेन पाणिपैषोत्थितस्य हि ।
मोहोत्थाशेषकार्येभ्यो विशुद्धिं श्रुतिरब्रवीत् ॥३६४॥

That Kāśya asked Gārgya, 'Where was this one then?' is explained in its fullness, as was necessary (*yathāvat*). [363]
And by this,¹ viz. this explanation, the Śruti has declared the purification (i.e. distinction) of just² that one, who was awakened by shaking (by Kāśya) with his hand, from all of the effects that had arisen from ignorance. [364]

¹Both SP and NKL point to it as *tvampadārthaśodhana*.

²This is for *hi*; SP remarks: *tathāvidhā śuddhir anyatrāpi prasiddheti hiśabdārthaḥ*.

कुत आगादिति त्वस्य प्रश्नार्थाविशिचकीर्षया ।
सुषुप्ताज्जाग्रदापत्तिर्यथा तदधुनोच्यते ॥३६५॥

And (*tu*) now is stated as to how there is awakening (i.e. bringing him to the waking state) from the state of sleep,

with a desire to clarify the thought (lit. thing, raised by) the question, 'Whence has he come?'. [365]

This refers, in substance, to Jīva 'the inner self' that was asleep.

Verses 366-390 discuss a doubt raised about the repetition of the questions (i.e. statements) of Kāśya and the rejection of the same.

नन्वस्थाद्यो हि यत्रेह स तस्मादन्यतो व्रजन् ।
वेश्मतो ग्रामतो वासौ तत एव व्रजेद्ध्रुवम् ॥३६६॥

'But, indeed,' (it may be argued) 'he, who stood at some place (*yatra*), would, going elsewhere,¹ whether from a house or a village, certainly go only from that place itself.' [366]

¹This is the object to which the person goes; cf. SP: *anyata iti gatikarmoktiḥ*.

तस्मात्सामर्थ्यतः सिद्ध उत्तरप्रश्ननिर्णयः ।
तन्निर्णयार्थमारम्भो न कार्यो जामिदोषतः ॥३६७॥

Therefore, the decision regarding (i.e. answer to) the subsequent question is (already) given (lit. determined) through the force (of that); therefore, there should not (now) be made an effort (lit. a beginning) to decide the same, lest there would result the fault of repetition (*jāmi*). [367]

न निमित्ताद्यर्थतापि पञ्चम्या उपपद्यते ।
ऊर्णनाभ्यग्निदृष्टान्ते न निमित्तादि गम्यते ॥३६८॥

Also, it does not stand to reason to hold that the meaning conveyed by the ablative case is expressive of reason (or, cause); (for) in the illustration of the spider and (also that of) Agni¹ there is not understood any reason etc. [368]

¹This is a reference to the illustration *sa yathorṇanābhiḥ* ... to follow.

प्रत्युक्तौ न निमित्तादि यदि साक्षात्समीक्ष्यते ।
अपादानार्थतैवास्तु दोषस्यान्यत्र दर्शनात् ॥३६९॥

Since, in the answer, there is not any reason etc. directly noticed, therefore, let there be the sense of ablation (or, going away from a thing), as there is noticed the fault (of repetition) (in the case) of the other (sense). [369]

नन्वत्रापि समो दोषो वाक्यस्य पुनरुक्तता ।
नैवं यतोऽखिलध्वान्तकार्यध्वंसो विवक्षितः ॥३७०॥

(An objection is raised thus:) 'But, here (i.e. in this case) also, there is the same (*sama*) fault, viz. the repetition of the sentence(-sense).' (There is now an answer to this objection:) 'This is not so; for what is intended to mention is the destruction of the entire effect(-world) of darkness, i.e. ignorance (Avidyā).' [370]

अव्यावृत्ताननुगतं पूर्णं ब्रह्म विवक्षितम् ।
प्रत्यङ्मात्रैकयाथात्म्यं न दोषो जामिता ततः ॥३७१॥

Since it is (here) wished to speak about the Brahman, which is not distinguished from (anything else), nor is it similar to (anything else); full/complete (in itself), and only the true nature of the inner self; therefore there is no fault of repetition. [371]

This is the intended statement latent in the second question of Kāśya.

विषयौ द्वावपन्यस्तौ विद्याविद्यात्मनोरिह ।
आत्मेत्येवेति विद्याया विषयः प्रागुदाहृतः ॥३७२॥

अविद्याविषयस्तावत्संसारानर्थ ईरितः ।

क्रियाकारकभेदेन नामरूपक्रियात्मकः ॥३७३॥

Here are put forth two topics of the dialogue, i.e. the subject matter regarding knowledge and ignorance about (the true nature of) the two Ātmans,¹ (and) already (*prāk*) the subject matter of knowledge is presented just in the words *ātman* [372]

(and), as for the subject matter of ignorance, there is stated the undesirable transmigratory existence which comprises action (or activity) and various factors related to it and which has the nature of name(s), form(s) and action(s).² [373]

¹The highest Ātman and the inner self.

²This refers to the subject matter of first Adhyāya.

तत्राविद्योद्भवं कार्यं यावत्किंचिद्विवक्षितम् ।

तत्प्रत्यपादि निखिलं पूर्वं श्रुत्यैव यत्नतः ॥३७४॥

Of these two,¹ whatever was intended as effect arising from ignorance has been already² explained by the Śruti, in its fullness and with particular care. [374]

¹That is, knowledge (*vidyā*) and ignorance (*avidyā*).

²That is from 1.4.10 onwards up to the end of first Adhyāya.

अविद्याप्रतिपक्षाया विद्याया विषयोऽधुना ।

प्रवक्तव्योऽतस्तद्योग्यौ प्रश्नौ द्वौ समुदाहृतौ ॥३७५॥

(And) now is to be discussed (or explained) the subject matter of knowledge, which is opposed to (lit. is an opponent to) ignorance; therefore, there are introduced two questions which are suitable for the same.¹ [375]

¹SP states *vidyāsūtram na prapañcitam iti*.

हेतुस्वरूपकार्याणि विरोधीनि परस्परम् ।
अविद्याविद्ययोर्यस्मात्तद्योग्यप्रश्नगीरतः ॥३७६॥

Since the causes, natures and effects¹ of ignorance and those of knowledge are mutually opposite, therefore, the statement of the (two) questions is proper.² [376]

This clarifies the mutual opposition of ignorance and knowledge.

¹SP clarifies them thus:

	ignorance	knowledge
cause	informative of non-discrimination, attachment etc.	productive and informative of (proper) discrimination, aversion to pleasures etc.
nature	manifest	unmanifest
effect	bondage	freedom from bondage

²That is, suitable for giving an exposition of knowledge which removes ignorance.

कारकव्यवहारोऽयमविद्याविषयः सदा ।
आधाराधेययोर्भित्तौ तयोः कारकतेष्यते ॥३७७॥

The function of various factors which are instrumental in bringing about an activity is ever the subject matter of ignorance. (And) on the basis of the support and the supported are the two¹ accepted as related to action (expressed by the verb in the sentence (*kārkatā*).¹) [377]

¹Namely, ignorance and the instrument of its activity.

²SP states that this statement pertains to the first question of Kāśya.

तद्वद्गच्छति यो यस्माद्भेदे सत्येव याति सः ।
इत्यविद्याव्यवस्थेयं विद्यायास्तद्विपर्ययः ॥३७८॥

Similarly, he who goes from some (place) does so (i.e. goes) only when there is a difference (between the other place and the goer's earlier place); thus is the order of things (*vyavasthā*) related to ignorance and, in relation to knowledge,¹ the opposite of it (viz. non-difference and the consequent order of things) is (to be understood). [378]

¹SP observes that this is related to the second question of Kāśya. The editor of NKL adds a note to the NKL thus: *apādānakartṛbhāvasya* (as *apādānatvakartṛtvayoḥ*), *tathāṭve* (as *avidyākāryatve*) and *yuktim* (as *bhedasāpekṣatvarūpāṃ yuktim*) *āha*.

क्रियाकारकभेदाद्या लोकतः शेमुषी त्वभूत् ।
यथास्थितात्मयाथात्म्यसम्यग्ज्ञानेन बाध्यते ॥३७९॥

And (*tu*) what notion there was about the difference between an activity and its instruments—as is held by the people (*lokataḥ*)— is stultified by the right knowledge of the real nature of the Ātman that has been existent. [379]

This expresses the effect of knowing clearly the difference between ignorance and knowledge.

नान्योऽयमात्मान्यत्राभन्नान्योऽन्यस्मात्तथैति च ।
इति निःशेषतन्मोहकार्यैर्ध्वंसो विवक्षितः ॥३८०॥

This Ātman (i.e. the inner self) did not become another in another place, nor is it another and does it go elsewhere; thus it is intended to express the complete (or, utter) destruction of the wrong apprehension about it and also (the consequent) effects thereof. [380]

NKL briefly points out the intention thus: *ādhārādheya-bhāvāpādānakartṛtvādinirāso vivakṣita ity arthaḥ*.

अभेदव्यतिरेकाभ्यां वस्त्वन्तरमिहात्मनः ।
श्रुत्या निषिध्यते साक्षाद्वेदहेतोर्निषेधतः ॥३८१॥

Here (in this statement of questions) anything else than the Ātman (i.e. the inner self) is rejected by the Śruti, with the Anvaya and Vyatireka (method of argument) and, directly, by (the consequent) rejection of the cause of (their) being distinct.¹ [381]

¹This refers to ignorance.

ननु प्राणादिभिः सद्भिः कथं निर्भेदतात्मनः ।
नात्मन्येव तदध्यासाच्छ्रुतकारजतादिवत् ॥३८२॥

‘But’ (it is objected): ‘How can there be the non-distinction of the Ātman (i.e. the inner self) (from the *prāṇas* ...) while there are *prāṇas* and others¹?’ (The answer is:) ‘That cannot be so, owing to the superimposition of them on the Ātman (i.e. the inner self) like that of silver etc.² on a shell.’ [382]

¹The word etc. refers to intellect, *manas*, *ahaṁkāra*, *mamātva* and others.

²This ‘etc.’ is yet again Sureśvara’s loose diction, i.e. for *ādi* in *rajatādi* there are not mentioned any counterparts other than a shell. Or, are we to understand the compound *śūktikārajatādivat* as *śūktikādi-rajatādi-vat*, (for such is Sureśvara’s way of expression)?

कथं तदिति दृष्टान्त ऊर्णनाभ्यादिरुच्यते ।
वास्तवं वृत्तमापेक्ष्य न त्वयं सृष्टिरात्मनः ॥३८३॥

(A question is asked:) ‘How is that¹ (to be understood)?’ (In answer) it is pointed out ‘(the illustration of) a spider etc. is given.’ (Again, another question:) ‘(Is not) this with actual happening in view?’³ (An answer to it is given thus:)

'Indeed, this is not the creation of the Ātman (i.e. inner self).'
[383]

¹The questioner asks about the superimposition affirmed in the preceding verse.

²The word etc. refers to the sparks of fire. It has a basis in the clauses *yathorṇanābhiḥ tantunocaret, yathāgneḥ kṣudrā visphulingā vyuccaranti*.

³The *lyabanta* form *āpekṣya* is from a verb root *īkṣ* with *ā-apa* as a compound prefix.

नासतो जन्मना योगः सतः सत्त्वान्न चेष्ट्यते ।
कूटस्थे विक्रिया नास्ति तस्मादज्ञानतो जनिः ॥३८४॥

That which is non-existent is not connected with (any) origination, nor is it accepted as originating from what is existent; because it has (already) the nature of being an existent. In the immutable again, there does not occur any modification. Therefore, (it is settled that the *prāṇas* etc. have) an origin in ignorance.
[384]

This explains the unreality of *prāṇas*.

पुंसप्रबोधप्रसिद्धयर्थं सृष्टिव्याजोऽयमुच्यते ।
कौटस्थ्यात्त्वात्मनः सृष्टिर्न कथं च न युज्यते ॥३८५॥

In order to explain (lit. establish) the waking up of the man,¹ this pretext of (the statement of) the creation is adopted; nevertheless, (any) creation from the Ātman (i.e. the inner self) does not, owing to its immutability, become in any way possible.
[385]

¹NKL reads: *svaprabodhasiddhyartham* in place of *pumspra...*; but that does not seem to be probable.

निःशेषवेदसिद्धान्तविद्वद्विरपि भाषितम् ।

गौडाचार्यैरिदं वस्तु यथास्माभिः प्रपञ्चितम् ॥३८६॥
 मृल्लोहविस्फुल्लिङ्गाद्यैः सृष्टिर्या चोदितान्यथा ।
 उपायः सोऽवताराय नास्ति भेदः कथं चन ॥३८७॥

The revered teacher (*ācārya*) Gauḍapāda, who knew the entire Vedānta doctrine (only too well), also has described at length the thing (viz. the existent thing is really the Ātman alone), in the same way as I have done: [386]

“Whatever creation (was earlier) pointed out (by me), viz. by (citing examples of) clay, iron, sparks of fire and others, was only otherwise (i.e. false or not real); that was only by way of introducing (the real matter, in hand); indeed, there do not exist any discrete objects.”¹ [387]

¹This is a quotation, viz. *Gauḍapādakārikā* 3.15.

सृष्टावन्यपरायां तु न चोद्यस्यास्ति संभवः ।
 कूटस्थात्कथमुत्पत्तिरचित्कं चेतनात्कथम् ॥३८८॥

When creation¹ is pointing towards something else,² there is no possibility of (or, no scope for) any objection;³ (for we ask:) ‘How can there be any origination (of something) from the immutable and how could there be any non-sentient (produced) from the sentient?’ [388]

The argument refers to what are known as *sr̥ṣṭivākyas* ‘statements about the origination of what forms the mundane world’. Reference was made to these by Gauḍapāda and other Vedāntins; yet with the intention of showing the origination as unreal.

¹That is, the statements about creation or origination of some thing(s).

²This is based on the singleness of the Ātman.

³Namely, the Ātman or the immutable originates other things.

निःसाधनं च कार्याणि कथं कुर्यादनेकधा ।

विश्वरूपसमुत्पत्तिरेकरूपात्कथं भवेत् ॥३८९॥

How can what does not have any means (of activity) produce manifold (i.e. varied) effects? How (again) can there be creation of all forms (*viśva-rūpa*) from what is (only) uniform? [389]

This argument is based on the prerequisites of creation, viz. (i) there should be the means for creation and that (ii) the cause and the effect must be similar (in form).

इत्येवमादि चोद्यानां पुंस्वभावानुरोधतः ।
परिहारवचः श्रौतं न च वस्त्वनुरोधतः ॥३९०॥

Thus the statements of refutation in the Śruti¹ pertain to the objection (that arises) from men's nature and not from (the real state of) the thing.² [390]

Here is given finally the purport of the whole of the argument. This is to explain the need of the Śruti sentences which resemble those in common parlance; cf. BSB 1.1.1 (p.40): *tam etam adhyāsam avidyākhyam ātmānātmanor itaretarādhyāsam puraskṛtya sarve pramāṇaprameyavyavahārā laukikā vaidikāś ca pravṛttāḥ*.

¹The reference in the singular implies the plurality of the sentences. This refers to the illustrative statements in the Śruti which explain the natures of ignorance and knowledge.

²That is, the nature of the Ātman or, the inner self (as the case may be).

Now follows the explanation of the BU 2.1.20 and discussion of allied matters.

ऊर्णनाभिः स्वयं कर्ता प्रयुङ्क्ते कर्म चात्मना ।
तन्तन्स्वतः प्रसिद्धेन करणेन च तन्तना ।
गमिक्रियां साधयति तथैकत्रापि चात्मनः ॥३९१॥

A spider, being itself an agent, employs, on its own, the object, viz. the threads (produced) from itself¹ by means of its (well-)known organ, viz. the thread, and accomplishes the action of going (along/about) it); so is it (to be understood) also (*ca*) in the case of the Ātman (i.e. the inner self), even though it is only single (by itself).² [391]

The word *anekadhā* in the preceding verse is in view.

¹See on this NKL: *svayam eva kartrā karanam ca tyaktvā anekadhā sṛṣṭatvam āha*.

²'So is it ... (by itself)' is in conformity with the explanation of SP and NKL. I believe it to be necessary owing to the incompleteness of the meaning, if *ekatrāpi cātmani* is related to the spider itself. So also, the force of *ca* 'also' would be otherwise lost.

अचेतनो यथा जाल ऊर्णनाभेः सचेतनात् ।
आकाशादिजगत्कार्यमात्मनश्चेतनात्तथा ॥३९२॥

As an insentient cob-web¹ (comes from, i.e. is produced from) a sentient spider, so does the (entire world of) effect(s), beginning with the sky,² (come from) the sentient Ātman (i.e. the inner self). [392]

This answers *acitkam cetanāt katham* in verse 388 above.

¹Sureśvara uses the word *jāla* in the masculine! Perhaps, a fastidious reader, following the dictum of Poetics, would suggest: *acetanam yathā jālam* so that it corresponded to *kāryam* (in neuter) and that could not be objectionable. But this can be in (Sureśvara's) occasional Vedic fashion.

²Cf. *Taittirīyopaniṣad* 2.1.

विस्फुलिङ्गा यथा चाग्नेर्जायन्तेऽग्निस्वभावकाः ।
सुषुप्तादात्मनस्तद्वत्प्राणादीनां समुद्भवः ॥३९३॥

Also as small sparks proceed (i.e. arise) from fire and (further) have the nature of fire (itself), so do the *prāṇas* etc. come (i.e. arise) from the Ātman (i.e. the inner self) which is asleep. [393]

This is to answer (also) *kūṭasthāt katham* in verse 388 above.

सुषुप्तोदाहृतिर्येयं तया समुपलक्ष्यते ।
विश्वाभिव्यक्तितः पूर्वं ब्रह्मैवानामरूपकम् ॥३९४॥

What (again) is the example of the one (viz. the inner self) that is asleep points to (or, indicates) the very Brahman which existed before the world became manifest (and) which did not have any name and form. [394]

This sets aside any notion of *kāryakāraṇa* relation between the (sleeping) inner self and the highest Ātman.

सर्वासूपनिषत्स्वेवं कारणं नान्यदात्मनः ।
श्रूयतेऽतः परात्मैव जगतः कारणं परम् ॥३९५॥

Thus in all of the Upaniṣads is thus heard that there is nothing else¹ as the cause of the inner self; therefore, the highest Ātman alone is the ultimate (*para*) cause. [395]

¹SP points out that this sets aside the theory of the Pradhāna as the cause. This, on the basis of the Upaniṣads.

There is now, in verses 396-413, Sureśvara's discussion about the divergent views of the followers of his some allied schools, viz. possibly of those who accept the authoritativeness of the Śruti. And there is also the refutation of the same in brief.

ब्रह्मण्यस्तमितेऽत्यर्थं जगत्स्मिन्नशेषतः ।
जगत्प्रसूतौ को हेतुस्तदन्याव्यतिरेकतः ॥३९६॥

(One might say:) 'When (i.e. in the case that) this entire world has finally merged into the Brahman, what can (or, could) be the cause of/for its origination, since there is altogether an absence of anything else than that?' [396]

The argument is based on two aspects of the Brahman: (i) it is immutable and (ii) it is without a second. Therefore, once the world merges into the Brahman, there can never be any creation!

अस्तीशो व्यतिरिक्तश्चेत्सोऽपि केन प्रवर्तितः ।
जगन्निर्मिनुयादेतत्स्वतश्चेत्सर्वदा न किम् ॥३९७॥

If (it is held that) there is a Lord, apart (from the Brahman), (then the question would be,) 'How would he be able to create the world?'¹ (and) impelled by whom? And if he would do so, on his own (*svataḥ*), then why (does or can he) not (create the world) always?² [397]

This argument comes from Tārīkikas 'Logicians' who hold that there is an indifferent (*atastha*) Lord, beside the Brahman.

¹Having doubted the existence of such a Lord (cf. *so 'pi*), Sureśvara puts a question: 'Who would impel that Lord?'

²This is a counterquestion to the Tārīkikas. Here, another alternative, viz. *svataḥ* 'on his own' is refuted.

ऐश्वर्यं पारतन्त्र्यं च नापि संभाव्यते मितेः ।
नापि कार्यं विलीनत्वात्स्वात्मोत्पत्तौ प्रवर्तते ॥३९८॥

And Lordship and dependence both cannot possibly exist (in just one Lord), (for that can be understood) from the modes of arguing.¹ So also, the effect, owing to its having merged (in the Brahman), cannot proceed to produce itself.² [398]

There are two aspects of this verse. One is in continuation of the Tārīkikas' argument and, the other of the Svabhāvavādins

who believe in the nature of things to come into existence on their own. Cf. *Śvetāśvataropaniṣad* 1.2 and 6.1.

¹This has reference to yet another aspect of the Tārīkikas' thought, viz. it is *karman* that impels the Lord to create. But this would mean his dependence and, being a Lord, he should be independent! That would involve self-contradiction.

²It can be argued by the Svabhāvavādins that the world, which is a *kārya*, can come into existence by its own nature. Yet, having had merged into the Brahman, how could it proceed to any activity?

भिन्नं चेत्कारणात्कार्यं कार्यकारणता तयोः ।
पृथक्प्रसिद्धयोः केयं हिमवद्विन्ध्ययोरिव ॥३९९॥

If (again) the effect is different from the cause, what kind of cause and effect relation can there be between them, viz. the cause and the effect, which are quite well-known to be distinct even as Mt. Himālaya and Mt. Vindhya? [399]

The question pertains to the Tārīkikas' position that cause and effect must be similar. Here the Brahman and the world are totally different from each other and, therefore, one could not consider them as the cause and the effect.

अथाभिन्नं तदैकत्वात्कार्यकारणता कुतः ।

Further, if thus the effect is not distinct¹ from the cause; then the two being just one, how could there be (posited) the cause and effect relation of the two? [400ab]

¹By 'distinct' one should be required to understand two different entities; but this is denied by the use of the word *ekatvāt*. Non-distinction in nature is not under discussion here; for, the Tārīkikas have already mentioned that as what is a characteristic of the cause and the effect—this is mentioned in the note on the preceding verse.

नापि निष्क्रियरूपं सत्कारणत्वं समश्नुते ॥४००॥
 तथा चाक्रियमाणं सत्कथं कार्यमिहोच्यते ।
 क्रियाशून्यं च यद्वस्तु तच्चकारकमिष्यते ॥४०१॥

Also, nothing, being inactive in nature, can be a cause (or, be called a cause).¹ [400cd]

So also, what is not being subjected to some action is described here as the effect!² And, that thing which is devoid of any activity is regarded (lit. accepted) here as what is instrumental (in some activity).³ [401]

¹Actually, this line is read in the printed edition together with verse 400ab and is not separated as is done here. But it begins a discussion of the natures of what are related as the cause and the effect. Here, it is pointed out that what is non-operative/non-active in nature—such is the Brahman—is considered as the cause; this is not logically possible.

²To be an effect something is required to have been subjected to an activity of some cause(s) to produce it. But the argumentator seems to hold that there is some effect, and yet that has no cause(s) for it!

³The word 'instrumental' suggests the nature of what is held as cause—most likely, the agent—and has no relation to any activity whatever.

लयेनैव समाप्तत्वात्कालकर्मादिकारणम् ।
 स्वात्मोत्पत्तावशक्तं तद् व्यक्तं सामर्थ्यभाष्यतः ॥४०२॥

Since what is considered as the cause of creation, viz. the *karman* (or activity of) Kāla,¹ is already included in Merger,² that (viz. Kāla) is not capable of coming into existence itself and it is held to have the capacity to create (only when) it is manifest!³ [402]

Here is controverted a view of those who hold Kāla as the

cause of the creation of the world; cf. reference to this view in *Gauḍapāḍakārikā* 2.24.

¹The basis of this may be BU 1.2.4 (and *Maitrāyanyūpaniṣad* 6.14).

²The Brahman itself is (in every likelihood) called *laya* 'Merger', since all objects in the world merge in it.

³The argument is: To be able to create anything, Kāla must come into existence first.

नित्यशक्तित्वपक्षेऽपि युगपत्प्रभवादिकम् ।
प्राप्नोति सर्वकार्यस्य न च तद्वर्तते तथा ॥४०३॥

If a view is held¹ that the cause of the world² has ever (or, for all time) the power to create, then the origin etc.³ of all effects would be (only) simultaneous; but that does not so happen.⁴ [403]

¹For 'If a ... held', alternatively translate: 'In the view that ...'. But the first alternative appears better.

²That is Kāla, continued from the preceding verse.

³The word etc. refers to *apyaya* 'merger'. Or, one can understand in the place of these two: the usual triad, *utpatti*, *sthiti* and *laya*.

⁴This is how the view under reference cannot be accepted.

शक्त्युत्पत्त्यभ्युपेतौ च कारणं स्यादशक्तितमम् ।
अथ शक्त्यन्तराच्छक्तिरनवस्था प्रसज्यते ॥४०४॥

Or, if it is held that this power to create the world comes to exist in the cause, it would then mean that the cause does not have the power (to create the world);¹ thence it would follow that that power (to create the world) has come from (or, originated in) another power² and thus there would be the contingent *infinite regress*. [404]

This is an alternative view to that in the preceding verse and

is consequently refuted.

¹This would mean a cause is powerless to create the world and is itself created by some cause.

²This power, in its turn, must originate in yet another and so on.

किमपेक्ष्य व्यपेतत्वं कालोऽयं वार्तमानिकः ।
यायादनागतत्वं च तस्यैक्याभागवत्त्वतः ॥४०५॥
नित्यमेकं विभु द्रव्यं यदि कालोऽभ्युपेयते ।
अतीतानागतत्वादिभेदः स्यात्किंनिबन्धनः ॥४०६॥

On what does (Kāla) depend (i) to be (of the nature of being) past and (ii) that this Kāla of the present would be (of the) future—if it has just the nature of being one whole and having no parts? [405]

If Kāla is accepted as eternal, one (i.e. single) and all-pervading substance; then in what is rooted its differentiation into what is past and what is to come? [406]

The argument is: Acceptance of the past, the present and the future as three parts of Kāla would render it unfit to be the origin or cause of this world.

The Vaiśeṣikas (i.e. Tārīkikas) hold Kāla as *nityā-*, *eka-* and *vibhu-* *dravya* 'substance'. This means, being *vibhu* 'all-pervading' like the sky, it cannot have such parts as are mentioned in the above.

आदित्यादिगतिश्चेत्स्यात्कालोऽव्यक्तसमुत्थितौ ।
आदित्यादेर्विलीनत्वान्न तदा तत्क्रियेयते ॥४०७॥

If (it is said that) Kāla is the (varying) movement of Āditya and others,¹ then (it has to be admitted that that movement can occur only) after there has been the rise (or manifestation) of the unmanifest;² but, because Āditya and others¹ have already had merged (in the unmanifest), there would not be any action thought of (or, contemplated, lit. accepted of the

Āditya and others).

[407]

¹It is difficult to explain what is meant by *-ādi* 'others' in *ādityādi* (this is twice used in this verse). One can perhaps say that *-ādi* refers to the limiting adjuncts of the sun, viz. *gati*, capacity to heat, and light—this can be so on the clue suggested by NKL's explanation of *kālah* as *kālopādhir iti yāvat*. NKL's comment on this verse offers some difficulty: It states: *yad vā ādityādikriyaiva kālah ity āśanikya anena vārtikena nirasyate*; but how can this be an alternative? The tenor of the arguments precludes the same.

Or possibly, and better perhaps, to hold that this is based on *Maitrāyaṇyupaniṣad* 6.15.

²The unmanifest is the Brahman, the so-called source of the world; *nāmarūpābhyām avyākṛta*.

न चावयविनो वृत्तिर्निरंशैकत्वहेतुतः ।

भागेषु निष्कलत्वैक्यनिःसामान्यत्वकारणात् ॥४०८॥

So also what is (said to be) made of parts¹ cannot exist in (its different/discrete) parts (simultaneously) owing to the reason that it is without parts (i.e. a whole) and (just) one thing; and also because it is (really) not made up of parts and (therefore) is not (what can be called as) general property.

[408]

SP clearly brings out the argument thus (this is only briefly indicated here): A piece of cloth, as a whole, cannot rest on all threads which are related to it as its parts—it can be argued that, while 'clothness' can obtain in some threads, it does not obtain on others. Thus the so-called *samavāya* relation cannot obtain in the case of the Ātman and the various individuals. (This is clarified in the following verse. SP points out thus: *vipakṣam anūdya doṣam āha*.)

¹That is, 'it is a whole'.

आधारेषु निरंशेषु यद्याधेयस्तथाविधः ।
भिन्नदेशेषु तेष्वेकस्तथा चावयवी कथम् ॥४०९॥

If (then) that kind of 'what is to be supported' exists in 'what are supports' that are (in reality) not parts, how then the single one, existing in various places (or beings) can be said to be 'having parts'? [409]

This is to say that the single Ātman, though appearing to exist in many bodies, cannot be said to have those bodies as its parts. It cannot be compared with 'being a form' (*rūpatva*) that is common to many forms (*rūpas*).

तस्मान्न देशकालादिभेदो वस्त्वाश्रयो मितेः ।
दिग्भेदकलृप्तिवद्वयोमिन् भेदोऽयं तद्वदात्मनि ॥४१०॥

Therefore, the distinctions¹ such as a region (or part), Kāla 'time' do not have a support in the thing (viz. the origin of the world, i.e. the Brahman), since (we can show) by (or from) inference (*mitēḥ*) that this (world of) distinctions in (alleged to be obtaining) in the Ātman (in this context, the inner self) is like the (differentiation) in (the case of) the sky in (its) divisions (called) quarters. [410]

Actually, there is not any specific argument in respect of region (unless, of course, *ādhāra-ādheya*, *avayava-avayavin* or *bhāgas* (and, therefore, *bhāgin*) are understood in the sense of *deśa*— and this is clear from the illustration of the sky which is (said to be) divided into quarters.

¹This plural is implied by the singular.

जगदुत्पत्तिसंहारास्तद्वदात्मनि कल्पिताः ।
वस्तुवृत्तं समालोक्य कुतः सृष्ट्यादिसंभवः ॥४११॥

In the same way, (then), the origin and the merger of the world in the (highest) Ātman are (only) imagined; (therefore),

after having seen (i.e. carefully examined) the nature of things,¹ how (or, on what ground, or, whence) can (one posit that) there is a possibility of the creation etc.² of the world? [411]

There is here a stress on the imaginary nature (*kalpitatva*) of the world. This is entailed by the earlier statement about the imaginary nature of the world.

¹Things here refer to the discrete objects in the world, their origination and merger as also the ultimate reality.

²The word etc. refers to the mutual relations among the things in the world and their modifications (*vikāras*).

कारकादिर्यथा भ्रान्तिस्तथा पूर्वमवादिषम् ।
सर्वमात्मेति नेतीति तथा सत्युपपद्यते ॥४१२॥

I have already spoken as to how the (distinctions such as) instrument of activity¹ are only imaginary (i.e. products of imagination). Only that being so,² (the Śruti statements) *sarvam ātmā ...*³ and *neti ...*⁴ become⁵ reasonable. [412]

¹This is indicative of the agent, his action and so on.

²This means: since this is so.

³Cf. BU 4.5.7.

⁴Cf. BU 4.4.22; 4.5.15.

⁵That is, they prove to be in conformity with reason (in our arguments above).

उद्भूतिस्थितिनाशाः स्युर्जगतोऽतः प्रतिक्षणम् ।
अविद्यामात्रहेतुत्वान्नामौषां विद्यते क्रमः ॥४१३॥

As a result, therefore, there occur at every moment the origin, the sustenance and the destruction of (the discrete things in) the world. (And) since these have only ignorance (*Avidyā*) as the cause (of their existence), there is no specific order (among them).¹ [413]

¹This is to point to various orders in creation in different Śruti texts; e.g. *Taittirīyopaniṣad* 2.1: *tasmād vā etasmād ātmana ākāśaḥ sambhūtaḥ*; CU 6.2.4: *tat tejo 'srjata*.

Verses 414-425 explain the meaning of sarve prāṇāḥ

प्राणाः श्रोत्रादयोऽत्र स्यर्दश सप्त च ये मता ।
लोकावच्छेदतोऽमीषां भेदोऽध्यात्मादिलक्षणः ॥४१४॥
जरायुजादिसंभेदभिन्ना लोकाः पृथग्विधा ।

They are the *prāṇas*, viz. the ears and others, which are known as ten and seven,¹ because they are the limiting adjuncts of the *loka* 'a body'; these have a further division into what have the nature of *adhyātma* 'pertaining (or related) to the body' and so on. [414]

The *lokas* 'bodies'² are of various types, viz. distinguished into discrete bodies such as *jarāyuja* 'born from a womb'.³ [415ab]

¹These are: five organs of knowing, five organs of activity, five winds, *manas* and intellect. NKL quotes from *Samkṣepa Śārīraka* 3.20: *iha tāvad akṣadaśakam manasā saha buddhitattvam atha vāyugaṇaḥ*.

²This is to explain how *loka* has a special sense here, viz. 'a body'.

³The others are *udbhijja*, *aṇḍaja* and *svedaaja*.

तथाधिदेवतात्मानो देवाः स्युर्बहुभेदकाः ॥४१५॥

So also there are gods, viz. those who have the nature of (superintending)¹ deities and have many distinctions (among them). [415cd]

¹That is, superintending over the *prāṇas*.

तेऽपि साधारणाः प्राणा देहेऽसाधारणास्तु ते ।

भूतानां परिणामोऽयं यथाकर्म यस्माश्रुतम् ॥४१६॥

And those *prāṇas*¹ are so jointly (i.e. generally)² (residing) in the body, yet they are particular ones (also);³ this is (thus) the modification of the (five) elements,⁴ in accordance with the *karman*⁵ and as it is heard. [416]

¹Here the word *prāṇa* is understood in the sense of gods.

²This is while they are mentioned as having godhead, or, the nature of gods in a general way, viz. Āditya and others, as superintending deities (*ādhidaivika*).

³Those very gods are each one of them identified with the eye and other organs severally (*ādhyātmika*).

⁴They are the products of the five elements and therefore capable of effecting various functions of the organs.

⁵This explains why at times they bring happiness and at others sorrow.

प्राणादिजन्मना जज्ञे विस्फुलिङ्गैर्यथा शिखी ।

परमात्मापि जज्ञे खं यथा कुम्भादिजन्मभिः ॥४१७॥

प्राणाद्यद्भूतितो नान्या क्षेत्रज्ञोद्भूतिरिष्यते ।

श्रुतेरेतेभ्य इति हि तथा स्पष्टं वचः श्रुतम् ॥४१८॥

(The inner self) was born by becoming *prāṇas* 'organs' etc., in the same way as fire was produced (i.e. born) in (lit. by or from) small sparks; (and) also the highest self (i.e. Ātman) was born in the same way as the sky came into being (manifold) through becoming a pitcher etc. [417]

The birth of the knower of the field is not accepted as other than the springing up (i.e. coming into existence) from the *prāṇas* 'organs' etc.; for there is (very) clearly heard a statement from the Śruti, viz. *etebhyaḥ* [418]

Verse 417 clarifies the thought in *sarva eta ātmano vyuccaranti* read in the Mādhyandina recension of BU after *sarvāṇi bhūtāni* in the Kāṇva recension as explained by Śaṅkara also. The stress

is on the *viśiṣṭa-cidābhāsa-rūpa-janma-vyavahāra*. NKL adds: The illustration of *kha-janman* (as *ghaṭākāśa*, *karakākāśa* etc.) is for precluding the idea of the *ātmajanman* owing to the acceptance of *aṁśāṁśi* relationship.

The argument in verse 418 is based on (or, related to) a doubt that the Ātman is born of itself and not from anything else), like a pitcher. It is related to the Śruti (this is explained later:) *etebhyo bhūtebhyah samutthāya* (BU 2.4.12). Also, basically, the notion of the birth of the inner self is rooted in ignorance/superimposition on *cit* of the limiting adjuncts.

यस्मादविद्ययैवात्मा प्राणक्षेत्रज्ञरूपभाक् ।
स्वतोऽतः स परं ब्रह्म तस्योपनिषदुच्यते ॥४१९॥
उपासनार्थं यद्गुह्यं नामोपनिषदुच्यते ।
तदस्य परं गुह्यं तेनोपासीत तत्त्वतः ॥४२०॥

Since, it is owing to ignorance (Avidyā) alone that the (highest) Ātman, of itself, comes to have the forms of the *prāṇas* 'organs' and the knower of the field; therefore, it is the highest Brahman. Now is stated the secret doctrine, viz. *upaniṣad*, of that; [419]
whatever is the secret name for purposes of a worship is called *upaniṣad*.¹ This² is the highest secret of this one;³ with that (in mind) should one worship that truly. [420]

These verses preclude the idea of a triad, viz. *prāṇas*, *jīva* (i.e. *kṣetrājña*) and the highest Ātman. The triad could be posited on the basis of verses 417-418 above.

¹I have taken 420ab as parenthetical.

²The word this refers to the Śruti statement: *satyasya satyam*, understood from *tasyopaniṣad* and *upāsanārthaṁ guhyaṁ nāma*.

³The highest Ātman is meant.

ब्रह्मविद्याधिकारेऽस्मिन्यावत्किञ्चिदुपासनम् ।
ब्रह्मविद्योत्थितिफलं तत्सर्वमिति निर्दिशेत् ॥४२१॥

Whatever be the mode of worship in the topic of the lore of the Brahman, viz. the rise of the knowledge of (the true nature of) the Brahman,¹ is, one should affirm, in this (context) also. [421]

¹The word *brahmavidyā* is understood in a double sense: (i) the lore of *brahman* and (ii) the knowledge of the true nature of the Brahman; *vidyā* in (i) has thus a reference to some mode of studying or worshipping and in (ii) the result of it. Here, in the later case, it is *vastutattvapratipatti*.

गोदोहनादिवद्विद्यादेवं सर्वमुपासनम् ।
विद्याधिकारजीवित्वात्र स्वतन्त्रफलं भवेत् ॥४२२॥

Thus all modes of worship are to be considered, like the ritual with Godohana¹ etc.² (as yielding the result of the various modes of worship in the later Brāhmaṇas); since they have dependence on the topic of *vidyā* (i.e. *Brahmavidyā*), it does not have a result of its own. [422]

¹This is an example which Sureśvara takes over from the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā. The use of the Godohana pot forms a part of the *apām prañayana* rite, which, in its own turn, forms an ancillary to the Darśapūrṇamāsa rite. Therefore, since the performance of the Darśapūrṇamāsa rite secures for the sacrificer the result, viz. *svargaprāpti* 'attainment of abode in heaven,' the use of the Godohana pot also (depending on *apām prañayana*) has the same result for the performer. Yet it has its own result also—that is in addition, viz. it brings about the securing of cattle. Sureśvara extends this ritualistic procedure to the mode of worship of the Brahman, mentioned in verse 420. For further details on Godohana, read SP. Read NKL's brief statement: *jñānārthatvena sṛṣṭaprapaṇicopajīvitvāt prapaṇicadvāreṇa jñānam prasādhyaiḥ (upasanā-)phalāntarahetutvāt upāsanam śuddhidvārā (brahma-) dhīsāadhanam ity arthaḥ*. See also BUBV 3.3.51 and note thereon.

²The word etc. refers to similar relation of *strīṇātikriyā* with *vedikarāṇa*.

सत्यस्य सत्यमिति या ब्रह्मोपनिषदुच्यते ।
प्राणा वै सत्यमित्यस्या व्याख्योपनिषदः कृता ॥४२३॥

What is called the Brahmopaniṣad, viz. *satyasya satyam*, itself presents (or, forms) the explanation of this Upaniṣad, viz. *prāṇā vai satyam*. [423]

This is the meaning of *prāṇā vai satyam*.

नामरूपात्मकाः प्राणाः परसत्याभिसंगतेः ।
सत्यमित्यभिधीयन्ते तेषां सत्यं परं पदम् ॥४२४॥

The *prāṇas*, which are of the nature of name and form, are, on account of their close association (*abhi-saṅgati*), with the highest Truth (i.e. Reality) called *satya* 'Truth'; their basis is the highest Truth. [424]

This points to the meaningfulness of the preceding verse.

उक्तोपनिषदर्थस्य सम्यगाविष्कृतुत्तरम् ।
यो ह वै शिशुमित्यादि भविता ब्राह्मणद्वयम् ॥४२५॥

Of this *upaniṣad* 'secret doctrine,' the two subsequent Brāhmaṇas (viz. BU 2.2-3) which begin with *yo ha vai śīśum* ..., will give a clear exposition. [425]

This points to the significance of the two subsequent Brāhmaṇas as bringing to fullness the contents of this one.

Verses 426-432 form an introductory to a question whether the secret doctrine (*satyasya satyam*) relates to the transmigratory being or the Brahman.

कामं ह्युपनिषद्व्याख्या भवतु ब्राह्मणद्वयम् ।
संसारिब्रह्मणोः कस्य नामैतदिति भण्यताम् ॥४२६॥

Granted that the two (subsequent) Brāhmaṇas are an exposition of the *upaniṣad* (mentioned above); let this be declared (or lit. said), however, as to whom, between a transmigratory being and the Brahman, it relates. [426]

पाणिपेषप्रबुद्धस्य नाम संसारिणो यदि ।
तदा स एव विज्ञेयस्तज्ज्ञानादेव मुक्तता ॥४२७॥

If it relates to the transmigratory being who is awakened (from sleep) by shaking (him) by the hand, then it is he who should be known (in fullness), for liberation can realise (i.e. be effected) through the knowledge about him. [427]

SP rightly points out a well-known dictum in the field of enquiry, viz. *saṁdigdham saphalam ca vicāryam*. Also, it justifies *tajjñānād eva muktatā* as an answer to the possible doubt: *yajjñānān muktis tasyaiva jñeyatā na jīvasyety āśaṅkyāha*.

ब्रह्मशब्दाभिधेयश्च संसार्येव तदा भवेत् ।
तद्विद्या ब्रह्मविद्येति प्रतिपद्यामहे तदा ॥४२८॥

Then (i.e. in that case), the transmigratory being himself would be what is to be expressed (or, signified) by the word *brahman*. And, as a result of that, we propose that the knowledge about him will be the knowledge of the Brahman. [428]

In this verse also, the doubter has continued his argument.

अथासंसारिणो नाम न्यायतोऽध्यवसीयते ।
संसारिणि यदुक्तं तत्तदा तत्र भविष्यति ॥४२९॥

If, on the other hand (*atha*), it is concluded (lit. determined), on the basis of proper reasoning (*nyāya*),¹ that it (viz. the

upaniṣad) relates to the non-transmigratory (Brahman), then what is said in relation to a transmigratory being could apply (or, be extended) to that (viz. the non-transmigratory Brahman).

[429]

The doubter still persists and points out the result of his own view.

¹Read SP: *yathoktanāmārthasya tasminn eva mukhyatārtham bādhāyogyatvādinyāyaḥ*; or, in brief though, NKL: *sarvakalpanā-dhiṣṭhānatvaṃ nyāyaḥ*.

भिन्नात्मनोस्तयोर्दोषो ब्रह्मत्वप्रतिपादिकाः ।

कुप्येरञ्श्रुतयः सर्वा नान्यदन्यद्ववेद्यतः ॥४३०॥

If the two are held as having different natures, then the Śrutis which propound their oneness would be set aside (lit. would be angry); since one thing cannot be another. [430]

This argument proceeds from holding utter distinction between the transmigratory being and the Brahman.

ब्रह्मणोऽव्यतिरेके च तद्वच्चासति दुःखिनि ।

ब्रह्मविद्योपदेशस्य कैमर्थक्यं प्रसज्यते ॥४३१॥

And also (or similarly (*tadvac ca*)) in case there is (held) non-distinction between them, then there will not be any sorrowful being (i.e. anyone misery-stricken) and the contingent question would be: What is the purpose of the knowledge about (the real nature of) the Brahman? [431]

This is an argument in contrast with that in the preceding verse. The Brahman, by its nature, is free from all misery and therefore even a transmigratory being would be free from it. That would render any effort to acquire the knowledge about the Brahman useless!

इति संदेहे हेतुश्च विचारस्य प्रयोजकः ।
तस्माद्विचारः कर्तव्य उक्तसंदेहहानिकृत् ॥४३२॥

Such is the cause for the doubt and it compels a discussion (on the matter under doubt); therefore is to be undertaken an enquiry (or, to begin a discussion) that would remove (lit. destroy) the doubt. [432]

In verses 433-444ab, there is a statement of the prima facie view (pūrvapakṣa), viz. this upaniṣad is related to a transmigratory being.

नासंसारी परोऽन्योऽस्ति पाणिपेषप्रबोधितात् ।
प्राज्ञावस्थात्मकाद्यस्मादुत्पत्तिः श्रूयते श्रुतौ ॥४३३॥

It is not a non-transmigratory (thing related to the *upaniṣad*), that is other (i.e. different from the highest Brahman which is other) than that who is awakened (from sleep) by shaking him by the hand; the one who is of the nature of one in the state of Prājña¹ from whom there is the rise (or, origin of *prāṇas*) heard in the Śruti. [433]

Cf. Verse 330 above.

ब्रह्म तेऽहं ब्रवाणीति प्रतिज्ञाय ततो नृपः ।
सुप्तं पुरुषमभ्येत्य पाणिना बोधयन्स्वयम् ॥४३४॥

(But,) after making a promise 'Let me declare to you what is the Brahman', the king approached a man who was asleep and himself awakened him, shaking him by the hand. [434]

The thought underlying this verse is identifying the Brahman as a transmigratory being.

तमवस्थान्तरं नीत्वा स्वप्नदर्शनवर्त्मना ।
सुषुप्ताख्यं ततस्तस्मात्प्राणाद्युत्पत्तिमब्रवीत् ॥४३५॥

Having brought him to another state (viz. the waking state), he first offered the explanation of the experience(s) in the dream state¹ and later described him as one in the state called sleep and as having an origination of his *prāṇas*. [435]

¹This refers to *sa yatra itat svapnyayā carati* (BU 2.1.18); also cf. verses 281-285 above.

संसारी प्रक्रमाच्चेह नान्यः संभाव्यते ततः ।
अनूद्य च प्रियात्मानं स द्रष्टव्य इतीर्यते ॥४३६॥

It is clearly the transmigratory being (that is intended) from the introductory (part of Kāśya's talk/doing) here¹ and none other is possible to think of; and (later) having made a reference to that again as a dear one to himself,² he has said—it is argued—'that he should be seen'. [436]

¹This refers to the introductory *tau ha ...* in the beginning of this narrative (*iha*).

²This refers to Yājñavalkya's dialogue with Maitreyī in BU 2.4 where occurs the oft-repeated phrase *ātmanas tu kāmāya sarvam priyam bhavati* and the concluding remark *ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ ...* (this referring to the dear *ātman* 'self' of his own, the enjoyer (that is a transmigratory being)! [Let it be remembered that this is said for argument's sake.]

वेदान्तेषु च सर्वेषु प्रत्यगात्मैव चोद्यते ।
वेद्यत्वेन न तद्विन्नं पश्येदित्यभिधीयते ॥४३७॥

And, in all the Vedānta texts, only the inner self is put forth (or, pointed out) as what is to be known; also it is said that one should not see any other knowable different from that (i.e. the inner self). [437]

Possibly, the argument: *janmādy asya yataḥ* has a reference

to *jīva/kṣetrajñā* from whom are born the *prāṇas*, as said earlier in verse 435 above. Therefore, that one should be known.

अवस्थान्तरसंबन्धादसंसारो भविष्यति ।
संसार्यपि स्वतोऽयं चेन्नेदृग्दृष्टेरसंभवात् ॥४३८॥

If one might argue (here against this, thus:) 'Owing to its having relation to the different states, even a transmigratory being will be non-transmigratory';¹ then (the reply will be: 'That is) not so, since such a sight/seeing is impossible to happen.'² [438]

SP reports this argument as one coming from the *Seśvaravādins'* school which believes in the work of an all-powerful God.

¹Here, there is a reference to the sleep state wherein the *Jīva* has no connection whatsoever with the world of objects.

²The argument is: A change in the state of a being does not bring about any essential change in that being. The argument is thus opposed to common experience.

नान्यजातिविशिष्टोऽर्थः स्वतो जात्यन्तरं ततः ।
कश्चिदेति जगत्यस्मिन्नन्यत्रेश्वरहेतुतः ॥४३९॥

In this world, not a thing, which is characterized by some one genus, can come to belong to another genus, unless where (or, when) it is on account of the Lord's wish (that it does so). [439]

This is the position of the *Seśvaravādins* mentioned in the note on the preceding verse.

स्वभावमपि जह्याच्चेदग्निः शीतो भवेद्ध्रुवम् ।
सर्वप्रमाणकोपश्च सर्वं स्यादधरोत्तरम् ॥४४०॥

If indeed fire would give up its own nature and, for certain, become cool, then it would mean that all the means of right

knowledge¹ have gone totally wrong² and everything would be topsy-turvy.³ [440]

Evidently, the Seśvaravādins persist to hold that the power of the Lord defies all laws of logic. Thereby, they seek to point out that the one related to Brahman is none other than a transmigratory being. Any idea of some Lord which one would be required to posit (as shown in verses 439 and 440 above) would be only to be scoffed at. The reference to the Sāṃkhyas and others in the following verse is for strengthening the argument.

¹This refers to various sets of rules regarding the behaviour of things that form logic.

²That is to say: these rules are not in conformity with what is happening. Literally, the rules would be angry, i.e. they would refuse to be logical.

³*adharottaram* literally means 'the low and the high' and it indicates the reversal in the order of things. The true would become false and the false, true. SP seems to hint at this thus: *yo bhāvo yaddharmako mito nāsau taddharman vyabhicarati (ity atiprasaṅgaḥ)*. One remembers here Śāṅkarava's remark *Abhijñānaśakuntaram: śrutam bhavadbhir adharottaram* pointing to the reversed of truth and falsehood on the part of Śakuntalā and Duṣyanta.

सांख्यादयस्तथेशस्य ह्यभावं बहुयुक्तिभिः ।

आपादयन्ति यत्नेन तेभ्योऽन्यः कोऽधिको धिया ॥४४१॥

The Sāṃkhyas and others¹ propound the character of a negative entity in that (kind of) Lord by means of various reasons² and with great care;³ who else than them is superior in intellect? [441]

¹This is a reference to other Tārīkikas 'Logicians'.

²SP points to these: *tasya (īśasya) dehitve 'smadāditulyatvāt; tadabhāve muktavajjagatkartṛtvāyogāj jīvānām evādrṣṭadvārā tat-*

karṣṭvasambhava and, as a result, *tasya (īśasya) akiñcitkaratva*. And NKL thus: *īśvarecchāprayatnādeḥ nityatve sadotpattyāpattiḥ anityatve asmadādisāmya* and so on. A close study of these thinkers' writings would reveal more of their arguments for not accepting such a Lord.

³The word *yatna* is explained by SP as *yuktiṣu doṣa-rāhityopanyāsa* 'careful presentation of reasons which are free from faults'. Therefore, we have translated 'carefully'.

संसारिणोऽप्यसामर्थ्याज्जगज्जन्मादिकर्मसु ।
जगद्धेतुत्वमन्याय्यमिति चेन्न श्रुतेर्बलात् ॥४४२॥
अक्षाद्यगोचरो यद्वच्छास्त्रादध्यवसीयते ।
तद्वत्संसारिकारित्वं जगतो गम्यतां श्रुतेः ॥४४३॥

(One might argue:) 'Yet, since a transmigratory being does not have the (necessary) power for (accomplishing) such acts as the production of the world etc., it is contrary for reason to accept (that transmigratory being as) the cause of the world.' (The answer:) '(This argument is) not (correct), for there is the Śruti's strength (opposing it).' [442]

'As a thing, which does not occur as the object of the eye and/or other (organs), is determined (or, grasped to be such and such) through (or by or from) the Śāstras (i.e. scriptures);¹ so also, should the world be known from the Śruti as what creates a transmigratory being. [443]

The arguer of the preceding verse points to how scriptures can inform one about Dharma etc. Thus, the scriptures would oppose the non-acceptance of a transmigratory being as the cause of the world.

¹Reference is here to matter related to Dharma, Adharma, Adrṣṭa and so on.

एवं तावदयं पक्षो न्यायतः प्रतिपादितः ।

Thus, this view is, so far, presented (or, explained), on the

basis of reasoning.

[444ab]

This marks the end of the arguments of those who follow the authority of the Śruti but reject the idea of the Lord who governs the world.

In verses 444cd-445, the view of the Seśvaravādins is presented.

शास्त्रन्यायादितोऽन्योऽपि पक्षोऽथ प्रतिपाद्यते ॥४४४॥

Now is presented (or, explained), on (the basis of) scriptures and reasoning (i.e. logic), the view, which is other than this.¹

[444cd]

¹The word this refers to the just preceding section.

यः सर्वज्ञः सर्वविद्योऽशनायादिविवर्जितः ।

यः पृथिव्यामिति तथा नेति नेतीति चागमः ॥४४५॥

अस्थूलाद्यक्षरोक्तेश्च तथापूर्वादिवाक्यतः ।

असंसारी परोऽस्तीशो यस्य सर्वमिदं वशे ॥४४६॥

The sentences in the Śruti (describe him thus:) *yaḥ sarvajñah*,¹ *sarvavid yaḥ*,² *aśanāyādivivarjitah*,³ *yaḥ pṛthivyām*⁴ and also *neti neti*⁵ [445]

and also from the statements (about him as) *asthūla*,⁶ *akṣara*⁷ etc.; and again from sentences (about his being) such as *apūrva* etc.;⁸ (it can be concluded that) there is a Lord, non-transmigratory, the highest (or, beyond/above all), in whose control is (or, on whom rests) this world. [446]

¹Cf. *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* 1.1.9; 2.2.7.

²Is it *sarvavidyaḥ*?; cf. *Śvetāśvataropaniṣad* 6.2.22.

³Cp. BU 3.5.1.

⁴BU 3.7.3.

⁵Cf. BU 3.9.26; 4.2.4; 4.4.22; 4.5.15.

⁶Cf. BU 3.8.8.

⁷Cf. BU 3.8.9; Śaunakopaniṣad 1.

⁸Cf. BU 2.5.19; see verse 237 note 3.

स एव च जगत्कारी सत्यज्ञानादिलक्षणः ।
तस्मादित्यात्मनश्चेति सामानाधिकरण्यतः ॥४४७॥

And he alone is the creator of the world, having the nature of *satya*, *jñāna* etc.¹ Therefore, the words *tasmāt* and *ātmanah*² have to be understood as standing in the relation called *sāmānādhikaranyā*. [447]

¹Refer to *Taittirīyopaniṣad* 2.1.

²This also is from *Taittirīyopaniṣad* 2.1 where the words *tasmāt* and *ātmanah* are taken to be *sāmānādhikaranyā*, i.e. not only as occurring in the same grammatical case (*sāmānavibhaktika*) but also as related to the same *substratum*. Therefore, the argument is that the word *ātman* in the *Taittirīyopaniṣad* refers to the inner self also; as a result, it then follows that the inner self is related to the *upaniṣad* 'satyasya satyam' which is in question.

संसारिणो ननुत्पत्तिरेवमेवेति कीर्तिता ।
नैवं महेश्वरस्यैव तत्राकाशत्वसंश्रयात् ॥४४८॥

But (one argues:) 'In the sentence *evam eva* ...,¹ there is stated the origin of the world from a transmigratory being',² (the answer is:) 'No, not so; for, there is in *evam* ... reference to the great Lord since there is (mention made of) him as the sky (in the heart).'³ [448]

¹The reference is here to the phrase *evam evāsmād ātmanah* in the BU passage under discussion.

²The argument is: Thus this BU passage is contradictory to the *Taittirīyopaniṣad* passage.

³The BU sentence *ya eṣo 'ntar hṛdaya ākāśah*, it is argued, has the word *ākāśa* as referring to the highest self as *prakṛta*

‘the subject matter (of the discussion)’. Cf. BS 1.1.22: *ākāśas tallingāt*.

ब्रह्म तेऽहं ब्रवाणीति प्रकृत्य ब्रह्मबोधनम् ।
अब्रह्माप्रकृतं ब्रूयात्कथं राजातिपण्डितः ॥४४९॥

The topic in the passage has begun with (the words) ‘Let me declare to you (the nature of) the Brahman’; (that is to say with the intention of) declaring (the nature of) the Brahman. Therefore, how would the king, himself a great learned man, would declare what is not relevant (here), viz. what is not the Brahman? [449]

The argument is based on a doubt that the word *ākāśa* in the passage under reference does not signify the Brahman. Cf. BSB 1.1.22 (p.198): *tatra saṁśayaḥ— kiṁākāśaśabdena param brahmābhīdhīyata uta bhūtākāśamiti, kutaḥ saṁśayaḥ; ubhayatra prayogadarśanāt*. Therefore, since *ākāśa* does not it signify the Brahman, and signifies the elemental sky, the Śeṣvaravādin is adopting *prakṛtahāni* and *aprakṛtaprakriyā* on the part of the intelligent king (SP).

श्रुत्यन्तरविरोधश्च संसारी चेदिहोच्यते ।
सता सोम्येति सन्नाम्ना ब्रह्म तत्र विवक्षितम् ॥४५०॥

Again, there would result opposition to another Śruti (passage), if here (i.e. as in your opinion regarding the king’s reply, it is) a transmigratory being that is (talked about, or, relevant). (For), in the sentence *satā somya ...*,¹ it is the Brahman that is intended to be expressed by the name (i.e. word) *brahman*.²

[450]

¹This is CU 6.8.1.

²The same *sat* is used in CU 6.1.1 for the Brahman and the Brahman continues to be discussed in the succeeding sections of CU. As a result, *satā somya* has a meaning *brahmaṇā somya*

.... Therefore, in view of *sarvavedāntapratyayanyāya*, the reference in the passage under discussion to a transmigratory being is unwarranted. Cf. NKL's remark *durbalaparakaraṇena balavacchruticālanam* which means, in deciding the meaning of doubtful Śruti passages, Śruti (even if another) is the stronger decider than *prakaraṇa* 'topic under discussion'.

आकाशो ह वै नामेति ब्रह्मैवानामरूपकम् ।
श्रुत्यन्तरे श्रुतं साक्षादाकाशाह्वानवत्परम् ॥४५१॥

In a passage *ākāśo ha vai nāma* in another Śruti¹ is heard only the Brahman which has not a name and a form; (and) that² is directly³ expressive of the highest Brahman. [451]

This is to point out that another Śruti also intends to use *ākāśa* as a synonym of the word *brahman*.

¹Cp. CU 8.14.1.

²The word or name *ākāśa*.

³The word *sākṣāt* is used expressly to rule out another sense of *ākāśa*.

तथा चाहरहः शास्त्रं पर आत्मनि चेति यत् ।
सुषुप्ते ब्रह्मणोऽन्यस्य नावकाशोऽस्ति दुःखिनः ॥४५२॥

So also, since the Śāstra 'scripture' *aharahah ...*¹ is in respect of the highest Ātman; therefore, in the sleep state, there is no place/scope for anyone who is other than the Brahman and who is affected by misery. [452]

¹This is a reference to CU 8.3.2: *aharahar brahma gacchantya etam brahmalokam na vindanti*. NKL adds to this *Praśnopaniṣad* 6.7: *sa yathā somya vayāṃsi vāsovrkṣaṃ sampratiṣṭhante evaṃ naitat sarvam pare ātmani sampratiṣṭhate* to support the argument that, in reality, the inner self is, in the state of sleep, of the nature of the Brahman.

अतद्विकारतो जन्म प्रलयश्च तथात्मनः ।
भौतिकाकाशविषयो न कथं चन युज्यते ॥४५३॥

It is in no way reasonable to hold that the Ātman (here, the inner self) has its origin and merger as well in (*ākāśa*, viz.) what is not a modification of that (Brahman), and that the word (*ākāśa*) has for it the elemental sky the object of reference. [453]

SP clarifies the argument thus: *ya eṣa ityādau bhūtākāśasya prakṛtatve tasyaivāyam parāmarśaḥ syāt, na ca tasmāt prāṇādi-janmalayau tasya bhūtākāśavikāratvāprasiddheḥ, asmād ity asyātmaśabdasāmānādhikaranyāc ca tasmān nāyam ākāśaśabdo bhūtā- kāśaviṣaya ity arthaḥ.*

जगज्जन्मादिसामर्थ्यं सामग्र्यादि च दुःखिनः ।
संसारिणो न संभाव्यमस्मदादेर्यथा तथा ॥४५४॥

The capacity for (causing) the origin etc.¹ of the world, the means (for creating it etc.) and other things² cannot possibly be thought of (as belonging to) a miserable transmigratory being³ in the same way as (belonging) to us! [454]

¹The word etc. refers to the sustenance and the merger.

²These other things are the knowledge for creating etc. (or, the technical know-how for it).

³Here, the reference can be to *ākāśa*.

न शक्त्याधानकृच्छ्रास्त्रं तस्याभिव्यञ्जकत्वतः ।
मानान्तरविरोधेन न हि मानं प्रवर्तते ॥४५५॥

Śāstra does not place in any one the capacity/ability (for doing some particular thing),¹ since it is merely informative about the same. (Also) a means of knowing would not be (usefully) operative when there is opposition to it of another means

of knowing.²

[455]

The argument in the first half of the verse is to thrash away the view that a transmigratory being can be the creator etc. of the world since scripture has said it. And the second half points to the opposition among the means of knowing being the cause of the futility of one of them.

¹In other words, scriptural text would be only *jñāpaka* 'informative about something' and not its *kāraṇa* (or *utpādaka*) 'producing (the necessary) capacity or ability for some doing/activity'.

²Here, one would hold Śāstra as an informative means about the activity of originating the world etc. obtaining in a transmigratory being and there can be opposition to it by another means, viz. direct perception showing a human being's capacity for doing so.

Verses 456-460 state a view that there is no non-distinction between the inner self and the Brahman.

परस्परानपेक्षौ चेत्संसारीशौ स्वतः स्थितौ ।
ऐकात्म्यं न तयोर्युक्तं प्रकाशतमसोरिव ॥४५६॥

If, thus,¹ a transmigratory being and the Lord are not mutually dependent, and they have been in existence in their own right (*svataḥ sthitau*); then it is reasonable to hold that they are but one (or, that they have oneness/identity) in the same way as (identity could be posited) of light and darkness. [456]

¹This refers to the arguments in the preceding section.

अहं ब्रह्मेत्यतोऽयुक्तं ब्रह्म प्रत्यक्तयाञ्जसा ।
ग्रहीतुं दुःखिनोऽन्यत्वाद्दोषभावस्यादतोऽन्यथा ॥४५७॥

Therefore, it is unreasonable¹ to accept smoothly that the Brahman is the inner self, (while one is saying) 'I am Brahman';

for, that² misery-stricken being is different (from it).³ From this (or, by this notion) the thing which has (so many) faults/shortcomings (in itself) would consider itself (lit. be) otherwise.⁴ [457]

This verse expresses the outcome of the preceding argument.

¹Both SP and NKL have not pointed out that there is Saṁdhi of ... *tyato* and *ayuktam*.

²This refers to the inner self.

³This refers to the Brahman.

⁴Free from all faults.

सत्कर्मभिस्तु तं देवं जगतः कारणं परम् ।
आराध्य परमोत्कर्षं तत्प्रसादात्समश्नुते ॥४५८॥

As against that (*tu*), (a transmigratory being/inner self) would attain the highest well-being through the favour of that (Lord), after it has pleased by good deeds¹ that Lord, the highest and the cause/origin of the world. [458]

This is the way to attainment of liberation.

¹SP supports this by quoting possibly from Bhartṛprapañca(?): *uktaṁ hi— matkarmakṛṇ matparama ityādi*. Also it cites the view of the Pañcarātrins in:

*parabrahmatvam āyāti matkarmaparamaḥ pumān iti ca and
ye saṁśrayanti taṁ bhaktyā sūkṣmam adhyātmacintakāḥ /
te yānti vai padam viṣṇor jarāmarañavarjitam //*
(Jayākhyā Saṁhitā 1.24) [a Pañcarātra text]

ब्रह्मात्मैकत्वशंसीनि वाक्यान्यपि तथा सति ।
अर्थवादीभविष्यन्ति विरोधः स्यादितोऽन्यथा ॥४५९॥
तर्कशास्त्रैस्तथा लोकन्यायैरप्यविरुद्धता ।
तथा सतीति संप्राप्तावत्र प्रतिविधीयते ॥४६०॥

That being so, the sentences (of the Śruti),¹ which speak about (or express) the oneness (or, identity) of (the inner self with)

the Brahman,² the Ātman would be (fully) meaningful. If (taken) otherwise than this,³ there would be an opposition to them. [459]

(Only) that being so, there would be non-opposition to logical reasonings⁴ and popular acceptances.⁵ When this position⁶ is reached, (now) there follows an argument which sets it aside. [460]

Verse 460 up to 'is reached' concludes the views of the Seśvaravādins.

¹I think, here the round brackets (viz. of the Śruti) should be necessary.

²This indicates the sentences like *tat tvam asi*.

³Namely, if the common man's opinion/view (*lokavāda*) is held.

⁴This is a reference to the Sāmkhyas and others; cf. verses 441-443.

⁵The commonly held beliefs or faiths.

⁶This is reiteration of the view that it is the Lord who, at his will, creates the world etc.

Now there is (a brief) exposition of the Siddhānta view, in verses 461-465, viz. that the upaniṣad, i.e. satyasya satyam, is related to the Brahman which is non-distinct from the inner self.

नैतदेवं यतोऽस्यैव मन्त्रब्राह्मणमानतः ।
प्रवेशः श्रूयते साक्षात्परमेशस्य सर्वतः ॥४६१॥

This is not so, since it is learnt (lit. heard) from this very (authoritative) means of knowing, viz. the Mantra and Brāhmaṇa (texts),¹ that there is the entry of the all-controlling (Brahman) everywhere. [461]

¹This refers to the Saṃhitās and the Brāhmaṇas (which include the Upaniṣads).

पुरश्चक्रे द्विपदः पुरः पुरुष आविशत् ।

रूपं रूपं च सर्वाणि त्वं स्त्री त्वं च पुमानसि ॥४६२॥
 इति मन्त्रसमाम्नायस्तथा च ब्राह्मणान्यपि ।
 इह प्रविष्ट इत्युक्तिः पुरस्ताद्ब्राह्मणोदिता ॥४६३॥
 तत्सृष्ट्वेति तथा वाक्यं तैत्तिरीयश्रुतौ श्रुतम् ।
 सेयमित्यादिकं वाक्यं छान्दोग्योपनिषद्वापि ॥४६४॥

‘He made cities, i.e. bodies, the bipeds ... the highest (i.e. supreme) Puruṣa entered the bodies’,¹ ‘In every form he assumed a similar form’,² ‘You are all, you (are) a woman and you (are) a man.’³ — [462]

this is a collection of Mantras. So also are there the Brāhmaṇa (texts): (Thus) there is a statement ‘In this he entered’, as already recorded in (this) Brāhmaṇa;⁴ [463]

also there is heard in the Śruti of the Taittirīyas a sentence *tat sṛṣṭvā ...*;⁵ so also in CU a sentence which begins with the words *seyam*.⁶ [464]

¹ Cf. BU 2.5.18; Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa 14.5.5.18.

² Cf. Rgveda 6.47.17.

³ Cf. Atharvaveda 10.8.27.

⁴ BU 1.4.7.

⁵ Taittirīyopaniṣad 2.6.

⁶ CU 6.3.2 and 3.

ब्रह्मात्मशब्दयोस्तद्वदेकाधिकरणश्रुतेः ।
 अहं ब्रह्मेत्यवसितुं युक्तमेव भवेदतः ॥४६५॥

In the same way, on the basis/strength of the Śruti regarding the two words *brahman* and *ātman* referring (only) to one substratum,¹ it will only be proper (i.e. reasonable), therefore, to conclude *aham brahma*,² i.e. the inner self is the Brahman.

[465]

¹ Refer to BU 4.5.19.

² This has a reference to the opponent’s view expressed in verse 457 above. The falsity of that view follows from the Śruti,

viz. BU 4.5.19.

Verses 466-467 refer to a view that the oneness (or, identity) of the inner self and the Brahman is faulty.

यदा चैवं स्थितः पक्षस्तदा दोषोऽयमागमत् ।
संसारित्वं परस्येति तदनन्यत्वकारणात् ॥४६६॥

(An objector says:) 'If this is thus established (*sthitah*) as (your) view, then there follows (lit. comes) this difficulty in (lit. blame to) it, viz. the highest (Brahman) would come to have transmigratory character on account of its being non-distinct from that (viz. the inner self).' [466]

अथासंसारितैतस्य कथंचिदुपपद्यते ।
तदोपदेशानर्थक्यं तमृतेऽप्यस्य मुक्ततः ॥४६७॥

'(Also,) if the non-transmigratory character of this one (viz. the highest Brahman) is somehow (shown to be) reasonable, then, in that case, there would be meaninglessness (*ānarthakya*) of the instruction (about it); since, without that also, there is the state of liberation for this one.'¹ [467]

¹*muktataḥ* is for *muktatvataḥ*.

Verses 468-472 present *Bhartrprapañca*'s answer to the objection above.

एवं प्रचोदिते केचित्परिहारं प्रचक्षते ।
सृष्टेषु न परः साक्षात्प्राविशत्परमेश्वरः ॥४६८॥

When this has been put forth (as an objection), some (scholars)¹ state (the following as) an answer (to clear that away): 'In the (objects) created, the Lord himself, viz. the highest (Ātman) itself (*sākṣāt*), did not enter.' [468]

This is a respectful reference to Bhartṛprapañca.

विकाररूपापन्नः सन्विज्ञानात्मत्वलक्षणः ।
ब्रह्मादिस्थावरान्तेषु भूतेषु प्राविशत्परः ॥४६९॥

‘Coming to have the forms of modifications and being characterized by the nature of *vijñāna* ‘specified knower/knowledge’, the highest (Ātman) entered into the beings/becomings, from the Brahman¹ up to those which are immovable.’ [469]

This explains the second line of the preceding verse.

¹Does this stand for Viriñca?

विज्ञानात्मापि महतः परमात्मस्वभावकात् ।
अन्योऽनन्यश्च विज्ञेयः स्वाभाव्यात्सर्ववस्तुनः ॥४७०॥

‘The one having the nature of an individual self also is different from the great one, viz. the one having the nature of the highest Ātman and further it should be known as non-distinct also on account of the nature of all things (in the world).’

[470]

This is Bhartṛprapañca’s affirmation of his Bhedābheda, viz. the theory of difference in non-difference.

येनान्यस्तेन संसारी कर्माधिकृत इष्यते ।
अनन्यपक्षेऽहं ब्रह्मेत्युक्तेर्ब्रह्म प्रपत्स्यते ॥४७१॥

‘Since it is different (from the highest Ātman), therefore it is accepted/desired that a transmigratory being is enjoined to (ritual) activity and, in the case (*pakṣa*) that it is not different (from it), it comes to be (i.e. attains the status of) the Brahman from the (Śruti) statement, ‘I am Brahman’.’ [471]

This, according to NKL, is the advantage of the Bhedābheda

theory; this will be evident from the following verse.

यथोक्तदोषसंबन्धो नैवं सति भविष्यति ।
इतोऽन्यथा कल्पनायां यतो दोषेण संगतिः ॥४७२॥

'This being so, there will not be any connection with the blame that is pointed out earlier;¹ for, in case a theory other than this is accepted, there is connection with that fault.' [472]

SP summarises the argument thus: *atyantam bhinnatve 'bhinnatve vā kalpyamāne nopadeśārthavattā nāpi brahmaṇo 'saṃsāritā tadbhinnābhinnatā pārīṣeṣyād ity arthaḥ*.

¹Cf. verses 466-467 above.

Verses 473-505 discuss the faults in the view of *Bhartrprapañca* who understands (only) a part of theory correctly (*ekadeśin*).

देहाद्युपाधिसंबन्धं सिद्धं मान्तरसंश्रयात् ।
अनूद्य ब्रह्मता वाक्यान् प्रविष्टाद्यतः श्रुतेः ॥४७३॥

(The refutation of the above is thus:) After the connection (of the individual self) with the limiting adjuncts, viz. a body etc.,¹ which is already known among people by resorting to the other ways of knowing,² there follows (for the *ekadeśin*) its nature as the Brahman from (only) the (Śruti's) statement,³ and not from a Śruti statement regarding (the modifications beginning with) 'he entered.'⁴ [473]

¹SP refers to *upādhidvaya viśiṣṭa jīva*.

²This refers to direct perception (*pratyakṣa*) in particular.

³This refers to the famous *Mahāvākya tat tvam asi* in CU. Both SP and NKL refer to the subsequent result which can be traced to *Taittirīyopaniṣad* 2.7; CU 8.3.4.

⁴These are probably the sentences quoted in verses 462-464 above. The correctness of the translation of *na praviṣṭād yataḥ śrutiḥ* can be subject to question!

विज्ञानात्मन एताः स्युर्गतयो विक्रियां प्रति ।
 नानाद्रव्यसमाहारः पृथिवीवत्परो भवेत् ॥४७४॥
 तस्य सावयवस्य स्यादेकदेशस्य विक्रिया ।
 विज्ञानात्मेति यं प्राहुः परिणामः स आत्मनः ॥४७५॥
 घटादिवत्क्षितेरस्य ह्येकदेशस्य विक्रिया ।
 संस्थानानुपमर्देन यद्वा केशोषरादिवत् ॥४७६॥
 कात्स्न्येन वा परिणमेत्क्षीरद्रव्यादिवत्परः ।
 इयन्त एव पक्षाः स्युर्विकारे परमात्मनः ॥४७७॥

Now, as regards the modification of the individual self, these would be the ways (or, alternative ways): (i) The highest self would be, like the earth, an aggregate of many substances¹

[474]

and the modification of a part (*ekadeśa*) of that which comprise many parts they call the individual self; (thus) that is an effect (or, a modification) of the Ātman,

[475]

like a pitcher etc. (is a modification) of the earth; or (ii) The form of the Ātman remaining unmodified, it (viz. the individual self) would be a modification, like, for instance, hair (on a body) or a piece of barren land (of the earth);

[476]

or (iii) The highest self would fully undergo a modification (and become the individual self) like the substance (called) milk wholly (becoming curds); only these² could be the possibilities of the modifications of the highest self.

[477]

¹Both SP and NKL refer to this aggregate as similar to a heap of sesame (i.e. a homogeneous aggregate) or one made up of dissimilar things (no example is provided!). Yet, in actual argument this fastidious division is unwarranted! (cf. BUB).

²SP's remark: *sambhavati kalpāntare kalpatrayaṃ kurvato bhāṣyakṛto nyunatvam āśaṅkyāha ityanta iti*, is for precluding any other possibility.

भिन्नद्रव्यसमूहस्य मुख्यैकत्वं न युज्यते ।
 एकजात्यभिसंबन्धादेकत्वं गुणतो यतः ॥४७८॥
 तथा च सति सिद्धान्तहानिर्वः संप्रसज्यते ।

In the case that the Ātman is held to be an aggregate of different substances, then it would not be logical to say that there is a certain principal singleness (among many), for singleness consists only in one property in the relation to many of a single. [478]

For, if that be so, there would arise the contingent defeat (lit. loss) of your (i.e. Bhartṛprapañca's) theory. [479ab]

Verse 478 sets aside the first alternative as incorrect. The idea is: One can posit *gotva* as the principal single property in respect of the Brahmatva among the many modifications together, according to the first alternative. Sureśvara's composition is here very terse. BSB in this respect is more lucid. Read: *tatra samānajātīyānekadravyasamūhasya kaścīd dravyaviśeṣo vijñānātmavm pratipadyate yadā tadā samānajātīyatvād ekatvam upacaritam eva na tu paramārthataḥ tathā ca sati siddhāntavirodhaḥ*. And verse 479ab points to the consequence of the above.

नित्यं चायुतसिद्धांशानुगतोऽवयवी यदि ॥४७९॥
 तदवस्थस्य तस्यैकदेशः संसारितामगात् ।
 प्रत्यंशावसितेस्तस्य तदापि परमात्मनः ॥४८०॥
 स्वभागानुगतो दोषो गुणो वास्य प्रसज्यते ।
 संसारिता परस्यैवं दोषः स्याद्दुर्निवारणः ॥४८१॥

If (in the second alternative) the (Ātman is a whole) ever having parts which are inseparably connected with it [479cd] and while (it remains) in that state, a part of it becomes transmigratory (viz. an individual self); then, owing to the highest Ātman (ever) consisting in each of its parts, [480] there would then come contingently to it either a blemish or an excellence that is connected with its part and thus the blemish of being transmigratory in the case of the highest

(Ātman) would be difficult to avoid/avert.

[481]

Obviously, these verses refute the second alternative.

निःशेषपरिणामेऽपि पयोवत्परमात्मनः ।

श्रुतिस्मृत्युक्तिकोपः स्यात्स चानिष्टः प्रसज्यते ॥४८२॥

Also, if (there be accepted) the modification of the highest Ātman as a whole, in the same way as (that) in the case of milk,¹ there would be opposition of Śruti(s) and Smṛti(s);² and that is an undesired contingency. [482]

This is the refutation of the third alternative.

¹*payovat* is either *yathā payasi* or *yathā payasaḥ* according to Pāṇini Sūtra 5.1.116: *tatra tasyeva*.

²These are quoted in the following two verses.

न जायते म्रियते वा इति षड्भावविक्रिया- ।

निषेधकृद्वेदवाक्यं प्रत्यग्विकृतिवारणम् ॥४८३॥

In the verse *na jāyate mriyate vā ...*¹ there is a clear (Śruti) statement which rejects the six modifications of beings/becomings—that is warding away (of the alternative regarding) modification of the inner self. [483]

¹Cf. *Kenopaniṣad* 2.1.8. SP reports this Mantra with a variant *kadācit* in place of *vipaścīt*— NKL reports correctly (with a misprint 1.2.18!). Also, SP cites *avyakto 'yam acintyo 'yam ...* from *Gītā* 2.25.

दिव्यो ह्यमर्तः पुरुषः सबाह्याभ्यन्तरो ह्यजः ।

निष्कलं निष्क्रियं शान्तं विमलं व्योमवत्स्थितम् ॥४८४॥

‘Heavenly, formless is the Puruṣa, being without and within (of things), unborn ...,’¹ ‘without parts, without activity, tranquil,’² ‘free from blemish has it remained like the sky’.³

[484]

This verse cites the Śruti texts to point to their opposition to all the three alternatives discussed before. SP's erudite remarks may be read with profit. NKL cites *Gītā* 2.20 and 25 and a verse:

*avikārāya śuddhāya nityāya paramātmāne /
sadaikarūparūpāya viṣṇave prabhaviṣṇave //*

(This is not traced in *Viṣṇusahasranāma*, however, cf. *Mahābhārata* xiii.713^{*}.1.)

¹*Mundakopaniṣad* 2.1.2.

²*Śvetāśvataropaniṣad* 6.19.

³Not traced.

इत्यादिशतशो वाक्यैः श्रुतिस्मृत्युदितैरमी ।

सर्वे पक्षा विरुध्यन्ते त्याज्यास्तेऽतः प्रयत्नतः ॥४८५॥

By these and other¹ hundreds of sentences, expressed in the Śrutis and Smṛtis, all these alternatives (or, views) are opposed and, therefore, they are to be discarded with insistence (lit. effort). [485]

¹SP refers to *ākāśavat sarvagataś ca nityaḥ*; cf. *śaṅkara's* reference to *kaThopaniṣad* (not traced in that tradition, though *śaṅkara's Bhāṣya* on CU 6.3.3 so mentions it); BU 4.4.24: *sa vā eṣa mahān aja ātmā*; *Gītā* 12.3: *kūṭastham acalam dhruvam*; *Gītā* 2.25: *avikāryo 'yam ucyate* as sentences from Śrutis and Smṛtis.

संसारानुपपत्तिश्च कूटस्थात्मैकदेशतः ।

स्वकर्मफलदेशेषु क्षेत्रज्ञस्य प्रसज्यते ॥४८६॥

On account of being a part of the immutable Ātman, there would contingently follow, in the case of the knower of the field, unreasonableness in respect of its transmigratory existence, in the regions that are earned by its own (ritual) activity.

The individual self would attain to heaven etc. by means of its ritual activities; but this would not happen in case (i.e. when) it is a part of the immutable. NKL rightly remarks: *aṁśino niścalatve aṁśānām calanāyogāt*.

वियुक्तस्यात्मनश्चेत्स्याद्विस्फुलिङ्गादिवद्गतिः ।
तथापि क्षतसंप्राप्तिरव्रणस्य प्रसज्यते ॥४८७॥

If it is said that, in the case of the individual self which has (or, is) separated from the Ātman, there can be movement (i.e. transmigration), like that in small sparks (of fire, from which they have separated), then also, there would be the contingency that the one (viz. the highest Ātman), which is not having (even) a scar, has come to have a wound. [487]

Sureśvara's cryptic verse needs some explanation. It presupposes the individual self to be a part (*aṁśa*) of the highest Ātman (*aṁśin*) like the small sparks are of fire. Therefore, as the sparks can get separated from fire and move in various ways, every individual self also gets separated from the highest Ātman and then transmigrates. Consequently, Sureśvara adduces the argument: the highest Ātman first comes to have a scar by the separation of an individual self and then a wound inasmuch as a part of it, viz. that individual self, is wounded, i.e. it transmigrates. This is undesirable an incident, for the highest Ātman is declared by the Śruti (*Īśopaniṣad* 8) as free from any scar.

वारिणो मत्स्यसंचारे छिद्रसंग्रथने यथा ।
भ्रमत्सु तद्वज्जीवेषु प्राप्नुतः परमात्मनः ॥४८८॥
तथा चाव्रणवाक्येन विरोधोऽपि प्रसज्यते ।
स्वकारणातिरेकेण वृत्तिः कार्यस्य नान्यतः ॥४८९॥

As in the case of water, one thinks (only foolishly) that there

is a hole when the fish have moved in it and a consequent repair in it (viz. water); so also, in the case of the highest Ātman, there (appear to) occur the two (viz. the scar and the wound) when the individual selves are transmigrating. [488] And, in this way, there will also¹ be the contingency of opposition to the Śruti statement (about the highest Ātman's being) without any scar. (Indeed, one should note that) an effect does not have existence/modification beside its own cause, i.e. elsewhere than in it.² [489]

Verse 488 states one more reason for proving the blemish (or, foolishness) in the ideas of Bhartṛprapañca.

¹The word *api* has the force to remind one of the opposition of the Śrutis and Smṛtis cited above in verses 483 and 484.

²This is a general rule regarding the relation between the cause and its effect. Any special modification cannot come to the effect, in case it does not come to the cause. In the present context, since the individual selves are the effects of the highest Ātman, there cannot come to them transmigration unless it comes to the highest Ātman. But such is never the case, for the highest Ātman is immutable.

परमात्मैकवृत्तित्वात्कुतो जीवस्य संसृतिः ।
स्वप्नसंचारवत्तस्माज्जीवसंसार इष्यते ॥४९०॥

(Further) whence can there be transmigratory existence in the case of the individual self, since it exists/abides only in the highest Ātman? As such, the transmigration of an individual self is accepted (or, can be conceded) only to be like one's movement in a dream.¹ [490]

This verse clarifies the general statement in the second line of verse 489 above.

¹That is to say: It is an effect of ignorance (*bhrānti*).

स्थास्नुष्वपि महद्दुःखं कण्टकादिषु देहिनाम् ।

परात्मनो महद्दुःखं जीवसंचरणेऽप्यतः ॥४९१॥

Even though (the individual persons) continue to remain (alive),¹ there is yet, on the part of men, great pain when there are thorns etc.² (pricking them); therefore, in the case of the higher Ātman also, there is great pain when there is transmigration of the inner self.³ [491]

¹*sthāsnūṣu* expects *jīveṣu* to be supplied, though, at the very sight of it (*āpātataḥ*), it appears to qualify *kaṇṭakādiṣu*. However, by pun, one may take it as a qualifier of the same! Yet, there is not any charm or purpose in doing so.

²*kaṇṭakādiṣu* can be taken for the cause of piercing the body and thereby causing pain to an individual. The word etc. refers to other painful things in life.

³*jīvasaṁcarane* is a variant reading noted in AnSS edition, it is preferable to what appears in both AnSS and NKL editions. It is meaningless to argue: 'When the individual selves do not migrate, the highest Ātman also is in pain.' Again, *jīvasaṁcarane* would not well balance with *kaṇṭakādiṣu*.

अदोषो विस्फुलिङ्गादिदृष्टान्तादिति चेन्मतम् ।

नैवं यथास्थितार्थानां शास्त्रस्य ज्ञापकत्वतः ॥४९२॥

If it be held, on (the basis of) the illustrations of small sparks (of fire) etc. that there is no fault (in accepting the highest Ātman and also the individual selves as transmigratory); that cannot be so, the Śāstra (i.e. scripture) is (merely) informative of objects as they are. [492]

The verse aims at rejecting the opponent's view of *aṁśā-ṁśibhāva* between the individual selves and the highest Ātman and also, as a consequence, their transmigratory natures—on the basis of the Śāstra. The reason adduced is that the Śāstra does not go beyond describing the things as they are.

अज्ञातज्ञापकं शास्त्रमेवंस्वाभाव्यतो मितेः ।
पदार्थान्नान्यथा कर्तुं प्रवृत्तं माननिश्चितान् ॥४९३॥

The Śāstra is informative (or, makes one know) about what is not known, for it is known that knowledge (gained from it) has such nature;¹ it has not (ever) proceeded to render things otherwise than what they are determined to be by various means of knowng.² [493]

¹Namely, it is *ajñātajñāpaka*.

²Cp. verse 455 above.

मूर्तामूर्तादयो यद्वत्पदार्था माननिश्चिताः ।
यथादृष्टानुरोधयेव दृष्टान्तैर्वस्तु बोध्यते ॥४९४॥

As the perceptible and imperceptible things are determined by the (various) means of knowng to be such and such; therefore, the (nature of a) thing is made known by an illustration, only in a way conformative of how it is known (lit. seen). [494]

This is to state that Śāstra, or rather the illustrations in it, merely confirm the nature of a thing which it already has.

एवं प्रवृत्तं सर्वत्र शास्त्रं दृष्टान्तपूर्वकम् ।
न प्रमान्तरसंसिद्धविपरीतात्मबोधनम् ॥४९५॥

Thus has proceeded everywhere (any) Śāstra, adducing illustrations; it is never to inform (one) of the nature of a thing which is the opposite of (or, contrary to) that established by other knowledge.¹ [495]

¹Namely, other means of knowledge.

अतिशीतोऽग्निरित्यत्र दृष्टान्तानां शतैरपि ।
प्रमान्तरविरुद्धत्वान्नेन्द्रेणाप्यधिगम्यते ॥४९६॥

(For example, in some information like) 'Fire is very cold,' that would not be accepted (i.e. so understood) by Indra also, even if hundreds of illustrations (go to say so), on account of that being opposed to other knowledge(s).¹ [496]

¹Namely, those acquired through other means of knowing.

मानान्तरविरुद्धं च न च मानं सदिष्यते ।
मानान्तरेणासंव्याप्ते मेये स्यान्मानता यतः ॥४९७॥

Also a means of knowing is not accepted as useful if it is opposed to the other means of knowing, since it has the nature as a means of knowing (only) if the matter to be known by it is not covered (i.e. made known) by any other means of knowing. [497]

तथा पदतदर्थैश्च लिङ्गप्रत्यक्षगोचरान् ।
नानादृत्यगमेनार्थमज्ञातं वेत्ति कश्चन ॥४९८॥

In the same way, one does not (come to) know an unknown object by means of Āgama (i.e. Śruti), having disregarded the words and the objects signified by them and also those that are known from their characteristics and direct perception. [498]

The point which this verse emphasises is: In actual worldly dealings, the Śāstra is not opposed to the accepted means of knowing.

लोकप्रसिद्धन्यायार्थैरंशशित्वादिकल्पना ।
परात्मनः कल्पयितुं नातो युक्ता कथं चन ॥४९९॥

Therefore, it is in no way reasonable to entertain a notion about the highest Ātman that its relation to the individual selves is that of a whole and (its) parts, on the basis (or, strength) of popularly known illustrations (lit. ways of knowing).

[499]

The point is: Since the Śāstra is not opposed to the popularly accepted ways of knowing, it should not be necessarily in conformity with them, in matters that are not worldly. In fact, that alone is the authoritative means.

विस्फुलिङ्गाद्युपन्यासः क्षेत्रज्ञपरमात्मनोः ।
ऐकात्म्यप्रतिपत्त्यर्थस्तस्मादत्र विवक्षितः ॥५००॥

Therefore, here, (in the context of the relation) between the knower of the field and the highest Ātman, it is intended to introduce (the illustration of) small sparks (of fire) as the conveyer of the oneness (or, identity) of them. [500]

उपक्रमोपसंहाराद्यथोक्तोऽर्थो विवक्षितः ।
ब्रह्मादि सर्वमात्मेति प्रतिज्ञाय श्रुतिर्यथा ॥५०१॥
दुन्दुभ्याद्यैश्च दृष्टान्तैर्हेतुभिश्च समर्थ्यते ।
अपूर्वाद्यादिभिर्वाक्यैः प्रतिज्ञार्थोपसंहृतिः ॥५०२॥

(Therefore), from the introduction and the conclusion, the thing that was sought to be expressed is first enunciated as the Śruti text 'All this which begins with the Brahman is the Ātman', [501]

it is then justified by the illustrations of a trumpet etc. and by various reasons;¹ and thereafter is the recapitulation of the matter enunciated by such sentences as begin with the words *apūrvā* etc.² [502]

¹These refer to explanations of various superimpositions caused by ignorance (Avidyā).

²Refer to BU 2.5.19; see verse 237 note 3.

सर्ववेदान्तवाक्येषु ब्रह्मैकत्वं विधीयते ।
इत्यविप्रतिपत्तिर्हि व्याख्यातृणामशेषतः ॥५०३॥

'In all the sentences of the Vedānta, there is declared (lit. stated) the singleness of the Brahman'—there is thus no disagreement (viz. agreement) of all the exponents of them, without exception (*aśeṣataḥ*). [503]

तद्विद्येकोक्तियोगस्य ह्यक्लेशात्संभवे सति ।
सृष्ट्यादिवचसां नैव युक्तार्थान्तरकल्पना ॥५०४॥

(Therefore,) when it is possible to connect with ease the sentences about creation etc. with the sentences which converge on stating the earlier unknown oneness of that (viz. the highest Ātman), it is not reasonable to entertain any other meaning (of those sentences). [504]

SP shows the connection between this and its preceding verse by pointing to an accepted mode of reasoning (*nyāya*) among the discussants. The *nyāya* is: *sambhavaty ekavākyatve vākyabhedo hi neṣyate*.

न च प्रमाणं तत्रास्ति कल्प्यं च स्यात्फलान्तरम् ।
ऐकात्म्यपरतैवातः सृष्ट्यादिवचसां भवेत् ॥५०५॥

There should not be imagined any authoritative means of knowing in respect of that;¹ nor also should one entertain the thought of any other result;² as such, it is only oneness or identity (of the individual selves and the highest Brahman) that is (finally) conveyed by sentences regarding creation etc. [505]

¹ Namely, in respect of the Śruti statements about the creation of the world.

² That is, the reality of the world full of variety of objects. Read in this context SP: *na ca tat kalpayitum śakyam phalavatsamnidhāv aphalaṃ tadanigam iti nyāyavirodhāt*; cf. *śaṅkara on &iizopaniSad 9 and cp. &zaastradiipikaa 4.4.1.*

Now there is in verses 506-523 a discussion on a certain narrative told by Dravidācārya.

आचक्षते तथा चात्र केचिदाख्यायिकां शुभाम् ।
यथाभिलषितार्थोऽयं यया संभाव्यते स्फुटः ॥५०६॥

In connection with this matter, they¹ narrate an auspicious² tale by which³ is clearly honoured (i.e. exposed as possible) the matter (or, view) that is desired (or, accepted by the knowers of the Vedānta). [506]

¹This is a reference to Dravidācārya as reported by Ānandagiri (and, of course, by NKL). Śaṅkara describes him in BUB as *saṃpradāyavid* 'knower of the tradition' in Vedānta. very little is known about him.

²Read SP in this connection: *phalaparyantatayā dr̥ṣṭānta-dār̥ṣṭāntikarūpāyās tasyāḥ śubhatvam* (this consists in the second line of the verse).

³'by which' is for *yayā* —I suggest this emendation in the place of the second *yathā*. The two *yathās* in the verse are meaningless! Further, read the last sentence in SP: *sa yayā niḥsaṃdigdho 'bādhito sambhavati*.

यथा हि कश्चित्प्रागासीच्चक्रवर्तिसुतो युवा ।
व्याधियोगोपघातादेरुन्मत्तः सम्पद्यत ॥५०७॥

It is like this (*yathā hi*):¹ There was in olden days a certain young (prince), the son of a sovereign monarch. Struck as he was by an attack of some disease, he became disordered in mind. [507]

Sureśvara has made quite a few changes in the narrative reported by Śaṅkara. Here, in this verse, SP points to the prince's separation from his parents and also the subjects of the kingdom. Sureśvara omits this detail here.

¹Ordinarily, one finds *tathā hi* for this.

ध्वस्तराजाभिमानः सन्मुग्धो वनमुपेयिवान् ।
व्याधैः परिगृहीतश्च व्याधोऽस्मीत्यभिमन्यते ॥५०८॥

Losing his awareness that he was a king¹ (this is for a king's son), he went to forest. (There) he was received (lit. surrounded) by fowlers and (consequently) he began to feel 'I am a fowler'. [508]

¹This refers to the disorderliness in his mind.

तत्कर्मा तदहंकारः कालेन महताभवत् ।
ध्वस्तराजत्वसंस्कारो वसञ्शबरसद्मनि ॥५०९॥

And, in the course of long time, he, who had lost all (his previous) impressions of royalty and was staying in the dwelling of a forester, did their doings and entertained an awareness of that (viz. belonging to the fowlers' clan). [509]

शुभौषध्युपयोगाच्च स्वस्थधीः समजायत ।
स्वस्वभावानुरोधाच्च व्याधेभ्यो व्युत्थितात्मधीः ॥५१०॥
तच्छीलरूपकर्मभ्यो व्यावृत्तधिषणः स्वतः ।
केवलस्मृत्यभावाच्च न व्याधत्वं जहात्यसौ ॥५११॥

And (as time went on) he became orderly (or well) in his mind by the use of good medicines. Further, owing to his natural instincts, he became aware of himself (as different) from the fowlers. [510]

By himself, he had his mind turned away from their mode of behaviour, of attire and of activity; but (ca), only because there was no memory (of the past), he did not give up his belonging to the fowlers' clan. [511]

कुतश्चिदागमाज्ज्ञात्वा तमुपेत्याप्रतारकः ।
तज्जातिकर्मसंबन्धतत्त्ववित्तिपतः सखा ॥५१२॥
प्रवृत्त्या कर्मणा जात्या चक्रवर्त्युचितैस्तथा ।

लक्षणै राजपुत्रत्वं यथा कश्चित्प्रबोधयेत् ॥५१३॥

(Then later, some) friend of his father (to become),¹ having known (about him) from (somebody's) telling,² (becoming) conversant (lit. a knower) about the truth of his birth, doings (i.e. duties) and other relations,³ (himself) an honest person (lit. non-deceiver), approaching him (i.e. the prince), [512] (acquainted him) with his being a prince on account of (or rather, by the revealing things/factors,) such as his natural inclinations, doings (or, actions),⁴ (the truth of his) birth, and also the characteristic marks (on his person) befitting a sovereign monarch, as someone (who is a knower of some fact) would inform (another person about the same).⁵ [513]

¹This is to say: (*tatpituh sakhā*) *bhaviṣyan*; this last word is to be supplied predicatively.

²This is *āgama* 'talk by one person to another'—not usual sense of traditional knowledge of scriptures.

³This refers to the real situation about the young prince. However, it is possible to understand this also as 'the truth about his belonging to the fowlers' clan, duties and his real relations to them (i.e. the fowlers).

⁴*karman* in verse 512 meant 'duties, as determined by the stay among the fowlers' and in verse 513, doings or actions (for, they were not as yet his royal duties, owing to his utter ignorance about his royal connections).

⁵A simple statement of the simple behaviour of a person who knows some truth about the real state of things is here used, not as a simile; only the resemblance between such a person and the one, who was going to be a friend of the prince's father is meant.

लब्धमात्रस्मृतिः सोऽथ राजास्मीत्यवबोधतः ।

बाधित्वा स्वमसंबोधं हित्वा व्याधत्वमात्मनः ॥५१४॥

राज्याभिषेकमाप्नोति प्राप्य सिंहासनं पितुः ।

अवाप्तराजसूनुत्वात्तत्प्राप्तौ नापि चेष्टते ॥५१५॥

Immediately as he (i.e. the prince) got back his memory, he gave up his own ignorance (that obtained up to now) about himself by the awareness (awakened in him thus) 'I am a king' and also the relation to the fowlers (as one of them),

[514]

he secured (i.e. could secure) coronation of himself, obtaining the father's throne—(this is to say that he could do so) because he was (i.e. got back the memory and also the status of) the king's son; he did not act (or have to make efforts) to get it (viz. the coronation).

[515]

मोहाद्यस्तात्मव्याधत्वान्मोहध्वंसातिरेकतः ।
राजपुत्रत्वसंप्राप्तौ नान्यत्किंचिदपेक्षते ॥५१६॥

Since the nature of a fowler was superimposed upon him owing to his ignorance and (later) by the complete (*atireka*) removal (lit. destruction) of that ignorance, there was no need of (his doing) anything else for securing the status of a prince. [516]

In this verse, Dravidācārya (in the words of Sureśvara) mentioned *mohakārya*, *mohadhvaṃsa* and the consequent achievement in the case of the prince. This serves as a suitable illustration for proving the philosophical point of view under reference. This is clear in the following verse.

यथा तथायं ब्रह्मैव ब्रह्मासंबोधमात्रतः ।
बुद्धीन्द्रियशरीरादावात्मत्वं प्रतिपेदिवान् ॥५१७॥

As (the prince obtained his natural status), so does this one (viz. the individual self) obtain (i.e. came to know)¹ the nature of the Ātman, viz. the Brahman, in the place of intellect, organs and the body etc. (which existed for it earlier) owing merely to not knowing (i.e. ignorance about the true nature of) the Brahman.

[517]

¹*pratipedivān* is for *pratipadyate*.

सोऽयं सांसारिकैरर्थैः प्रत्यक्तत्त्वाप्रबोधतः ।
विशिनष्टि स्वमात्मानं प्रतीचीनमनात्मभिः ॥५१८॥

This one (viz. the individual self) characterizes itself, that has turned back (from reality), by means of the properties or objects belonging to the transmigratory world, the non-Ātmans, on account of (its) not knowing the true nature (of the sentience/self) within. [518]

This verse explains how a person gains the knowledge of the Ātman/Brahman.

संसारभूमावासीनं संसार्यस्मीत्यवस्थितम् ।
मुमुक्षुं तत्त्ववित्साक्षात्संसारव्युत्थितैषणम् ॥५१९॥
य आत्मेत्यादिभिर्वाक्यैरन्वयव्यतिरेकतः ।
तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्येन गुरुः संबोधयेन्नरम् ॥५२०॥

Him (i.e. the man), who has belonged to (lit. occupied) the level of transmigratory world, who has considered himself thus, viz. 'I belong to this world', who is (now or afterwards) seeking to be liberated (from transmigration), who has all his desires for the transmigratory world removed directly by a knower of truth, [519]

(such a man) should the preceptor (first) awaken by (using) sentences such as *ya ātmā*,¹ i.e. by the method of Anvaya and Vyatireka, (and then) by the sentence *tat tvam asi*² etc. [520]

These verses explain the preceptor's role in a person's effort to obtain liberation.

¹Cf. CU 8.8.1.

²Cf. CU 6.8.7ff.

सम्यग्ज्ञानाग्निसंप्लुष्टप्रत्यक्तत्त्वमहातमाः ।
हित्वा मोहोत्थमखिलं ब्रह्मैव ब्रह्म यात्यथ ॥५२१॥

प्रत्यक्तत्त्वतमोऽध्वंसव्यतिरेकेण मुक्तये ।
अपेक्षते यतो नान्यत्किञ्चित्साधनमण्वपि ॥५२२॥

This (individual), who has then his thick (lit. great) ignorance (lit. darkness) about the true nature of the inner self burnt (i.e. destroyed, or removed) by the fire of right knowledge, first gives up (or, abandons) what has arisen from ignorance and thus (knowing) only the Brahman, attains to (the status of) the Brahman immediately,¹ [521]
since, (for obtaining) liberation, he does not need (lit. depends on, or, waits for) any—even a (very) small—means whatever beside (lit. in addition to) the destruction of darkness (i.e. ignorance) about the true nature of the Brahman. [522]

¹Cf. SP states: *kāryāntaravāraṇam athaśabdārthaḥ*. See next verse.

जन्माद्यसंभवात्तस्माद्ब्रह्मबोधातिरेकतः ।
कार्यान्तरं न संभाव्यं व्यर्थं चापि भवेद्वचः ॥५२३॥

Then, on account of the impossibility of birth etc., consequent to it (*tasmāt*), there is not any possibility (or need) of (his doing) any other activity in addition to (his) knowledge of the Brahman (which he has already obtained); (otherwise) the utterance (of the Upaniṣad) would become futile.¹ [523]

¹Cf. *brahma veda brahmaiva bhavati* (Munḍakopaniṣad 3.2.9). NKL, however, points to *Gītā* 3.20: *karmaṇaiva hi saṃsiddhim āsthitā janakādayaḥ*.

Verses 524-530 state that the passage regarding creation etc. does not intend to point out the relation of a part and a whole between the individual selves and the Brahman.

अंशांशित्वादि चेत्साक्षाद्ब्रह्मज्ञाने विवक्षितम् ।
समुद्रादेरिव तदा नावक्ष्यच्छ्रुतिरादरात् ॥५२४॥

यदनभ्युदितं वाचा मनते मनसा न यत् ।
अपूर्वादि तथा वाक्यमपि सैन्धवखिल्यवत् ॥५२५॥

If it was intended to speak about the relation such as that of a part and a whole, as in the case of the ocean etc.;¹ then, in that case, the Śruti would not have respectfully stated:

[524]

‘That which is not expressed by speech’,¹ ‘that which it does not think with *manas*’;² in the same way, the sentence which begins with (the word) *apūrva*,³ and also (the simile) ‘like a lump of salt’.⁴

[525]

¹*Kenopaniṣad* 1.5.

²*Ibid.* 1.6.

³BU 2.5.19; see verse 237 note 3.

⁴BU 4.5.13.

नानात्वदृष्टिनिन्दां च मृत्योरिति तथा वचः ।
अंशांशित्वविवक्षायां न प्रायोक्ष्यत्तदेदृशम् ॥५२६॥

So also, it would not have employed such statements as purport to censure the seeing of multiplicity (of objects),¹ or the sentence ‘from death ...’² and others,³ having the intention to express the notion of a part and a whole.

[526]

¹BU 4.4.19; *Kenopaniṣad* 4.10 and 11.

²*Ibid.*

³BU 4.4.20; *Kenopaniṣad* 4. 11.

एकैकरूपैकात्म्यार्थधियो दाढर्यप्रसिद्धये ।
सृष्ट्यादिश्रुतयस्तस्मान्न तु तत्प्रत्ययाय ताः ॥५२७॥

The Śruti sentences regarding creation etc. are stated with a view to securing/establishing the strength (of arguments) about the knowledge of the single Ātman as one homogeneous unity; and (*tu*) not for (causing) belief in the same.

[527]

न चात्मनो निरंशस्य तथासंसारिणः स्वतः ।
 अंशिसंसारिभावत्वं न्यायेनाप्युपपद्यते ॥५२८॥
 कल्पितोपाधिहेतुश्चेदंशिसंसारिकल्पना ।
 काममस्तु न तादृक्षु धीराणां सत्यधीर्भवेत् ॥५२९॥

Not also does it stand to reason that the (highest) Ātman, which, by nature, is without any parts and also, in itself, non-transmigratory, can become possessed of parts and be transmigratory, on the basis of any illustrations. [528]

And this notion of being possessed of parts and transmigratory (in the case of the highest Ātman) has a cause in the imaginary limiting adjuncts (of it). Let that be there; the wise ones do not have a belief in these kinds of notions as true. [529]

These two verses point out that the relation of parts and a whole and having transmigratory existence also are purely imaginary, opposed to reason and the Śruti.

विवक्षितं चेदैकात्म्यं सर्वोपनिषदां भवेत् ।
 विज्ञानात्मादिसंभेदस्तद्विरुद्धः किमुच्यते ॥५३०॥

If all the Upaniṣad texts intended to declare the singleness of the Ātman, why then talk about the conglomeration of the individual selves etc.¹ which is opposed to it? [530]

¹The word etc. refers to the body, the organs and the several objects of them.

Verses 531-537 discuss if the discrete knowers of the field etc. are real in order that the Karmakāṇḍa portion of the Veda is to be considered as authoritative.

कर्मकाण्डप्रमाणत्वविरोधवस्तये किल ।
 विज्ञानात्मादिसंभेद इति केचित्प्रचक्षते ॥५३१॥

Some scholars¹ state that the conglomeration of the individual selves etc. is associated with the highest self and is accepted indeed for averting (lit. destroying) the opposition to the author-itativeness of the Karmakāṇḍa. [531]

This is an answer, as it were, to what is stated in the preceding verse as a question.

¹This refers to the dualists.

ऐकात्म्यमात्रे जगति समाप्तपुरुषार्थके ।
चोदनाप्रतिषेधौ वः स्यातां निर्विषयौ तदा ॥५३२॥

(This is a dualist's observation:) If this world were merely of the nature of just a single Ātman and also would have had achieved all the ends of man's life, then, in that case, the injunction(s) and prohibition(s) (in the portions of the Veda) would become for you without any purpose/scope. [532]

This is how the multiplicity of individual selves and the rituals involving worldly objects is justified. This is a direct address to the opponent(s).

स्वत एव विमुक्तत्वाद्धन्धाभावात्स्वतस्तथा ।
वेदान्तानां तथारम्भो निष्फलः संप्रसज्यते ॥५३३॥

Also, because the Ātman is by itself in the state of a liberated being and because there does not exist any bondage for it, in its own right, the activity or the beginning of all the Vedānta texts would become futile! [533]

This argument of the dualist goes to point to the futility of the Vedānta teaching as well.

इत्येवमादिचोद्यानि परिहाराश्च वर्णिताः ।
संबन्ध एव बहुशो विचारेषु च कीर्तिताः ॥५३४॥

This and such other objections and the answers to (lit. refutations of them) have been presented (lit. described) in the *Sambandha(vārtika)* itself and also mentioned (time and again) in different discussions. [534]

SP clarifies the meanings of the different words, viz. *iti*, *evam* and *ādi* but that was really not necessary. The relevant comment is: *prakārāntareṇa parihartum codyotthāpanam ity arthaḥ*. This is to indicate that repetition is avoided by adopting a different mode of refutation.

परस्परविरोधाच्च प्रकाशतमसोरिव ।
कर्मकाण्डोपनिषदोर्निष्प्रामाण्यं द्वयोरपि ॥५३५॥

And there is (in fact) unauthoritativeness of both the Karmakāṇḍa and the Upaniṣads (i.e. Jñānakāṇḍa) owing to their mutual opposition as (that of) light and darkness. [535]

In the first instance, Sureśvara here rejects the authoritativeness of both the Kāṇḍas, for each opposes the other.

सति यस्य प्रमाणत्वे प्रामाण्यं स्याद्द्वयोरपि ।
तस्यैव कर्मकाण्डस्य प्रामाण्यमवसीयताम् ॥५३६॥

Or, let it be decided that there is authoritativeness in the Karmakāṇḍa itself, which being authoritative, there will (automatically) follow the authoritativeness of both Kāṇḍas. [536]

The argument is: For the Karmakāṇḍa, there is need of the relationship of individuals as teachers and the taught. Such a relationship will be necessary in respect of Jñānakāṇḍa also and then it will also be authoritative likewise. Sureśvara takes up here another alternative. This verse takes for granted the authoritativeness of the Karmakāṇḍa and that would compulsorily invite the authoritativeness of Jñānakāṇḍa as well. Therefore,

the idea of only one being authoritative cannot be accepted.

SP, while introducing the following verse, states very succinctly the argument involved thus: *tarhi* (this is in view of verse 536) *karmakāṇḍavaj jñānakāṇḍasyāpi svārthe mānatvaṃ vācyaṃ na ca tadartho dvaitaṃ kāṇḍabhedābhāvaprasaṅgād upakramopasaṃhārādivirodhāc cāto jñānakāṇḍamānatvabalāt kāṇḍāntaraviśaya-dvaitabādhakam advaitaṃ eva punar āgatam iti.*

The purport of this verse is put by NKL very clearly thus: *jñānakāṇḍaprāmāṇyaṃ tvayaivānirākṛtam syāt.*

कर्मकाण्डप्रमाणत्वे प्रामाण्यं चेद्द्वयोरपि ।
सर्वग्रासि तदैकात्म्यमागादिह पुनर्बलात् ॥५३७॥

If there is thus, in accepting the authoritativeness of the Karmakāṇḍa, the (compulsory acceptance of) the authoritativeness of both, then there has followed here (i.e. in our discussion), with (full) force, the all-devouring singleness of the Ātman. [537]

Verses 538 and 539 state, in this context, a prima facie view: the Upaniṣads are then unauthoritative.

यद्येवमप्रमाणत्वमस्तुपनिषदां तदा ।
मानान्तरविरोधाच्च नैतासां मानतेष्यते ॥५३८॥

If this is so,¹ then let there be unauthoritativeness of the Upaniṣad texts; (for,) owing to the opposition of the other means of knowing² as well (*ca*), their authoritativeness is not accepted. [538]

This verse states what BUB states in *evaṃ tarhi* It can be taken to be the opinion of him who accepts that there are many individuals in reality.

¹SP clarifies this thus: *na caivam adhyayanavidhivirodho japārtham tadadhyayanasiddher iti matvā tāsām (=upaniṣadām) amānatvam.*

²These are direct perception (*pratyakṣa*) and inference (*anumāna*) (*upamāna* is included in the latter). Also the Karmakāṇḍa is (implied by *ca*).

अपि स्वार्थविधातं च करोत्युपनिषद्यतः ।

अप्रामाण्यमतस्तस्याः कर्मकाण्डस्य मानता ॥५३९॥

Also, because the Upaniṣad¹ disproves its own meaning as well; therefore, its unauthoritativeness follows and (further there follows only) authoritativeness of the Karmakāṇḍa (also). [539]

The purport of the argument is: The Upaniṣadic acceptance of such distinction as the teacher and the taught is against their own teaching of oneness (*advaita*).

Verses 540-587 establish the Siddhānta: the Upaniṣads are authoritative.

नोक्तोत्तरत्वात्साध्वेतद्भवता परिचोद्यते ।

व्यर्थतान्यार्थते नेह यथा तत्प्राक्प्रपञ्चितम् ॥५४०॥

(The Siddhāntin answers:) It is not that you have raised this objection well, since already it has been answered. Here (in respect of the Upaniṣads) there is neither futility nor subservience (to any system). How this is, is earlier discussed at length. [540]

ब्रह्मास्मीति धियो जन्मसमकाला विमुक्तता ।

यतोऽनुभूयते साक्षान्नानर्थक्यं भवेत्ततः ॥५४१॥

Since the state of liberation is directly experienced as occurring at the same time with the rise of the knowledge (*dhi*)¹ 'I am Brahman'; therefore, there is no meaninglessness (in the Upaniṣads). [541]

¹*dhiyo janmasamakālā* is an instance of Sureśvara's use of

sāpekṣā samāsa.

वस्तुमात्रावसायित्वं संबन्धे प्राक्प्रपञ्चितम् ।
यतोऽतो नोपनिषदामन्यार्थत्वं कथं चन ॥५४२॥

Since it is already discussed fully in the *Sambandha*(*vārtika*) that the final conclusion (of the Upaniṣads is that) there is (in reality) only the thing (viz. the Brahman), therefore, there is not at all any subservience of the Upaniṣads (to any system).

[542]

स्वप्रमेयप्रमोत्पत्त्यनुत्पत्त्येकहेतुके ।
प्रमाणत्वाप्रमाणत्वे नान्यथा ते प्रसिध्यतः ॥५४३॥

Giving rise to the correct knowledge of the object to be known by itself and not giving rise to the same are (really) the bases (of the means of knowing which have) the character of being authoritative and unauthoritative—if they are otherwise,¹ they are not accepted (lit. established as means).

[543]

¹That is, if they do not conform to what is already stated (in the earlier part of the verse).

किं चातो यदि नामैवं प्रकृतार्थोपयोगि यत् ।
शृण्वेकाग्रमनाः सर्वं यदेवं सति वस्तु तत् ॥५४४॥

(A question is asked:) 'If this is thus,¹ what (comes) from this, viz. which is useful in the matter in hand (or, for our purpose)?' (The answer is:) 'Listen, being attentive in mind, to all that which is the thing while this is so.

[544]

¹This refers to the purposeful means of knowing as explained in the preceding verse.

स्वप्रमेये प्रमां साक्षात्करोत्युपनिषद्यदि ।
अप्रामाण्यं कथं तस्याः कुतोऽतो मानतान्यथा ॥५४५॥

If, in respect of what is its object to be known, the Upaniṣad directly produces that (right) knowledge, then how could there be unauthoritativeness of it? where else than this could there be authoritativeness (as a means)? [545]

न चेत्करोत्युपनिषत्प्रमामित्यभिधीयते ।
प्रत्यक्षेण विरुद्धार्थं त्वदीयं वचनं भवेत् ॥५४६॥

If you were to say that the Upaniṣad does not produce right knowledge, then your (such) statement will have a meaning that is opposed to what is directly noticed. [546]

This verse presupposes the objector's view that the Upaniṣad does not produce knowledge.

नाग्निर्दहति काष्ठानि न तापयति भास्करः ।
इति यद्वत्तथोक्तस्ते प्रत्यक्षेण विरुद्ध्यते ॥५४७॥

Your statement is opposed by direct perception in the same way as (are the statements) 'Fire does not burn wood.' and 'The sun does not cause heat.' [547]

अग्निदाहादिवत्साक्षाद्वेदान्तज्ञानजं फलम् ।
संसारानर्थहानारूपं प्रत्यक्षमनुभूयते ॥५४८॥

The result of the knowledge produced by the Vedānta (i.e. Upaniṣad) is directly perceived like burning by fire; (the result) called as the losing of all the undesirable matters of transmigratory existence. [548]

विघ्नन्ति स्वार्थमित्युक्तं यच्च तच्चापि पेलवम् ।
यथा तदुच्यमानं त्वं यथावच्छ्रोतुमर्हसि ॥५४९॥

And what is said, viz. they (i.e. the Upaniṣads) destroy their own subject matter,¹ is also a weak (argument); how (that

is) is (now/hereafter) being told, you should hear that properly (yathāvat). [549]

¹This relates to the acceptance of the relations such as the teacher and the taught; the illustrations, narratives and so on.

स्वप्रमेयावबोधो हि मानानां स्वार्थ उच्यते ।
तं चेत्कुर्वन्ति वेदान्ताः कुतस्तेषाममानता ॥५५०॥

They call that indeed as the *svārtha* 'purpose' of the means of knowing, viz. what is making (one) know about what they present as the matter for knowing. (And) if the Vedāntas do that,¹ how can they be rejected as authoritative means? [550]

¹Namely, fulfil their purpose.

न च वेदान्तवाक्योत्थज्ञानस्येहास्ति बाधकम् ।
बाधकानामपि सतां प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यरूपतः ॥५५१॥

Not also is there here any stultifier of the knowledge arising from the Vedānta sentences; for, even in case there existed any stultifiers,¹ they would have been (in reality) the nature of the inner self. [551]

¹The stultifiers could only be the means of knowing such nature of the Vedānta sentences. But these also would have been nothing but the products of ignorance about the nature of the Ātman, i.e. they would have been falsely produced by the Ātman.

प्रमाणमप्रमाणं च प्रमाभासस्तथैव च ।
कुर्वन्त्येव प्रमां यत्र तदसंभावना कुतः ॥५५२॥

How could there be impossibility (of the existence) of those which cause right knowledge, viz. the authoritative means, the

non-authoritative means and also false knowledge?

[552]

This verse is identical with 1.4.874 and TUBV 2.619.

किमेकविषयत्वेन किंवा विषयभेदतः ।

विरोधः स्यात्प्रमाणानामित्येतदभिधीयताम् ॥५५३॥

Let this be told whether the opposition of the means of knowing (to the Upaniṣads) is on account of (just) the same object (as theirs) or their having different objects. [553]

मानान्तरेण संवादो यदि चेदनुवादिता ।

विरोधो न तु मानानां सदैकार्थसमागमे ॥५५४॥

If there is agreement of the Upaniṣads with the other means of knowing, call it their nature of being repetitive; and (*tu*) that would not be opposition to the other means of knowing, if they come together to convey one and the same object (to be known). [554]

This refers to the notion of mutual opposition between two means of knowing which have the same object to be known!

भिन्नप्रमेयतायां च श्रोत्रादीनां यथा तथा ।

परस्परानपेक्षत्वान्नितरामविरुद्धता ॥५५५॥

In the case that they have different objects to be known, they do not have any opposition (to the other means) in the same as the ears and others (which have different objects to be known) since they are mutually independent. [555]

This points to the acceptance of different means of knowing in relation to different objects to be known.

न चैकमेव सद्वाक्यं करोति न करोति च ।

प्रमां तत्प्रतिषेधं च कुर्वत्क्वचिदिहेष्यते ॥५५६॥

It is nowhere¹ accepted that just one sentence² causes and also does not cause (understanding of a meaning); and also causing right knowledge and its opposite as well. [556]

The argument relates to two opposite functions done by a single means of knowing, i.e. in respect of their operations and of the results as well.

¹This refers to 'no time' or 'no place'.

²Be it a Vedic or a popularly spoken sentence.

अग्निः शीतस्तथोष्णश्चेत्येवमाद्युक्तितो ननु ।
विरुद्धार्थावभासोऽयं जायमानः समीक्ष्यते ॥५५७॥

But (one might say:) 'From such expression as "fire is cool" and so also "it is hot", there is noticeable the conveying¹ of (two) opposite meanings!' [557]

This objection is based on popular experience of such meanings as are conveyed by sentences.

¹This is for *avabhāsa* not in the sense of *avamata* or *avasanna bhāsa*; it is for only *bhāsa*, i.e. *bodha*.

नैकस्मान्नापि च द्वाभ्यां विरुद्धार्थोऽवसीयते ।
अनूद्योक्त्येकदेशेन शीतोऽग्निरिति बोध्यते ॥५५८॥

Mutually contradicting meanings are not understood from (just) one sentence and also from two (different) sentences, for if there are two sentences, (then) by one part (of sentences which has parts of apparently two contradictory meanings) (of the composite utterance) there is repeated (what is conveyed by yet another sentence earlier) and there is conveyed (in another part) the sense 'fire is cool'. [558]

Note SP: *na cānuvādakabodhakabhāgayor virodho 'tulyabalatvād*

ity arthaḥ.

संभवत्येव शीतोऽग्निः प्रमाणान्तरगोचरः ।
मानान्तरविरोधोऽपि तथा च सति नेष्यते ॥५५९॥

Indeed, there does possibly exist cool fire,¹ (but) that is the object of another means of knowing;² and in case that is so, there is not understood thereby any opposition to (or, by) another means of knowing, at the same time.³ [559]

¹This refers to fire in the moon (this is poetically so!), fire in a cloud etc., cf. SP on verse 561 below.

²Here, there is reference to actually experienced hot fire.

³This is for *api*. SP states: *vidyamānārthatāvad ity aper arthaḥ*.

शीतवद्भा भवेच्छीतः शैत्यस्यानपहारतः ।
एवमप्यविरोधः स्यादस्य मानान्तरैरपि ॥५६०॥

Or 'cool fire' can be¹ 'like cool', owing to the non-removal of cool. (But), in thus saying also, there is (really) no opposition to this (sentence) by any other means of knowing. [560]

This verse keeps in view two parts of one sentence: 'fire is cool' and 'fire is hot' and also of the situation that both the meanings conveyed by the two parts are a matter of one direct experience; there is thus a difficulty. The answer relates to such a situation that fire is cool in winter (i.e. not as hot as at other time). Or, perhaps, it can be a simile 'some fire may be *like* cool fire'—in this case, a part of 'cool fire' is not opposed to one's direct experience. For, in similes, they accept *āhārya* 'imaginary' non-opposition.

¹Or, can be understood or purposely stated as.

शैशिरोऽग्निर्भवेच्छीतस्तथोष्णः पार्थिवो भवेत् ।
भिन्नार्थत्वावबोधित्वाद्वाक्ययोर्न विरुद्धता ॥५६१॥

Fire related to cool objects¹ is cool and (the usual) fire on earth is hot. Thus there cannot be opposition between the two sentences, since they convey two different meanings (i.e. states of, or for, a thing, here 'fire'). [561]

This is to clarify further verse 559 above.

¹These are, for example, the moon, the cloud (having lightning in it). Cf. NKL: *vidyuccandrādīdivyāgniḥ śaiśira ucyate*.

ऐकार्थ्ये न विरोधोऽस्ति द्वयर्थत्वेऽपि न माश्रयात् ।
मानान्तराच्च नैवास्ति मान्तराविषयत्वतः ॥५६२॥

If thus a sentence has only one meaning to convey or two meanings also, there is no opposition (to that being so), inasmuch as they resort to (right) knowledge; and, because there is another means of knowing, there is no (question of there being) any other object of right knowledge. [562]

अभ्युपेत्यैतददितं न तु वाक्यविदां नयः ।
यदनेकार्थबोधित्वमेकस्य वचसः सतः ॥५६३॥

This¹ is said (only) after granting (the objector's view),² but such is not the way³ of those who know (the science of) sentences),⁴ viz. that there is one sentence and that it has more senses than one. [563]

¹The word *etad* refers to the second part of the first line in the preceding verse.

²Namely, one sentence can have two meanings—this is an acceptance for argument's sake.

³That is, guiding principle.

⁴The Mīmāṃsakas are meant.

अर्थैकत्वादिति तथा वाक्यलक्षणमुच्यते ।
अनेकार्थावबोधित्वे न स्याल्लक्षणवद्वचः ॥५६४॥

That is to say:¹ The definition of a sentence given (by the Mīmāṃsakas) is that it has only one meaning.² In case a sentence conveys more meanings than one, the utterance (of it) does not conform to the definition (of a sentence).³ [564]

¹This is for *tathā*.

²Cf. *Pūrvamīmāṃsāsūtra* 2.1.46: *arthaikatvād ekaṃ vākyaṃ (sākāṅkṣaṃ ced vibhāge syāt)*.

³That is, it would not be one sentence, according to the definition.

एकमेव यदा वाक्यं कृत्स्नो वेदोऽभ्युपेयते ।
वाक्यान्तरासंभवतस्तदा केन विरुद्धता ॥५६५॥

When it is accepted that the entire Veda (is just one sentence), then, there being no possibility of the occurrence of any other sentence, to what (other sentence) the sentence under question would be contradictory? [565]

This verse presupposes the objector's question, 'if the entire Veda is accepted as one sentence—cf. the concept of Mahāvākya (not the Vedāntic; but that in Poetics)—or, it is made of many sentences' and answers the first alternative.

वाक्यद्वयं चेदथवा सिद्धसाध्यार्थभेदतः ।
तदापि न विरोधोऽत्र विभिन्नार्थावबोधिनाः ॥५६६॥

Or, it (i.e. the Veda) can be considered as two sentences owing to the difference (in respect of their meanings, viz.) what is already existent and what is yet to be effected.¹ Even in that case, there is no (mutual) contradiction, since they inform one about two different things (each different from the other).² [566]

¹The existent is *siddha*— it is the Brahman which has been existent even before the other thing, viz. Dharma, which is to

be effected or accomplished (*sādhya*).

²In both these cases, each sentence is *ajñātārthajñāpaka* 'informative of a thing which has not been known before'.

नापि स्वार्थं परार्थं वा विहन्त्युपनिषत्त्वचित् ।
कथं चेदुच्यमानं तच्छृण्वेकाग्रमना यथा ॥५६७॥

Also it is (a fact) that nowhere does an Upaniṣad contradict its own meaning¹ or the meaning of any other (means of knowing). (If you ask) 'How is it so?', listen to what is being told, with an attentive mind. [567]

¹This is either the subject matter or the result accruing from it.

सर्वमात्मेति चेत्कुर्यात्प्रमेयविषयां प्रमाम् ।
विहन्त्युपनिषत्स्वार्थमिति निर्लज्जगीरियम् ॥५६८॥

Since (lit. if) the Upaniṣad causes the right knowledge about the object to be known by it, viz. all is the Ātman, then it is only a shameless talk to say that the Upaniṣad contradicts its own meaning. [568]

निःशेषपुरुषार्थमिति सर्वानर्थात्ययः सदा ।
वेदान्तज्ञानतश्चेत्स्यात्स्वार्थोऽतोऽन्यः क इष्यते ॥५६९॥

If there would ever result from the knowledge conveyed by the Upaniṣad that the securing all the ends of life (or, *puruṣa*) in their entirety and also the awareness of all undesirables (in the transmigratory world); then what other thing than all this is expected to be its meaning? [569]

निषेधति विधत्ते वा न चाप्युपनिषत्क्रियाम् ।
प्रत्यक्तत्त्वैकसंबोधे तद्वाक्योपक्षयत्वतः ॥५७०॥

The Upaniṣad does not either prescribe or prohibit any activity,

since its sentences come to an end¹ only in giving the (rise to the knowledge of the nature of the inner self. [570]

¹Or literally, come to be exhausted.

न चापि कर्मकाण्डोक्तिः स्वार्थे न कुरुते प्रमाम् ।
स्वार्थे च सा प्रमां कुर्वत्यमानं कथमुच्यते ॥५७१॥

It is not also that the sentence in the Karmakāṇḍa does not produce right knowledge about the object of its knowing; how could it be said that it is not an authoritative means of knowing, produce as it does right knowledge about the object of its knowing? [571]

The argument is that the Karmakāṇḍa sentences are also meaningful so far as their own subject matter is concerned. That the Upaniṣadic sentences convey the knowledge of the Brahman should not be taken to mean that the Karmakāṇḍa sentences do not convey their meaning.

प्रात्यक्ष्याच्च प्रमोत्पत्तेर्ज्योतिष्टोमादिवाक्यतः ।
प्रमैवोत्पद्यते नेति वक्तुमेतन्न शक्यते ॥५७२॥

And it is a matter of direct knowledge that there arises from the sentences such as those about the Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice right knowledge (about them). It is (therefore) not possible to say this, viz. there does not arise (from them any) right knowledge at all. [572]

विषयापहृतेर्नो चेद्वेदान्तोक्त्या प्रमोत्तिथिः ।
न प्रत्यक्षबलीयस्त्वादनुमानप्रबोधतः ॥५७३॥

(If it is said that), since the Vedānta sentences disprove the meaning (of the Karmakāṇḍa sentences), there is no rise of right knowledge (from them, i.e. these latter); it is not so (to be understood) because the direct perceptibility (of the

knowledge from them) is stronger than what is understood (by you) from inference. [573]

यथासिद्धान्युपादाय कामद्वेषवशानुगः ।
 इष्टमेव सदा मे स्यान्मा भूच्चानिष्टमण्वपि ॥५७४॥
 साधनानीष्टलाभार्थमनिष्टार्थापनुत्तये ।
 आचक्षाणा श्रुतिः पुंसो नान्यार्थं वक्ति कंचन ॥५७५॥

“Having taken up (the things that are) already made, (a person) who acts under the sway of desire and hatred (or, dislike), (who thinks to himself) ‘let there always be for me only (what) I have desired and let not there be even a little undesired (or, undesirable thing)’ [574]

(should acquire) the means for securing what is desired and for warding away (every) undesirable”—thus saying, the Śruti¹ does not state for a man any other thing. [575]

¹This is the Karmakāṇḍa portion of the Veda.

यथा काम्याग्निहोत्रादौ साध्यसाधनसंगतिम् ।
 विदधन्नानृतत्वादि कामानां वक्ति कुत्रचित् ॥५७६॥

As, while the Karmakāṇḍa prescribes the connection between what is to be accomplished and what accomplishes (the same) in regard to the *kāmya* ‘desired’ (rituals) and Agnihotra etc., it does not anywhere speak of the truth (i.e. being true) of the desires. [576]

The argument seems to be this. The Karmakāṇḍa merely mentions the *sādhya-sādhana-sambandha* in the case of both the compulsory Agnihotra ritual and the *kāmya* rituals; yet it does not mention them as true (in the same sense as the Brahman is true).

न चापि न प्रवर्तन्ते पुरुषाः काम्यकर्मसु ।
 यतोऽतत्त्वविदां कामो न कदाचिन्निवर्तते ॥५७७॥

It is not that men do not enter upon (the performance of) *kāmya* rituals also,¹ since, in the case of those who are not conversant with (or, aware of) the Truth, desire never satiates.

[577]

¹The word 'also' indicates the performance of compulsory Agnihotra etc.; men do perform these, but they enter on the *kāmya* rituals as well.

अकामतः क्रिया काचिद्दृश्यते नेह कस्यचित् ।
यद्यद्वि कुरुते किञ्चित्तत्तत्कामस्य चेष्टितम् ॥५७८॥

In this world (*iha*) there is nowhere noticed any activity which is (done) without any desire. For, whatever a man does, is all of it the effect (lit. doing) of desire.

[578]

This is identical with BUBV 1.4.1816. We have changed *kasyacit* which is already shown by AnSS edition as a variant reading. Also, cp. BUBV 4.4.223. Cf. *Manusmṛti* 2.4 where the first line ends in *neha karhicit*.

स यथाकाम इत्यादिरेषोऽर्थश्च सविस्तरः ।
वक्ष्यतेऽकामयमानश्च तथाकुर्वन्विमुच्यते ॥५७९॥

This matter will be stated in its (full) length in *sa yathākāmaḥ* ...;¹ and a person, who does not entertain (any) desire,² does not perform³ (any ritual activity) and gets liberated.

[579]

¹Cf. BU 4.4.5.

²Cf. BU 4.4.6: *athākāmayamānaḥ yō 'kāmo niṣkāma āptakāmo na tasya prāṇā utkrāmanti brahmaiva san brahmāpyeti*.

³SP and NKL point to the dissolution of the Saṃdhi *tathā akurvan*.

सर्वाधिकारप्रध्वंसात् कृत्स्नात्मावबोधिनः ।

प्रवृत्तौ वा निवृत्तौ वा गुणभावः सदेष्ट्यते ॥५८०॥

Since in the case of one, who has the knowledge that all is the Ātman, there are all (kinds of) eligibility¹ (for ritual performance) destroyed, there is ever accepted, in regard to inclination and disinclination, the eligibility to act.² [580]

¹*adhikāra* is explained by SP and NKL as *vidhipuruṣa-sambandhādih*.

²This is for *guṇabhāvaḥ* paraphrased in SP and NKL as *karṭṛtva*.

अतो निर्विषयत्वादि ब्रह्मैकत्वाद्यदीरितम् ।
तत्सर्वं परिहृतं ज्ञेयं यथोक्तेनैव वर्त्मना ॥५८१॥

Therefore, (all that was said about the Upaniṣad as) having no object (to state about ritual activity) etc. and (as merely declaring) the singleness etc. of the Brahman is to be known as refuted, in the very way stated. [581]

Read in this context the note of the editor of NKL: *ajñasyāviraktasya karmaṇi pravṛttiḥ. sādhyasādhana-sambandha-bodhakatvena karmakāṇḍaprāmāṇyam. ... na virodhaḥ upaniṣadām ityuktamārgenetyarthaḥ.*

न निवर्तयितुं शक्तं रागाद्याकृष्टचेतसः ।
शास्त्रं विरक्तचित्तान्वा न प्रवर्तयितुं क्षमम् ॥५८२॥

The Śāstra (viz. Karmakāṇḍa) is not useful (lit. not able) to ward away those minds which are attracted by longing etc., nor is it capable of inducing those whose minds are averse (to worldly life). [582]

Read, in this context, the note of the editor of NKL: *ajñasyāviraktasya karmaṇi pravṛttiḥ/ sādhyasādhana-sambandha-bodhakatvena karmakāṇḍaprāmāṇyam/*

karmatatphalādīnāṃ satyatve udāgīnaṃ karmakāṇḍam/ tena na virodhaḥ upaniṣadām ityuktamārgenety arthaḥ/

इष्टानिष्टफलानीति साधनानि प्रकाशयेत् ।
न निवृत्तिं प्रवृत्तिं वा पुंसः शास्त्रं करोति तत् ॥५८३॥

(Therefore) the Śāstra¹ should reveal² the nature of those activities which yield either desired or undesired results. That the Śāstra does not promote man's activity or ward him from activity. [583]

¹This again refers to the Karmakāṇḍa.

²The words 'should reveal' is *really* for 'reveals', cf. verse 585 below.

अपि शास्त्रं समुल्लङ्घ्य रागादिबलवत्तया ।
प्रवर्तमानाः पुरुषा दृश्यन्तेऽद्यापि कामिनः ॥५८४॥

Also, even now are noticed men, having desires, to overlook (lit. go beyond the limits of) the Śāstra, owing to the strong longing etc. [584]

साध्यसाधनसंबन्धानिष्टानिष्टफलोदयान् ।
शास्त्रं त्वादित्यवत्साक्षात्प्रकाशयति तान्सदा ॥५८५॥

(Actually), the Śāstra ever reveals to them about the connections between various objects to be achieved and the means to achieve them and also about the rise of the desired and the undesired results, so directly as the sun (reveals different objects). [585]

तेषु शास्त्रैकदीपेषु साध्यसाधनवर्त्मसु ।
यथार्चि प्रवर्तन्ते पुरुषा न तु शास्त्रतः ॥५८६॥

But men turn to these paths of *sādhyā-sādhana*s which are for them the only lamp in the form of the Śāstra, only at

their liking and not in accord with the Śāstra.

[586]

विधिशास्त्रस्य नैवातो वेदान्ता बाधकाः सदा ।
न च निर्विषयं तत्स्यान्मेयभेदात्त्वगादिवत् ॥५८७॥

As such, the Vedānta (texts) are never the stultifiers of the Śāstra of injunctions. And that¹ should not be considered as having no objects (for them to talk about) only owing to the difference in respect of the objects to be known (from them), like the skin etc. (of a living being).² [587]

¹This should mean: the two Kāṇḍas together.

²The simile is not explained by both SP and NKL. It is somewhat unclear. I suggest: the skin etc. have various kinds of objects—even mutually opposed in nature—to touch etc. They remain the same and yet function in their particular ways. So do the two Kāṇḍas of the Veda.

Verses 588-591 state the view of the Tārkikas 'logicians' who are opposed to the Vedānta.

केचित्तु पण्डितमन्या विरोधीनि परस्परम् ।
संभावयन्ति मानानि सर्वाण्यैकात्म्यवस्तुनि ॥५८८॥

But there are some, who regard themselves as learned men, and look upon all the mutually opposed¹ means of knowing 'as opposed'¹ in respect of (the view that there is) (only) singleness of the Ātman. [588]

¹In this verse, the word *virodhīni* is to be read twice: First as *parasparam viruddhāni* with reference to the means acceptable to the Tārkikas, this is expressed (*vācya*); then as *viruddhāni aikātmavastuni* (locative singular indicating the *adhikaraṇa* 'object' of *viruddhāni*).

श्रोत्रादिभिर्यतो भिन्ना मिथः शब्दादयस्त्वमी ।

मीयन्ते सर्वमात्मेति प्रत्यक्षेण विरुध्यते ॥५८९॥

Since these mutually differing words etc. are known by the ears etc., in a similar way, (the proposition:) 'All is the Ātman.' is opposed by direct perception. [589]

The verse states the mutual opposition among the various means of knowing as an example for showing the opposition of direct perception to the statement regarding *brahmaikya*.

शब्दाद्यर्थोपलब्धारः कर्तारश्च पृथक्पृथक् ।
यस्मादिहानुमीयन्ते तस्माल्लिङ्गविरोधिता ॥५९०॥

Since the agents who know the objects such as a word are inferred here¹ to be different from one another; therefore, there is opposition (in respect of) inferences² (about singleness of the Brahman). [590]

¹The word *iha* refers to the body.

²*linga* means *anumāna*. This opposition of inference to the Vedāntic proposition is stated in BUB thus: *śrotrādibhiḥ śabdādyupalabdharāḥ kartāraś ca dharmādharmayoḥ pratiśarīraṃ bhinnā anumūyante saṃsāriṇaḥ, tatra brahmaikatvam bruvatām anumānavirodhaḥ*. Also see SP: *svadehasamavetaceṣṭātulyaceṣṭā dehāntareṣu drṣṭā sā yatnavatpūrvā viśiṣṭaceṣṭātvāt sammatavad ity anumānaviruddham aikyaśāstram iti bhāvaḥ*.

तथागमविरोधं च ग्रामकामादिभेदतः ।
उद्भासयन्ति संहृष्टा ब्रह्मैकत्वप्रदूषकाः ॥५९१॥

In the same way, those, who find fault with (the theory of) the singleness of the Brahman, (and feel) very delighted (at heart),¹ highlight (the argument of) the opposition of the Śruti texts on account of their having differences as regards desire for a village etc. [591]

The Śrutis which are adduced by the Tārkikas in support of their opposition to the Vedānta theory are: *grāmakāmo yajeta*, *paśukāmo yajeta*, *svargakāmo yajeta* etc. These presuppose many individuals who are possessed of many desires and are later sacrificers. But the Vedānta theory would not allow such multiplicity of them, recognised by the Śruti texts. This should point to the opposition they mention.

¹The delight is caused by their being able to point out contradictory Śrutis and, in general, every other kind of contradiction.

Verses 592 onwards to the end, i.e. verse 611, present the Vedāntin's refutation of the argument of the Tārkikas.

ब्रह्मैकत्वविरोधो वः कथं भिन्नार्थबुद्धिभिः ।
इति ब्रह्मविदोपेत्य प्रष्टव्या भेदवादिनः ॥५९२॥

The knower of the Brahman(-theory) should approach the dualists and ask them, 'How is (this) your opposition to the singleness of the Brahman (held/explained by you) who hold duality (in the world)?' ¹ [592]

¹This, I think, can be clarified by BUB thus: *śarīrendriyamana-ātmasu pratyekaṃ anumānakauśalapratyākhyāne śarīrendriya-manahsādhana ātmāna vayam ...* (of course, Śaṅkara has used this for scoffing at them!).

किं भोः शब्दादिभेदेन खस्यैकत्वं विरुध्यते ।
न चेद्विरुध्यतेऽथोच्चैर्विरोधः किमितीर्यते ॥५९३॥

Please tell us, O men, if the oneness of the sky is contradicted by difference(s) in words (which are used to signify the same). If it is not (contradicted), then why is it loudly said that there is contradiction (to the Vedānta proposition)? [593]

The argument of the Vedāntin is thus explained by SP: *yathā*

sarvabhūtastham ekam ākāśam ity ukter na śabdādibhēdagrāhi-pratyakṣādivirodho 'bhinnaviṣayatvāt tathā sarvabhūtastham ekam brahma ity ukter api na tatpratyakṣeṇa virodhaḥ.

सत्परिच्छेदकैर्नापि प्रत्यक्षाद्यैर्ग्रहो भवेत् ।
व्यावृत्तेरन्यतोभावमात्रायाः केनचित्क्वचित् ॥५९४॥

The means of knowing, viz. direct perception and others, which have only the existent (objects) as their (objects of knowing), cannot, any one of them and/or anywhere, grasp *vyāvṛtti* 'exclusion' which consists merely in the absence of any other (object). [594]

This argument is based on the Tārkikas' opposition to non-duality of the Brahman. Since non-duality is not an existent object, the Vedāntin contends, the Tārkikas' means of knowing cannot grasp and oppose the same.

द्वैतग्राहि यथा मानं न किञ्चिदपि विद्यते ।
तथोदर्के प्रवक्ष्यामि नातो मानविरोधिता ॥५९५॥

Since there does not (or, cannot) exist a means of knowing which can grasp duality¹—I shall discuss this later² (again)—for this reason also, there is no opposition by every means of knowing (to the Vedāntin's theory of the singleness of the Brahman). [595]

¹This is to state that the notion of duality, entertained by the Tārkikas, is already refuted in SV.

²This refers to BU 5.1 beginning with the Mantra *pūrṇam adah.*

यच्चोक्तमनुमीयन्ते प्रतिदेहं पृथग्विधाः ।
शब्दाद्यर्थोपलब्धारः कर्तारश्चापि कर्मणाम् ॥५९६॥

Now regarding the statement: 'There are inferred to be

different knowers, one in each body, of the objects such as words and also the agents of (various) activities.' [596]

भिन्नाः कैरनुमीयन्त इति पृष्टो वदेद्यदि ।
अस्माभिलिङ्गकुशलैरित्येतच्च न युक्तिमत् ॥५९७॥

If (the Tārkikas is) thus questioned: 'By whom are these different (agents of varied activities) inferred?', and then he replies, 'By us, who are adepts in the act of inferring'; then (we have to say) 'This (answer) is not (supported) with reason.' [597]

This last observation of the Vedāntin, i.e. 'The (answer) ... reason', is explained in the following verse.

अनन्यमानमेयेऽर्थे न भेदः प्रत्यगात्मनि ।
पराङ्मानप्रमेयाश्च नात्मानः स्तम्भकुम्भवत् ॥५९८॥

In the case of the inner self, which is a thing not to be known by any other knower or means of knowing, there is no discrete object (other than that can be pointed out).¹ And the Ātmans (i.e. inner selves) are not, like pillars or pitchers, to be known by the means of knowing that are outside (them).² [598]

¹This argument is put forth with a view to rejecting the inner self's being known as an object, since it is *svaprakāśa* 'self-illuminating'.

²In this part of the verse it is pointed out that the inner self, if taken as what can be perceived like a pillar etc. (i.e. *dr̥śya*), would cease to be the Ātman—it will be only non-Ātman—and thus non-existent (*asiddha*).

अनुमाकुशला ययं क इत्येतद्विभाष्यताम् ॥५९९॥
देहेन्द्रियमनोबुद्धिक्षेत्रज्ञेषु पृथक्पृथक् ।
नानुमाकौशलं तावत्प्रत्येकं तेषु विद्यते ॥६००॥
देहादिसाधनास्तस्माद्वयमात्मान एव हि ।

भूरिसाधनसाध्यत्वात्क्रियाणां नो विभिन्नता ॥६०१॥

Now, let it be explained as to who you are—you, who are adepts in the act of inferring.¹ [599]

To begin with, there does not obtain adeptness in the act of inferring in each of the body, the organ,² *manas*, intellect and the knower of the field, taken severally. [600]

(Then the Tārkikas would say:) 'Therefore, we are the very Ātmans (i.e. the individual selves), possessed of the body and others as the means (of the act of inferring) and there will be difference in our actions (of inferring) on account of their being accompanied by many (*bhūri*) means (of activity).' [601]

¹This is reference to verse 597 above. In verb root *vi-bhāṣ*, the preposition does not modify the meaning of root in any way.

²This is *jātāv ekavacanam*; it means the organs.

भूरिसाधनसाध्यत्वात्क्रियाणामिति चेद्वेत् ।
हेतुस्तवाप्यनेकत्वमेकस्यापि प्रसज्यते ॥६०२॥

If (you state as) the cause of the difference in actions as their being accomplished by many means of activity, then there will be the contingency that even a single inner self in (each one of) you (Tārkikas) will be many (inner selves). [602]

आत्मादीनां क्रियास्तित्वात्प्रत्येकं कारकत्वतः ।
अग्न्यादीनामिव तत आत्मानेकत्वमापतेत् ॥६०३॥

In the case of the Ātman (i.e. the inner self) and others, there will be action (performed by each), since each one of them is a *kāraka* 'instrumentally connected with the verb root, i.e. an agent (here)' (in the activity implied by it); therefore, as in the case of fire and others (there is maniness), there will (inevitably) follow maniness in the case of the Ātman (as well). [603]

This has reference to *avāntaravyāpāras*, i.e. some other functions, which also are conveyed by each of the *kāraṅkas*. This results into multiplicity of effects, viz. the main effect, together with some side-effects.

अनुमापि क्रिया साक्षाद्भवतैवाभ्युपेयते ।
शरीरेन्द्रियबुद्ध्यादेः प्रत्येकं स्यादनेकता ॥६०४॥

Inferring also is an action—so you yourself (*sākṣād bhavatā*) have accepted—therefore, in the case of each of the body, the organ, intellect etc.,¹ there will be maniness. [604]

¹The word etc. refers to *manas* and the *Ātman* (i.e. the inner self).

बहुसाधनसाध्यत्वात्क्रियाणामितिहेतुतः ।
एवंलक्षणहेतूक्तिर्मौख्यलिङ्गं भवेदतः ॥६०५॥

Therefore, adducing a cause of this kind, viz. owing to the difference in actions on account of their being accompanied by many means (of activity), will (only) be an indication of your foolishness. [605]

गुणक्रियाणां सर्वासां कर्तृमात्रव्यपाश्रयात् ।
अनैकान्तिकता हेतोस्तथा वः संप्रसज्यते ॥६०६॥

Since all of the subordinate actions have only the agent as the support; therefore, the cause (which you have cited) will have a contingency, viz. it will (have a fault called) *anaikāntika* 'leading to more than one conclusion'. [606]

अपक्षधर्मता हेतोर्नामरूपाश्रयत्वतः ।
धर्माभावात्प्रतीचश्च तद्भेदे हेतुता कुतः ॥६०७॥

Also the cause (*hetu* which you have cited) can be a property of the *pakṣa* 'subject under doubt', since it can have a support

(only) in name and form. But (*ca*) the inner self does not have any property and, therefore, how can there be any cause of distinguishing it (from others)? [607]

ऐकात्म्यवन्तो देहाः स्युर्विवादो येषु वर्तते ।
शरीरत्वाविशेषत्वात्प्रतिवादिशरीरवत् ॥६०८॥

(And, therefore,) there will be bodies having only one Ātman (within them)—and you have a difference of opinion about them!—and they will be, like the body of (any of their) opponents, having bodies which cannot be distinguished. [608]

तथेन्द्रियमनोबुद्धिविषयेष्वपि योजयेत् ।
ऐकात्म्यं सर्वभूतेषु प्रात्यक्ष्याच्चात्मनस्तथा ॥६०९॥

One should apply this (reasoning) in respect of the organs, *manas* and intellect as well; then (you would realise) oneness of the Ātman in all beings on account of its being directly experienced (by you). [609]

आत्मप्रत्यय एकात्मा सर्वदेहेषु सर्वदा ।
नानात्मवदनेकत्वं कश्चिदात्मनि वीक्षते ॥६१०॥

In all the bodies (then), there is ever (only) one Ātman; (indeed) no one experiences (lit. sees), in the Ātman, plurality (or maniness) as in the case of non-Ātmans. [610]

अनुमानादनेकत्वमात्मनो ये प्रचक्षते ।
तेषां प्रत्यक्षमानेन बाधो लिङ्गधियो भवेत् ॥६११॥

(Therefore,) for those who postulate, on the basis of inference, plurality (or, maniness) in the case of the Ātman, there would be opposition of the direct means of knowing (*viz.* experience) to the (or, their) knowledge derived by inference. [611]